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Introduction
I get up and turn on my phone, remembering a message I received from 
Babak1 yesterday. “Sorry, I have to work this weekend and I won’t be able 
to be with you [at the festival].” This is strange, I think. I know he some-
times works on the weekend. Babak is an artist in his early forties. But 
Milad, our common friend, told me that they were hanging out together 
yesterday evening. There must be some other reason why he won’t come. 
It’s the same for Milad, who did not follow up on my invitation, either. 
It’s a sunny Saturday in June 2013. Yesterday, I worked late: I am volun-
teering to help Behruz, a 27-year-old German-born man of Iranian ori-
gin, a student, organize the Iran-centered Color festival at Hochsieben, 
one of Hamburg’s most important avant-garde art venues.
When the 120 guests left after the ethnic (mahali) and traditional (son-
nati) music concert yesterday, I heard a German technician ask Ziba 
“[Here lives] Europe’s biggest Iranian community  – where were they 
tonight?” The cultural organizer in her mid-forties answered “Well, 
Behruz’s aim was to attract a German public and he succeeded in doing 
so […]. If Iranians have to choose between several similar concerts, they 
1 All names of interlocutors, associations, and events, in some cases also personal data, were changed 
in respect of their privacy and personal security.
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will come to see Taghi tomorrow” (field notes June 2013). Taghi is a 
famous classical Iranian music singer based in Iran. In our last reunion, 
Behruz said that he expects violent contestation at the festival in response 
to  Taghi’s political position-taking in the recent Iranian presidential 
elections.
My phone beeps. Yara writes that she is free today and asks if we need 
help. Apparently, Behruz doesn’t pick up the phone. Yara, an educator in 
her early thirties, has not been actively involved in the organization of 
this festival for months. Plus, as a member of the association Golestan, 
she is organizing a festival of young Iranian fusion music in only five 
months. Why does she want to help all of a sudden? I forward her quest 
to Behruz, who displays professionalism: “No, thanks, everything is 
under control.” He obviously does not want her support.
At the festival venue, the hall with the photo exhibition of Iranian 
landscapes fills indeed with a different kind of public than last night. 
Ziba was right! There are more than twice as many visitors as yesterday, 
most of them of Iranian origin. I spot her in the crowd and am struck by 
her feminine elegance. With her red sheath dress, she wears a black hat. 
The day before, she was dressed much more casually, in correspondence 
to Hamburg’s notorious understatement. “I told you, yesterday was for 
students, today is the real day”, she beams and takes a thousand pictures 
with all the people she knows. In our interview, she told me that she often 
feels suffocated within what she calls “the Iranian community”. Is she try-
ing to challenge limitations through her slinky dress?
More and more people arrive and mingle. I greet merchants, artists, 
students, and political activists I know, members of the cultural associa-
tion Golestan, people I met on the street when we promoted the festival, 
visitors I never met before, and my own extended family members who I 
invited. Two young men ask me for my number; a mother presents me to 
her son. Is the festival a dating market? My relative feels uncomfortable 
and says that there are many of her pharmacist colleagues. She obviously 
came to do me a favor.
Suddenly, I hear someone calling me by my family name “Miss 
Moghaddari!” Yara rushes toward me, energetic as ever and casually 
dressed in trousers and pullover. She presents me to her two female 
friends, like herself in their early thirties. One of them makes a  compliment 
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for the Color festival t-shirt I am wearing: it bears the event’s slogan writ-
ten in minimalist white letters on a royal blue background. Yara, how-
ever, contests: “I don’t like it.” Later she comes back to show me the 
t-shirts of the competing FusIran festival, explaining “I just received them 
today.” They bear the festival’s name in an elaborate font that resembles 
Persian letters printed in two colors on a dark blue background. “What a 
funny coincidence”, I think.
I catch Behruz at a moment of calm, between distributing flyers and 
preparing tea. “So how do you think the concert went yesterday?” “It was 
good but there were less people than I hoped. However, I really did not 
like when Hassan stepped on stage to dance. He didn’t even have a ticket 
as far as I know” (field notes June 2013). The Iranian man in his sixties 
improvised Iranian dancing during the last song. Hassan is a modest per-
son and I know him because he distributes flyers and promotions at every 
Iranian event in town. The public clapped hands to accompany him. 
Why did Behruz see this joyous performance as a problem, I wonder? 
Well, at least, there was no sign of a fight, so far.
Offering black tea, cooked in a samovar, on donation is one of my 
tasks. A woman in her forties, dressed in a feminine way with high-heeled 
shoes and her long black hair down, asks me to serve her two cups. She is 
accompanied by a man and a young blond boy, possibly her German 
partner and son. “It is Persian tea, isn’t it?” “No, it’s Turkish tea.” I show 
her the package. “Oh, then I’ll get just one for my son. This one is too 
strong. I always drink Persian tea, it’s milder.” Another woman, a stranger 
of about the same age, who is dressed more casually and also accompa-
nied by her family, intervenes, “What’s the matter? This tea is good!”
Nazanin arrives with her sister and German husband, dressed in a 
summerly skirt and high-heeled espadrilles. The 62-year-old, whose 
father was a professor of Iranian Studies in Germany, seems to enjoy the 
socializing at the festival. “Thanks for offering me the ticket although I 
dropped out early [from volunteering in the festival organization]. By the 
way, I tell you this in private, at Hochsieben they made fun of Behruz. He 
wanted to organize a big event and usually they do not collaborate with 
newcomers. But my friend Anna made a case for him and I am happy it 
worked out” (field notes June 2013). Does her getting demotivated from 
volunteering have something to do with Behruz’ image at Hochsieben?
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The doors to the concert hall are already closed and Behruz is nervous: 
some people on the guest list have not yet arrived. Is it an accident that 
the man who at last hurries in with his family—and thus evades the pre- 
concert sociability—is the representant of the local Iranian-run Imam Ali 
mosque? For the encore, the public requests a song called “Vatanam” (My 
home country). For just a few minutes, across all differences, the public 
seems to be moved, in good or in bad, by this first (but not the current) 
sweepingly emotional Iranian national anthem. It represents a pause from 
the atmosphere of antagonism that is at the heart of the interactions on 
this day at the festival.
This set of individual encounters highlight the diversity of positionali-
ties Hamburg-based people identifying (at least partly) as Iranians2 
(Iraner) take in relations to one another, here in the context of this Iranian 
cultural event. The encounters reflect, following Pierre Bourdieu’s 
approach to the study of power and inequality, subjacent micro- 
negotiations over the criteria by which agents evaluate each other’s ideas, 
objects, and practices (Bourdieu 1979). They appear as practices of social 
differentiation. A struggle is the essential feature of a social field (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992). It is in the context of such systems of relations that 
individual encounters take all their meaning. How do agents weigh 
between attendance and abstinence, choose their clothing and behavior 
at the event, and evaluate that of others? Considering that agents are 
migrants,3 which local and transnational social relations play a role in 
their decision? How do they evaluate the influence it will have on them? 
In other words, how do dynamics in different local and transnational 
social fields, and their prevalent systems of evaluation—hence, of 
value—interrelate?
People constructed as a cultural or racial Other form an integrate part 
of today’s Western societies. While migration studies shed light on many 
2 I use this emic appellation throughout the book. Importantly, it does not discriminate between 
people who migrated themselves and those who were born in Germany. It will become clear by the 
conclusion why the title bears the notion of Iranian-Germans, instead.
3 For reasons of readability, I will use this term throughout the book. It also corresponds to the way 
people with non-German identifications tend to be constructed in German society, namely as 
migrants or foreigners (Ausländer). However, numerous interlocutors in this study, in particular 
those who could be considered second-generation migrants, did not migrate themselves and the 
Iranian is only one among several national identifications.
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aspects of their presence in these countries, relations among migrants 
from the same country of origin are understudied due to dominant para-
digms that privilege their interaction with the society of residence and 
origin or altogether non-ethnic approaches. Yet, diversity in  local in- 
group relations is crucial to understanding social cohesion in contempo-
rary societies of immigration. This is particularly urgent in times of the 
European border regime’s crisis, where the question of migration has 
become a subject of political maneuvering; in times in which the tradi-
tional party system is destabilized by the rise of populist, nationalist, and 
extreme right forces to power positions in national governments where 
racist violence is seeing a drastic increase across the continent (Jäckle and 
König 2017; Vertovec 2018).
Extant research on such internal diversity reveals that processes of dif-
ferentiation are related either to migrants’ conditions of incorporation in 
the locality of residence or to their pre-migratory social context. 
Transnational reasons for these dynamics, however, are rarely examined 
in enough detail. Conversely, an emerging strand of research focuses on 
how migrants create different forms of capital in transnational social 
fields, but tends to neglect the connection with local dynamics. This 
book asks how diversity among Iranian-Germans, as it derives from pro-
cesses of social differentiation, relates to their past and ongoing histori-
cally situated experience of generating capital in local and transnational 
social fields.
 Internal Diversity
When the transnational approach to migration became dominant in the 
early 1990s, it was conceptualized as a “transgressive movement” that 
challenges, through cross-border circulation, dominant ideas, and prac-
tices linked to nation-states and, in general, to the global political econ-
omy (Glick Schiller et  al. 1997, 136f.). Accordingly, transnational 
migrants are seen as acting in contestation of and in confrontation to 
power structures such as national institutions and multinational corpora-
tions. Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, for instance, conceive of transna-
tional activities as being “commonly developed in reaction to governmental 
1 Introduction 
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policies and to the condition of dependent capitalism fostered on weaker 
countries” (idem 1999, 20). These research trends nourish the develop-
ment of what I call the “paradigm of internal horizontality”, according to 
which migrants are agents of change that engage in vertical relations with 
structures and institutions of their societies of origin and residence, while 
internal relations remain largely horizontal.
As a consequence, studies that reveal unequal relations among migrants 
did not receive enough attention. Their findings, however, forcefully 
argue against the idea of internal horizontality, as does for instance Pnina 
Werbner’s (1990) work on Pakistani entrepreneurial families in 
Manchester. Social differentiation among migrants evolves “in response 
to the changing communal and economic contexts” (idem 1990, 342) 
in local and in transnational social fields. Ludger Pries (1996) and Michael 
Smith (2005) also stress that migrants’ social spaces are heterogeneous 
and shaped by relations of power.
Eventually, the conceptualization of migration as transgressive move-
ment became criticized for its dualistic and romanticizing vision. 
Likewise, the paradigm of internal horizontality was gradually superseded 
by what I identify, building on an expression of Carter and Fenton 
(2010), as the “paradigm of not-thinking-ethnicity”.
The early 2000s saw the rise of a critique of “methodological national-
ism”, postulating that the analytical centrality of nation-states had left 
research conceptually blind for processes that cannot be grasped in terms 
of national belonging (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 324ff.). Taking 
further Brubaker’s (2002) important argument for the use of ethnicity as 
a category of practice instead of a category of analysis, the debate entails 
a critique of the ethnic lens, with the argument that research had fostered 
the construction of “migrant communities” based on a common ethnic 
or national origin. But instead of acknowledging the internal heterogene-
ity of migrant “communities” and questioning the horizontality of their 
relations, studies involving people who share a single ethnic or national 
identification gradually lost scholarly interest in favor of so-called non- 
ethnic approaches (Glick Schiller et al. 2006; Carter and Fenton 2010).
Diversity studies form part of the so-called local turn which aims at 
comparing place-making involving migrants in urban contexts (Brettell 
2003). The field of study is concerned with “understanding the modes 
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and processes of social differentiation” (Vertovec 2015, 10). Within this 
framework, the focus lies on multi-group relations, that is, between peo-
ple with a variety of ethnic, status, and gender identifications from differ-
ent countries of origin (Vertovec 2007). As diversity and transnational 
interconnectivity characterizes today’s societies of immigration, they offer 
insights into the social and administrative conditions to the construction 
of social cohesion in contemporary societies of immigration (Dobusch 
2017; Nieswand 2017). Yet, their focus on the local and on non-ethnic 
approaches leads to leaving transnational interconnections largely out of 
the picture (Lamont et al. 2016, 287).
In sum, the commonality between the paradigm of internal horizon-
tality and the paradigm of not-thinking-ethnicity is that they curb the 
study of social differentiation among migrants. The lack of interest in 
these dynamics, their historical depth, and their geographical scope, indi-
rectly reifies migrants of the same ethnic or national origin as a homog-
enous group. Notwithstanding these general trends in research on 
transnational migration, there is evidence on how relations among 
migrants produce and engage with power and the experience of inequal-
ity. Most of the studies on internal relations explain hierarchical behavior 
either through social dynamics in the context of residence or in the con-
text of origin. With regard to the society of residence, studies argue that 
specifically local conditions to incorporation contribute to “deep divides” 
(Ehrkamp 2006) between migrants. “Reactive ethnicity”, that is, the (col-
lective) exasperation of ethnic identifications as a means to differentiate 
from unmarked locals, can be a way to deal with ethnic, racial, or reli-
gious discrimination (Portes 1999; Çelik 2015). Intragroup Othering is 
yet another. According to Pyke and Dang (2003), the usage of categories 
such as “fresh of the boat” and “whitewashed” indicates that migrants 
internalize values that contribute to their own discrimination by the soci-
ety of residence. Another strand of research relates the origins of these 
categories to the unequal relations engendered by different historical con-
ditions of emigration, as well as to diverse political and socio-economic 
backgrounds in the country of origin (Kunz 1973; Charsley and 
Bolognani 2017; Su 2017). Yet, while both the context of residence and 
of origin are certainly crucial in shaping internal relations, considering 
1 Introduction 
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one without the other offers only a partial analysis of the social dynam-
ics at hand.
To gain greater insights into the historical depth and transnational 
scope of internal differentiation, this book examines it as an engagement 
with interconnecting hierarchical structures prevalent in the society of 
origin and of residence. Following Kelly and Lusis’ (2006) work on the 
way evaluations of resources among Toronto-based Filipino-Canadians 
are informed by interrelating strands of transnational connectivity, I 
combine the study of local social differentiation with that of migrants’ 
engagement in transnational social fields.
 Transnational Social Fields
The so-called transnational turn represents another effort to overcome 
the limitation posed by methodological nationalism. Building on previ-
ous research on “transnational social spaces” (Pries 1996; Faist 1998), 
Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004, 1015) suggest that, in order 
to understand migrants’ sometimes contradictory social processes, we 
need to recognize that they “occupy different gender, racial, and class 
positions within different states at the same time”. Drawing on Bourdieu’s 
work on capital creation, they introduce the concept of the “transnational 
social field” (idem 2004, 1008f.). Since then, a growing body of research 
explores the transnational dimension of migrants’ social mobility. These 
studies show that, as migrants engage in multiple local and transnational 
social fields, the positions they occupy in different contexts are interde-
pendent and complementary (Nowicka 2013, 2014). In creating capital, 
different European case studies show that migrants rely on two types of 
resources whose availability is conditioned by gender, class, ability, or age 
identities: “location-specific capital”, that is, locally relevant cultural and 
social capital (Nowicka 2013; Nohl et al. 2014; Cederberg 2015), and 
“migration-specific capital”, which is created through resources that draw 
on migrants’ racial, ethnic, and cultural identifications (Erel 2010). Thus, 
both location- and migration-specific resources are crucial in migrants’ 
creation of capital.
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This literature has a tendency to assume that, through their capital 
creation, migrants challenge and transform hierarchal orders in the coun-
try of residence and of origin—an idea that reminds us of the paradigm 
of internal horizontality. However, the focus on migrants’ capacities to 
transform societies entails the danger of sidelining individual difficulties 
and structural barriers migrants may meet in trying to create capital. It is 
thus useful to complement these studies with research that considers how 
past and present dynamics of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and 
nation-state policies shape migrants’ self-perceptions and their image 
among locals (Henry 1999; Glick Schiller 2005). Aihwa Ong offers great 
insights into the ways migrants’ strategies of creating capital respond to, 
and engage with negative stereotypes that draw on historically built inter-
national economic and political hierarchies (Ong 1992, 1996). 
Importantly, she observes that barriers to capital creation emerge “when 
there is a mismatch, from the hegemonic standpoint, between the sym-
bolic capital and its embodiment” (idem 1999, 91). In other words, a 
resource may not be recognized as a capital if it is devaluated by the sub-
jection of its holder to negatively charged social categories. In a similar 
vein, Anja Weiss shows that not only the identifications and categoriza-
tion of its holder, but also the origin of the resource itself plays a role in 
its valorization (idem 2005, 717–22). We thus retain that migrants’ strat-
egies of capital creation navigate between individual dispositions and a 
variety of structural—even though to some extent variable and 
negotiable—constraints.
In short, research shows that the use of location- and migration- specific 
resources plays an important role in migrants’ creation of capital, because 
their valuation is influenced by historically grown international social 
inequalities. Relations between people who are engaged in the same 
transnational social field reflect these inequalities. Strikingly, however, so 
far research on transnational social fields mostly traces unrelated indi-
vidual migrants’ trajectories, privileging the interest in migrants’ agency 
in relations with the society of residence and of origin over local internal 
relations.
To summarize, dominant approaches to internal differentiation and 
transnational social fields, respectively, neglect the study of the transna-
tional and the local dimension, which explains why we yet know  relatively 
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little about the way migrants engage with unequal relations across local 
and transnational social fields. The way I propose to address this issue is 
in combining both strands of research through their common theoretical 
background: Pierre Bourdieu’s work on social fields and symbolic strug-
gles over the definition of criteria of evaluation.
 Evaluation and Capital Creation Through 
Boundary Work
Pierre Bourdieu’s work certainly is one of the most substantial theoretical 
frameworks in the social sciences. Following Wacquant’s suggestion 
(2018), I use it as a toolbox rather than applying it in its integrity. 
Bourdieu (1979) argues that processes of evaluation and judgment form 
the basis of social differentiation. These relational processes represent the 
expression of relations of power and inequality resulting from the uneven 
distribution of resources and from variations in their recognition as capi-
tal. They take place when agents use distinctive symbols or practices in 
order to sustain their struggle over the valorization of their resources as 
capital in a particular social field. Here, an agent’s position is determined 
by his capital’s relative volume and its composition compared to that of 
other agents. He defines a capital as a material or immaterial resource 
whose symbolic power is acknowledged in the social field in which it is 
employed. The three categories of capital are economic capital, which 
relies on financial assets or properties; cultural capital, which can be cre-
ated through professional, practical, or cultural knowledge that may or 
may not be institutionalized; and social capital, which derives from 
meaningful or creative relationships (Bourdieu 1985, 724).
In this book, I refer to two authors whose work is a productive expan-
sion of Bourdieu’s approach to power and inequality: Michele Lamont’s 
boundary approach and David Graeber’s theory of value. The link 
between the three approaches is their focus on practices of evaluation 
within particular social fields.
The boundary approach traces the construction and deconstruction of 
social boundaries. Social boundaries are thereby defined as “objectified 
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forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal 
distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportu-
nities” (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). The strength of this approach 
lies in its ability to reveal intersecting inequalities as it takes into account 
the usage of boundaries based on any socially and situationally relevant 
marker of difference. Moreover, the conceptualization of boundaries 
respects the fluctuant nature of structural constraints and the great 
importance of individual agency. In doing so, it offers an alternative view 
to a widely critiqued path-dependency in Bourdieu’s conception of the 
interaction between structure and agency (Lahire 1999; Martuccelli 
2006). In bringing together Bourdieu’s concept of capital creation with 
the boundary approach, I understand the deconstruction of a boundary, 
in other words, inclusion, as the valorization of a resource as a capital. 
Vice versa, exclusion represents the denial of a resource’s value, which is 
expressed in the construction of a social boundary. Tracing differential 
patterns of evaluation in boundary work is a tool to understand the way 
different systems of evaluation interrelate (Lamont 2012).
In his anthropological theory of value, David Graeber introduces an 
understanding of such systems of evaluation that goes beyond Bourdieu’s 
relatively state-centered and static view. In Bourdieu’s conception, agents’ 
activities in a social field simultaneously exhibit and reproduce incorpo-
rated evaluation criteria which he calls classificatory schemes4 (Bourdieu 
1979, 191). The attribution of worth through practices of differentiation 
does not only represent individual cognitive structures, but such criteria 
of evaluation reflect and engage with the dominant social structure 
(Wacquant 1992, 12f.). Accordingly, the symbolic struggle over the defi-
nition of these classificatory schemes is at the heart of power relations 
(Bourdieu 1985, 729). Graeber (2001, 115) agrees with Bourdieu in 
understanding struggles over the definition of structures of reference, but 
also their relation to one another, as the most crucial political project.
Despite the diverse theoretical origin of Bourdieu’s and Graeber’s5 
work, their notions of classificatory schemes and systems of value  converge 
4 Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus to explain these processes.
5 Graeber builds on Marxist and Maussian thought, in which he follows the action-oriented anthro-
pology of value in the tradition of the University of Chicago (Robbins and Sommerschuh 2016).
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in a crucial point. Following Bourdieu, mental structures incorporate 
social structures. According to Graeber (2013, 224) the worth that is 
given to an action or practices (its exchange value) mediates larger values, 
in the sense of “ideas about what is ultimately important in life”. Using 
Graeber’s vocabulary, criteria of evaluation reflect and engage with larger 
“systems of value”. Thus, in combining Bourdieu’s approach to power 
and inequality and Graeber’s theory of value, I conceive the creation of 
economic, social, and cultural capital in boundary work as essentially 
geared toward to mediation of particular values within a prevailing system.
However, Bourdieu foregrounds the national homogeneity of classifi-
catory schemes: systems of evaluation of all social fields embedded in one 
particular nation-state follow the same principles of division (Bourdieu 
1997, 98). Graeber (2013, 226), instead, suggests that in complex societ-
ies, a practice of evaluation is received in one or in several overlapping 
social fields (which he calls “social arenas”). Against Bourdieu, he sees 
social structure as inherently elusive, as it gets lost in the messiness of 
continuous social action, that is, its production and reproduction; social 
fields themselves are fragmented and ephemeral (Graeber 2001, 259ff.). 
Hence, the system of value by which one social field is shaped may or 
may not relate to those others in the same national context. Graeber’s 
more versatile conceptualization of systems of value will be useful to 
complement Bourdieu’s failure to theorize the interconnection between 
different social fields.
This book offers a fine-grained ethnography of the conditions and pro-
cesses in which difference, in the form of social boundaries, is constructed 
and deconstructed in internal relations. How do these processes interact 
with the Iranians’ opportunities and limitations to have their resources 
acknowledged as capital in social fields relative to the German or to the 
Iranian society? In tracing internal relations across a period stretching 
from the 1930s until today, I study how agents engage, through evalua-
tion in boundary work, with diverse, partly competing systems of value 
that prevail in the different social fields. In doing so, I examine the role of 
systems of value as structures of reference in the interrelation between 
dynamics in local and transnational social fields.
Needless to say, if it comes to studying internal diversity as a factor 
influencing social cohesion in European societies, we could think of a 
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great number of case studies. Similar dynamics to those this book will 
explore can certainly be found among other migrant groups. However, 
the historical depth and the geopolitical relevance of the presence of 
Iranians in Germany, more precisely, in the city of Hamburg, make it a 
particular case of study.
 Iranian Migration to Hamburg
Iranians did not start to emigrate after the Islamic revolution in 1979.6 
Certainly, the events which led to the replacement of the Western- 
oriented Pahlavi monarchy by a republic based on the principles of Islam 
under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini marked a turning point in these 
processes not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of the diversity 
of emigrants’ social profiles and their destinations. However, the territory 
of contemporary Iran has always been shaped by the fluctuation of peo-
ple (Keddie and Matthee 2002; Daryaee et  al. 2010; Dabashi 2016). 
Depending on the time of emigration, reasons for geographical mobility 
vary from economic motivations to studies, from flight of the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980–1988) and political persecution to social and family issues. 
Today, people identifying as Iranian are dispersed all over the world. They 
still live in some of the earliest places of settlement, that is, Iran’s neigh-
boring countries, the Persian Gulf region, and India, in Europe, and 
more recently in North America and Australia (Subrahmanyam 1992; 
Koser Akcapar 2006; McAuliffe 2008; Adelkhah 2012; Khosravi 2018). 
Finally, since the 1990s, Southeast Asia, in particular Japan and Malaysia, 
has become a destination of migration (Fozi 2013). Due to the great his-
torical depth, coming with important generational variety, and the 
uneven quality of statistical data provided by the countries of residence, 
the quantity of Iranians living abroad can only be approximated to 4 mil-
lion, which represents about 5% of the population of Iran (Vahabi 2012, 
13). Currently, the most important places of settlement are the USA 
(with about 481,000 (Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans 2014, 
3)), Germany (197,000 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017a)), Canada (about 
6 See timeline in the appendix.
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108,000 Iranian-born, (in UNICEF 2013, 2)), the UK (about 80,000 
Iranian-born in 2014 (Office for National Statistics 2015)), and Sweden 
(about 65,000 Iranian-born in 2014 (Malek 2015, 87)).
Iranian migration to Hamburg, Germany’s second largest city, dates 
back to the mid-nineteenth century, thanks to early trade agreements. 
Only the important waves of immigration that followed the Iranian revo-
lution in 1979 diversified the movement along lines of class, gender, eth-
nicity, political orientations, and religious adherence (Hesse-Lehmann 
1993). Today, more than 23,000 among the city’s 2 million inhabitants 
are of Iranian origin (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig- 
Holstein 2018, 7), constituting Europe’s second largest Iranian popula-
tion, and Hamburg’s fifth important immigrant group. Through 
naturalizations, onward or return migration, and mixed marriages,7 the 
true number of people nourishing Iranian identifications is certainly 
much higher. Thus, as a city, Hamburg counts the largest number of 
Iranians in Germany, while it is the third federal state in numbers of 
Iranians after North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2017b, 128ff.).
Iran’s place in the international political and economic landscapes, 
shaped through its Islamic government and its richness in natural 
resources,8 influences the lives of its emigrants. At present, it has the sec-
ond largest economy in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia, and, with 
about 80.6 million people (as of 2017), the second largest population 
after Egypt (The World Bank 2018). Since the revolution in 1979, the 
Islamic Republic constructs its political discourse on an opposition to the 
USA and Israel and, in its extreme, on a condemnation of anything asso-
ciated with the West. Since the hostage of US-embassy staff in Tehran in 
1979, this political stance and Iran’s pursuit of a contentious nuclear pro-
gram has seen the country repeatedly subjected to partly severe economic 
sanctions both from individual nation-states and international organiza-
tions. Within Iran, the revolution, the war with Iraq, and a neoliberal 
economy under sanctions fostered the development of tangled,  competing 
7 Until October 2019, when Iranian legislation changed, children of a foreign father and an Iranian 
mother were not eligible for Iranian citizenship.
8 According to the World Bank (2018), “Iran ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and 
fourth in proven crude oil reserves.”
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political and economic power structures (Therme 2013). In the face of 
internal and external restrictions to the participation of people living in 
Iran in global cultural and economic flows (Appadurai 1990), its migrants 
have come to play an important role, acting as intermediaries for the 
circulation of ideas, practices, and goods between Iran and the West 
(Azadarmaki and Bahar 2007; Sreberny-Mohammadi 2013; Moghaddari 
2015). This is even more significant, as the large portion of Iranians—at 
least those who go to Western countries—are not classical labor migrants; 
in Germany, they are typically characterized (and like to characterize 
themselves) as being one of the immigrant populations with the highest 
average level of education9 (see also Bozorgmehr and Sabagh 1988; 
Sadeghi 2015). As this book will show, the particular place of Iran in the 
global political and economic landscape, power constellations in Iran, 
and the average educational level of Iranian migrants shape their condi-
tions for capital creation in the place of residence.
Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, social scientists have produced a 
substantial body of qualitative research on Iranian migration, to which 
three critical remarks are at order. First, studies carried out in diverse 
countries of residence at different points in time observed a strong ten-
dency toward social differentiation between Iranians (Kamalkhani 1988; 
Bozorgmehr et  al. 1993; McAuliffe 2007; Khosravi 2018). However, 
schemes of social differentiation are often drawn along emic markers such 
as ethnicity and religion, generation (Chaichian 1997; Daha 2011), 
“vintages”10 of migrants, political convictions (Nassehi-Behnam 1991), 
and class (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh 1988; McAuliffe 2008). If we under-
stand these labels as “categories of practice” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 
4ff.) rather than as analytical instruments, such constructions of differ-
ence appear much more flexible and versatile. Second, as I showed earlier, 
inequalities related to Iran cannot be understood without taking into 
account their linkages with inequalities in the country of residence. 
Maybe because of the practicalities and risks of doing research in Iran 
(Nadjmabadi 2009), transnational dynamics have not yet received 
9 In an OECD report (OECD-UNDESA 2013, 6), half of the 845,000 Iranian-born adults living 
in member countries in 2011 are qualified as high educated.
10 I understand “vintages” of migrants with Kunz (1973) as people who move for similar reasons at 
the same period of time (see Chap. 3).
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enough consideration in the study of Iranian migration. Third, much of 
the research on Iranian migrants’ identifications centers on the USA and 
Canada (Mobasher 2006; Alinejad 2013; Maghbouleh 2017; Malek 
2019), while there is a need for more research on these negotiations in the 
European context. Despite Germany’s historical importance as a country 
of destination and the large number of residents of Iranian origin, there 
are few empirical studies providing consistent material for comparison 
(see Sanadjian 1995; Sadeghi 2018a, b). This book contributes to a more 
complex understanding of Iranian migration, tracing the fluidity of social 
boundaries and the transnational dimensions of local inequalities.
Since 2012, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) receives, with 
20–50%, the biggest share of asylum requests in the European Union 
(Migration Policy Institute 2018). Nevertheless, the society only awoke 
to the fact that it had become a country of immigration at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. At about the time, the national economy began its 
growth rate that made it one of the world’s leading economic and politi-
cal powers today.
Just like in all Western European countries, the history of mass immi-
gration to Germany started after World War II (WWII)11 (Castles et al. 
2013, 102–26). In contrast to other important European countries of 
immigration, however, Germany does not have a prolonged colonial past. 
Thus, most people who came to Germany from the mid-1950s were not 
former colonial subjects, but “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) mostly of 
Italian, Spanish, Turkish, and Yugoslavian origin, called upon to provide 
manpower for the thriving German economy (Göktürk et al. 2007, 9ff.; 
Messina 2007, 124f.). This immigration was conceived of as being tem-
porary: work and residence permits were only granted for restricted peri-
ods, family reunification was discouraged, and programs to facilitate 
insertion were largely directed toward their orientation in the job market 
(Castles et al. 2013, 107). From the recruitment ban for labor migrants 
in 1973 onward, immigration policies became ever more restrictive. 
Instead of diminishing the movement, this change led a growing number 
of migrants to try to obtain a residence permit via the asylum procedure 
in the following decades. While immigration became durable regardless 
11 These were previously rather countries of emigration.
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of policy changes, politicians continued to deny this reality (Aumüller 
2009, 195). Significantly, in 1991, the then-chancellor Helmut Kohl 
stated “we […] have to be conscious about the fact that we cannot admit 
all those who want to come. The Federal Republic of Germany is not a 
country of immigration” (Kohl 1991). Uncertainty and unemployment 
after the German reunification in 1990 fostered xenophobia and racist 
thought and urged politicians to implement a more restrictive legislation 
in order to decrease the number of asylum seekers (Messina 2007, 127ff.; 
El-Tayeb 2016, 143ff.; Mushaben 2017).
It was only at the turn of the century that more and more voices 
brought the culturally heterogeneous reality to the public debate, even 
though they were forcefully countered by anti-immigration discourses 
that did not originate exclusively from the social margins.12 The approach 
to immigration shifted from differentialism to assimilationism (Brubaker 
2001). Within this new conception, education, occupational achieve-
ments, and, importantly, resources conceived as Germany-specific,13 such 
as language skills and cultural knowledge, are seen as criteria for success-
ful integration (Bail 2008, 49). Comprehensive federal programs pro-
moting integration were developed, which, however, lay the responsibility 
for assimilation on the migrants (Aumüller 2009, 199f.). Research on 
interactions between Germans and people of foreign origin shows that 
migrants’, their children’s and even grandchildren’s chances to generate 
capital in Germany are restricted by their construction as cultural or 
racial Other (Weiss 2001; Sökefeld 2004; Terkessidis 2004; Ehrkamp 
2006; Gruner 2010; Marschke and Brinkmann 2015). At least since al-
Qaida’s attacks in the USA of September 11, 2001, Islamophobia has 
become one of the main vehicles for racial and cultural discrimination in 
Europe (Fekete 2004; Shooman 2014; De Genova 2017). In Germany, 
strong anti-immigration and anti-Muslim resentments are represented in 
movements such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization 
12 One example is the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) politician Thilo Sarrazin, whose book 
“Germany abolishes itself ” (2010) caused a huge public debate, and was sold in over 1,3 million 
copies (cro 2012).
13 I use the notion of “Iran- and Germany-specific resources” to designate assets which are, in a 
specific social interaction, conceived of as being created in or representative of identifications 
related to these national contexts.
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of the West, initiated in late 2014) and the increasingly popular right- 
wing nationalist party AfD (Alternative for Germany), founded in 2013.
The crisis of the European border regime in the context of the move-
ment of people by the thousands through the Mediterranean and the 
Balkans that began in 2015 eventually challenged the prevailing discourse 
on immigration. In June 2015, chancellor Angela Merkel stated for the 
first time that “we are after all already a country of immigration” (dpa 
2015). In that year, 434,750 first asylum requests were filed in Germany—
more than 3 times the number of the preceding year and 15 times as 
much as in the year 2008 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2016, 3). Within the government-promoted, but highly controversial, 
“Welcome culture” (Willkommenskultur) (Vollmer and Karakayali 2018), 
not only Germans but also already established migrants mobilize or 
become mobilized as benefactors, mediators, spokespersons, and cri-
tiques of the newly arrived (Karakayali and Kleist 2015). These develop-
ments make Germany an important place to study the stakes of 
transnational migration and the internal construction and deconstruc-
tion of difference today.
The fluctuation of people between Germany and Iran goes back to the 
Middle Ages, when merchants, soldiers, and political dignitaries began to 
travel between the Habsburg Empire and Iran (Kochwasser 1961, 28ff.). 
The contemporary conditions of Iranian immigration to Germany are 
structured by political and economic collaboration between the two 
countries throughout most of the twentieth century until today (Adli 
1960; Khatib-Shahidi 2013). Moreover, in contrast to North American 
countries of destination where Iranians can only enter after gaining a 
green card, due to its geographical proximity, Iranian migration to 
Germany passes through both regular and irregular entry and the asylum 
procedure (Hesse-Lehmann 1993). In the course of the so-called refugee 
crisis in 2015, Iranian asylum applications in Germany reached peaks 
that exceeded the post-2009-anti-election protests in numbers of applica-
tions (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2017, 21). As a matter 
of fact, in the past ten years14 Iranians figure among the ten largest groups 
14 Except for the years 2014 and 2015, as numbers of asylum requests from other nationalities 
skyrocketed.
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of asylum seekers in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2016, 8), alongside other forms of entry such as through student visas. 
Over the past 20 years, several people of Iranian origin have reached 
important levels of public renown. They include the federal politicians 
Sahra Wagenknecht (die Linke), Omid Nouripour (Alliance ’90/the 
Greens), actress Yasmin Tabatabai, journalist Bahman Nirumand, archi-
tect Hadi Teherani, composer Ramin Djawadi, artist Parastou Forouhar, 
and the footballer Ali Daei—to name but a few.
In sum, at a time in which Germany experiences a turning point in its 
history of immigration, studying the shifting reception of Iranians, most 
of whom have a Muslim background, over more than 80 years and their 
engagement with these changing conditions in internal relations offers 
crucial insights on the future stakes of recent influxes. The way migrants 
negotiate between different systems of value in processes of boundary 
work allows us to understand transversal social dynamics in one of 
Europe’s major countries of immigration.
 Fieldwork
According to the German poet Hermann Hesse (1999 [1923], 123), “the 
things we see […] are the same things that are within us”. Experiences of 
community and conflict in Iranian-German contexts and of cultural and 
racial Othering in contact with Germans stimulated my interest in study-
ing internal diversity. I am the child of an Iranian-German binational 
couple and that I grew up in a small rural town at the coast of the North 
Sea, which is a one-and-a-half-hour-drive north of Hamburg. More par-
ticularly, I grew up between a largely migrant-less everyday life and regu-
lar get-togethers with some of the few local Iranian families. Every few 
years we spent our holidays in Babol—my second place of origin. Episodes 
of racism I experienced myself or I witnessed my father experiencing 
marked me. These experiences also informed my relations in the field and 
the way I interpret ethnographic data.
This book is based on material I raised through nine months of ethno-
graphic fieldwork in Hamburg between March 2013 and April 2014. 
However, rather than being single-sited in the “classical” way, it was a 
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“strategically situated ethnography”, that is, there was a “sensed, partially 
articulated awareness of specific other sites and agents to which particular 
subjects have (not always tangible) relationships” (Marcus 1995, 111). 
Hence, between 2012 and 2016, the research followed me during my 
temporary stays in Iran—I spent a total of three months in Tehran, Babol, 
a city in the north of Iran, and Mashhad—and in Geneva, where I 
was based.
Life experiences as a “halfie” (Abu-Lughod 1991) in itself does not say 
much about the level of my personal involvement and the relations that I 
developed with my interlocutors (Narayan 1993). In researching differ-
entiation, I am necessarily involved in its relationality. The following 
vignettes both introduce my ethnographic methods, illustrate my rela-
tional approach to ethnography (Desmond 2014), and offer insights into 
questions of my own positionality, research ethics, and political issues in 
encounters with my interlocutors.
In anthropology, participant observation remains a crucial method—
and so it was in this research. More than that, I voluntarily, and some-
times also involuntarily, became an observing participant. For instance, I 
worked as a waitress in a local Iranian restaurant for six weeks, I partici-
pated in the organization of two cultural festivals (see Chaps. 3 and 5), 
and engaged in several research vulgarization activities on the invitation 
of different interlocutors. Several times, interlocutors accompanied me to 
field sites (for instance to meet a person that could have known a deceased 
parent) thus directly and indirectly prompting me to confront my per-
ceptions and interpretations with theirs. I also spent free time with peo-
ple I met in the field and who later became research participants. It is 
through such long-term relations that I understood my role in the con-
struction of social boundaries.
On a warm summer evening in 2013, for instance, I joined Babak, 
Yara, and a few other friends at the Schanzenviertel, a recently gentrified 
district popular with young professionals and leftist activists. It is a quar-
ter of town where I lived before, where I felt at home. We made a barbe-
cue in a park and then walked round the lively streets. I knew these people 
since a few months already. Certainly, it helped that I could participate, 
despite with less fluency, in their discussions in Persian. We wanted to go 
somewhere together, but we still hadn’t decided on a destination. After a 
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while, I got tired of purposelessly standing on the street. I wanted to sug-
gest we join some friends of mine. “Okay, what should we do now?” I 
asked. Babak laughed “You are such a potato (sibzamini)! So funny. I have 
no idea, nobody cares, we just hang out here.” “Potato” is an expression 
popular among migrant youth to designate Germans. Babak had called 
me that way before and he had told me that it was meant as a joke. Yet, 
even if it was effective just for a few minutes, Babak created a boundary 
between me and the group. He interpreted my impatience as a Germany- 
specific resource and did not acknowledge it as a capital. Incidentally, 
four months later, I told him that I was tired of him repeatedly identify-
ing me as a German. “But you are German!” he said again. Then again, 
on the next Iranian new year, he invited me to a party at his place. When 
I asked if I could bring a Belgian friend, he said “I am sorry but I would 
like us to be only among ourselves.” Who did he mean by that this time? 
At the party, all guests were Persian speakers and his acquaintances.
But let me finish the story of the summer evening: just an hour after 
Babak’s boundary-making, Yara invited me to a high-end bar. While she 
included me, she managed to discreetly leave behind the others including 
her close friend Yalda whose new German boyfriend had just joined us. 
When we arrived there, I realized that Yara wanted to meet a new lover, 
the bar’s Iranian owner. I was a female of her age and unaccompanied—
probably the most suitable company of the group in this case. Thus, in 
my relations with interlocutors, I noticed how we used a variety of mark-
ers of difference to create boundaries that drew us together or created 
distance depending on the situations and the moments in the evolution 
of our acquaintance.
It is in observing the way my self-claimed and attributed identities 
shifted and how my resources were valorized differently in different social 
context (also compared to those of my interlocutors) that I understood 
the importance of taking situations as units of analysis (Eckert 2016). To 
account, against Bourdieu, for the complexity of individual situations 
and trajectories (Martuccelli 2009), I thus approach the production of 
difference through “ethnographies of the particular” (Abu-Lughod 
1991, 148ff.).
Interviews were a crucial part of my research, but while I carried out a 
small number of formal interviews, most occurred spontaneously and in 
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informal context. Some interviews were directed toward exploring the 
past rather than the present, relating oral history, while others narrated 
life courses. An issue that was omnipresent in this research, but that was 
particularly noticeable in conversations, was the concern with political 
position-taking, and, in as far as they may be interpreted as connected, 
with religious beliefs. There is little anthropological research carried out 
in Iran today, which is largely due to the Iranian state controlling access 
and publications (Nadjmabadi 2009; Khosravi 2017). Within the past 
decade, many researchers, mostly those with Iranian citizenship, have 
been detained in the country. Many non-citizen researchers have been 
denied entry or research permits. This is why my research in Iran was 
completely informal. However, even in researching Iranian migration in 
Hamburg, avoiding political risks for both my interlocutors and myself is 
a primary concern. This is a particularly acute concern in this city as there 
is a strong presence of Iranian state institutions: the Consulate General, a 
school for Iranian expats, an office of the Iranian national bank, and the 
Imam Ali mosque. Moreover, many local Iranians told me that they were 
suspicious of being spied on by peers.
The concern for my interlocutors and my own political safety shaped 
my fieldwork encounters. I particularly remember the one interview with 
a clerk of the Imam Ali mosque. I met Mr. Saidi once when I visited the 
mosque. However, it took months of negotiations and several refusals 
from his part before I could send him a list of questions and he agreed to 
the interview. Mr. Saidi must be around 60 years old, but his hair is com-
pletely white. Although he has a limp, he walks straight and exudes dig-
nity. It is a Friday afternoon and I follow him through the building, in 
which he opens doors to look for an empty room. Later, he told me that 
he chose that day of the week because he knew the place would be empty. 
Finally, we stay in the library hall. He  lays my printed questions with 
written notes in Persian on the sides in front of him—he was clearly cau-
tious. Although I planned to be equally careful not to express any politi-
cal or religious opinion in my questions and in my demeanor—I wore 
the veil—our conversation, in German, starts off with hitting a taboo. 
“Since when do you know Hamburg and the Imam Ali mosque?” “Since 
1982.” “What do you mean? Is it since 1982 that you live in Hamburg, 
or that you work at the mosque?” “Neither.” He explained me his 
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 professional and migratory trajectory prior to 1987, then he adds “but 
you should not mention this!” (field notes October 2013). Moreover, 
during the interview, my headscarf fell off several times. Every time it 
took a minute before I noticed it. He never even twitched his eye. In the 
end, he told me a secret which he also insisted I should not write about. 
In doing so, he presented himself as having a critical distance to the ideol-
ogy of the Iranian government.
Just like Mr. Saidi, interlocutors shared political opinions or a personal 
history of confrontations with Iranian authorities with me. It was only 
those who were sure never to return to Iran who did so without remind-
ing me that I should not write about this. Some interlocutors also chose 
not to tell me certain relevant personal matters. In many cases, when 
people withheld information, they did so in an attempt to influence my 
image of them and the way I represent them in my research. More often 
than not, these matters reveal the way my interlocutors engage with the 
historically situated experience of inequality. They form, as the “unknown 
known” (I know it but I behave as if I do not) or the partly “unknown 
unknown” (I just don’t know or I guess there might be more to it but I do 
not ask) (Žižek 2004), a ghostly presence in this book (Gordon 1997; 
Cabot 2016). Human beings are complex. Persian vocabulary has a word 
for the protection of the space for the unknown in our complex person-
hood: ta’ârof (Vivier-Muresan 2006). Relating to Islam, it serves to pre-
serve a person’s honor (âb’e ruh) in social interactions.15 It is a concept I 
strive to respect both in fieldwork and in writing. As far as I can sense it, 
this (un)knowledge informs my analysis. In this book, I mostly strive to 
respect the cover of the unknown and write around it.
Following Ann Stoler (2009) in reading “along the archival grain” is 
one way to study the ghostly—because tabooed or untold—stories of 
power inequality through written policy documentation (Vaught and 
Orum Hernández 2017). Reading along the archival grain consists on 
taking the archives as a site of ethnography rather than using archival 
documents as counterweights to the stories of the people (colonial) states 
govern. It means studying archival production on its own behalf, as a 
15 Tellingly, a religious saying goes “cover the believers’ failures, as god forgives all failures a thou-
sand times” (pushândeye oyub-e mo’menân bashin ke khodâvand satârâloyub ast).
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technology of rule, by reading “for its regularities, for its logics of recall, 
for its densities and distributions, for its consistencies and misinforma-
tion, omission and mistake” (Stoler 2009, 100). More generally, my writ-
ing an historically informed anthropology is motivated by the aim to 
complement Western historicity which tends to deny its “Others” a past 
of similar complexity as their own, and thus reproduces unequal power 
relations (Said 1978; Wolf 1982; Chakrabarty 2000). My interest is 
exploring how contemporary internal differentiation relates to local and 
transnational dynamics that shaped relations among Iranian migrants in 
the past. For all these reasons I studied the Hamburg government’s inter-
nal communication and correspondence with local Iranians as well as 
Iranian immigration-related newspaper documentation at the city’s 
archives, Staatsarchiv Hamburg (STAHH). These documents cover a 
period from 1857 until the 1980s.
The archives entertain a close relationship to the present. I could 
observe it when Karim, a barista in his early thirties, asked me if he could 
come with me. The tall man stands out by a dense black beard and long 
hair. He never went to college, but he said that he was curious about his-
tory. The lady at the entry studied him closely, suspiciously, when she 
asked him to sign the usual documents. As we looked through the archi-
val files, a signature saying “Heil Hitler” caught our attention. Karim’s 
first reaction was to raise my attention to the fact that the small cell that 
we occupied had no direct windows to the exterior and that there could 
be gas streaming through the ventilation system. “Everywhere I go, I first 
check possible escape routes. My father taught me this” (field notes June 
2013). His sense of threat together with my own trepidation which were 
provoked by the Nazi salutation made me shiver.
Finally, I used document and media analysis (newspaper articles, leaf-
lets, private photos, videos, TV documentation) in order to cross and 
complement ethnographic data  (Image 1.1). Media procuration and 
visioning were also sometimes integrated in relational dynamics. I 
obtained some of the most interesting pictures and movies through 
Parviz. The former carpet shop owner, in good shape despite being in his 
eighties, invited me to his home and enjoyed spending afternoons with 
me, scanning through his vast music and video archive together. He was 
more patient than me I admit. In the end, he handed me a DVD with a 
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personal selection and one video struck me in particular: shot with an 
amateur camera in the 1990s, it showed the flat, green, northern German 
landscape passing before the front window of a Mercedes Benz while the 
tape recorder played Iranian classical music.
 The Structure of This Book
This book is a knitwork between fine-grained narratives taking the reader 
ever more deeply into the complexities of the social construction of diver-
sity among Hamburg’s Iranians and how it relates to their chances and 
difficulties to create capital in different social fields. The four first chap-
ters are “paired”, with each pair looking at social dynamics which involve 
two occupational groups who entertain transnational relations.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the ways import-export entrepreneurs nego-
tiate their presence in Hamburg—a discussion that simultaneously traces 
Image 1.1 Black tea, a tablecloth from Iran and a part of Siavash’s family archives 
at his home. (July 2013, author’s photo)
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in the history of Iranian migration to the port city. Chapter 2 investigates 
how Ali and Jalal, two early Iranian merchants who came to Hamburg in 
the 1930s, mobilized kin to generate capital along the lines of generation, 
gender, and age and how this affects the way their children engage with 
other Iranians today. Chapter 3 reconstructs, through archival docu-
ments and historic accounts, how Iranian carpet merchants’ collective 
identitary narrative became motivated by shared politics of value that 
engaged with changing systems of value in three local and transnational 
social fields over more than 60 years.
Chapters 4 and 5, in turn, concern contemporary dynamics and exam-
ine the individual trajectories and interactions among artists and people 
who consider themselves in connection to the world of art. Chapter 4 
looks at the creation of collective identifications from an in-group per-
spective, that is, through the analysis of processes of inclusion and exclu-
sion of different people in the cultural association Golestan. It illustrates 
what it means to claim culturally pluralistic identifications in the system 
of value that shapes the German public sphere and sees national identifi-
cations as mutually exclusive. Conversely, in Chap. 5, I take an intra- 
relational perspective to examine how boundary-making between three 
film professionals relates to their politics of value and barriers to their 
capital creation in different social fields.
Chapter 6 offers, in the examination of social interactions around the 
organization of an Iranian cultural festival, a context in which different 
agents that appeared in previous chapters interact. The juxtaposition of 
the different ways interlocutors engaged with the festival’s organizer 
Behruz allows me to show how social differentiation among Iranians in 
Hamburg engages with multiple, contradictory systems of value.
In the conclusion I stress that migrants are active agents, who, depend-
ing on their personal trajectories, interests, and engagements, juggle 
resources to negotiate barriers to their capital creation in ephemeral, situ-
ational, often contradictory, and not always conscious ways in order to 
navigate swiftly vanishing and appearing chances and barriers to their 
generation of capital. Studying internal diversity, I argue, is showing how 
migrants are active agents in local and transnational relations that con-
test, evade, reproduce, and produce inequality.
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2
Cohesion and Conflict in Transnational 
Merchant Families
[Ali] is a merchant, an importer, whose company is located in Tehran, and 
in Tabriz, and at the Ballinndamm in Hamburg. He plays an important 
role in Hamburg’s big Persian colony. Since decades, the Persians are well- 
reputed merchants in our Hanseatic city. Those who settled in Hamburg 
and their families brought to us a little bit of Orient. In their well-kept 
homes near the Alster, they cultivate native custom and manner, even if 
their children grew on the shores of Elbe and Alster and they only went to 
school with Jungs and Deerns [local dialect: boys and girls] from Hamburg. 
(Hamburger Anzeiger, 17/08/1953,1 author’s translation, emphasis in 
the original)
This extract of a newspaper article from 1953 portrays, in the example of 
Ali, the situation of Iranian merchants in Hamburg from a local German 
viewpoint. The quotation underlines the transnational dimension of Ali’s 
business activities. It presents the local insertion of merchants as deriving 
from their important place in the local economy over several decades. 
1 All citations from the Hamburg city archives (Staatsarchiv Hamburg, STAHH) are in footnotes:
Hamburger Anzeiger, “In zwölf Monaten: Moschee in Hamburg”, 17/08/1953, no. 177, 
Staatliche Pressestelle I-IV (1919–1954), 135-1 I-IV_4636, STAHH.
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Thereby, the article states that Iranian merchant families maintain Iranian 
values in private, but conform to local ways of life in public. Further, it 
alludes to the role of family relations in their local engagements, and 
implicitly poses the question of the possibilities for a greater integration 
of their German-grown children. This chapter concentrates on diversity 
within kin groups. Utilizing a diachronic approach, I investigate how Ali 
and Jalal, two merchants with Azeri and Gilaki ethnic identifications who 
came to Hamburg in the 1930s, mobilized kinship relations to generate 
capital. Which role do constructions of gender, generational, and age 
hierarchies play in differentiation within these transnational families? 
How do these dynamics influence the descendants’ own identifications 
and their usage in strategies of capital creation, in particular, the way they 
position themselves in Iranian social fields? At the same time, this ethno-
graphic analysis that interweaves different sources of material, oral his-
tory accounts of living family members and contemporaries, secondary 
literature, and family and public archives also aims at historicizing Iranian 
immigration to Hamburg.
In anthropology, family relations are conceived of not as naturally 
given, but as socially constructed. Kinship is a state of doing rather than 
a state of being (Schneider 1984). Defined through its relationality, it 
relies on a “mutuality of being”, that is, on collective experience of emo-
tions and life events (Sahlins 2013). Following Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 
167), kinship is also a set of possible relations one may draw upon for 
their strategic and practical use through the engagement in “constant 
maintenance work” in the form of “material and symbolic exchanges”. I 
thus understand kinship through the description of the struggle about 
the definition of roles within a system of relationships, moving between 
changing degrees of differentiation and connection (Strathern 2014).
For at least 20 years now, scholars have been interested in understand-
ing the role of the family in transnational migration. In coherence with 
the conception of kinship as a matter of practice, transnational families 
are defined
as families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet 
hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collec-
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tive welfare and unity, namely ‘familyhood’, even across national borders. 
(Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, 3)
Studies of transnational families show that kinship relations may gener-
ate crucial resources: the creation and circulation of economic capital is 
certainly one of the most studied aspects of transnational kinship rela-
tions (Conway and Cohen 1998; Monsutti 2005; Sana and Massey 
2005). Moreover, these ties represent a social resource which migrants 
may build on, for example, when emigrating (Massey et al. 1998, 42ff.; 
Moghaddari 2015, 134f.), or rely on for child care when being away 
(Baldassar and Merla 2014). In her study of Chinese transnational 
business families, Aihwa Ong (1999) made an important contribution 
to the study of the way kinship, that is, relations of alliance and filia-
tion, is involved in practices of flexible capital creation through migra-
tion. Ong demonstrates how family fathers strategically place their kin 
in different countries to engage in professional trajectories, higher edu-
cation, citizenship acquisition, and marriage alliances, in order to 
increase the family’s collective efficiency in generating capital in differ-
ent social fields (1999, 124–57). This chapter expands on her work as it 
interrogates, through the relational approach to kinship, the family 
members’ responses to hierarchical role attribution. Moreover, based on 
a historically informed ethnography and research on kinship relations 
in other transnational trade networks (Curtin 1984; Fewkes 2009), it 
stresses the dimension of time and temporality in the understanding of 
geographical flexibility.
A brief sketch of the socio-economic organization of merchants in Iran 
and in Germany sets the grounds for the ethnographic description of 
Iranian merchants’ flexible strategies of capital creation through mar-
riages, transnational brotherly relations, and the image of the nuclear 
family. Building on these descriptions, the analysis of differentiations and 
disruptions that developed between kin offers an understanding of how 
the experience of kinship, in combination with inherited resources (or 
their lack), influences the ways in which migrants’ descendants engage 
with other people of Iranian origin.
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 Bazaris Meet Kaufmänner: Conditions of Early 
Iranian Mercantile Migration
As mentioned in the introduction, Iranian migration to Hamburg 
began—although initially very slowly—after the conclusion of the first 
“commercial and friendship treaty” between Iran and the Hanseatic cit-
ies of Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg2 in 1857 (Khan, Rumpf 
23/07/18573). Of course, commercial cooperation between Europe and 
Iran was not completely new: economic relations can be traced back to 
historical trade networks of the silk route which connected Europe to 
Asia, passing through Iran (Tsutomu 2013, 235).4 Local products, such 
as carpets, dried fruits, silk worms, cocoons, and opium were exported 
to Russia, to the Caucasus, and, via Turkey, to Europe. According to the 
80-year-old merchant Akbar, Istanbul was one of the first foreign desti-
nations of successful Iranian merchants.5 However, with the rising effi-
ciency of trade6 and with growing competition (Tsutomu 2013, 247), 
they searched for alternative business strategies. The establishment of 
bilateral trade relations with German cities thus offered the possibility to 
set up a branch in Hamburg and reach new markets in Europe and 
North America.
As in many similar historical cases, these trade networks were mainly 
based on kinship relations. Fewkes (2009, 61ff.) and Van (2011), for 
example, describe the centrality of filiation and alliance in sustaining reli-
ability and creating resources acknowledged in different locations of trade 
2 At that time, Germany was not a state yet. Until the foundation of the German Reich under 
William I in 1871, the city of Hamburg was part of the German Confederation, a loose association 
of 39 German states.
3 Ferrokh Khan, Vincent Rumpff, Beglaubigte Copie des Freundschafts- und Handelsvertrags der 
Hansestädte mit Persien d.d. Paris, 23/07/1857, Ältere Register E III, 132-5/2, STAHH. See also 
Gropp and Shaghaghi (2009).
4 One of its main routes passed through the northern provinces of Iran (Azerbaijan, Gilan, and 
Mazanderan), which, thanks to their thriving commerce, were the most prosperous regions of Iran 
in the nineteenth century.
5 The Persian Gulf region is another historical center for Persian merchant houses (Moghadam 
2013), but in Hamburg, merchants from north Iran were much more significant.
6 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the old system of caravans passing the silk routes was 
gradually replaced by railway and steam boats (Tsutomu 2013, 238f.).
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within historical trade networks in Ladakh and New England, respec-
tively. Indeed, setting up a new branch in Hamburg was frequently a son’s 
task. Importantly, this migration was predominantly male, as most of 
these rather young men were either bachelors or they left their wives and 
children in Iran. This group of pioneering merchants was marked by 
strong ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity,7 but held together by a 
shared adherence to the logics of Iranians bazari networks.
The Iranian marketplace, the bazar, is a physical space within which 
social and economic transactions take place in hierarchized networks 
(Keshavarzian 2007, 16). The term bazari, that can be attributed to the 
pioneering merchants, refers to
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, brokers, and middlemen who make up the 
historic commercial class situated in urban centers and involved in diffuse, 
complex, and long-term exchange relations with the city, the nation, and 
international markets. (Keshavarzian 2007, 228)
In Iran, the bazaris, just like urban entrepreneurs and the clergy, can be 
defined as the traditional “propertied middle class” (Abrahamian 1982, 
432f.). At the time the first merchants came to Hamburg, the Iranian 
bazar’s social structure was characterized by a high level of social, cultural, 
ethnic, and religious diversity. According to Arang Keshvarzian, there was 
no official monitoring organism that supervised commercial activities. 
Instead, based on a tight social network of mutual acquaintance, infor-
mal socio-economic activities8 relied on a system of reputation in which 
traders could monitor each other’s activities, reward honesty, and sanc-
tion betrayal through public shaming. Multiplex relations, including kin-
ship, friendship, neighborhood relations, and common religious and 
leisure practices, cutting across professional hierarchies sustain the mutual 
monitoring. Shared values such as honesty, generosity, religious adher-
ence, modesty, and expertise were the basis for collective identifications. 
Conflicts were resolved internally to preserve the reputation of the com-
7 As Sepehr explained to me, it was constituted by Christians of ethnic Armenian origin, Jews, and 
Muslims identifying as Azari or Persian origin.
8 Most long-term commercial collaboration was concluded with a handshake, without a legal 
contract.
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munity as a whole. Long-term cooperation, secured by the ongoing cre-
ation of mutual debt in exchange, was a necessary condition to this 
reputation system (Keshavarzian 2007, 17, 88ff.).
The Iranian bazari offspring that arrived in Hamburg met a relatively 
favorable professional environment. The city already looked back on a 
history of several hundred years as an important northern European 
trading port. From the thirteenth century onward, Hamburg’s mer-
chants were involved in a vast trade network, the Hanse. It connected 
important port cities in the area of the North and Baltic Sea to Western 
European and Mediterranean trade networks (Wubs-Mrozewicz 2013, 
6). Interestingly, the structure of trade in this network had much in 
common with the social organization of the historical Tehran bazar. 
Indeed, the Hanse was not so much a formal trading trust than a shared 
concept. As in the bazar, commercial cooperation was based on a sys-
tem of reputation. Similarly, this involved mutual monitoring through 
multiplex long- term relations with shared values tying merchants 
together (Ewert and Selzer 2009, 5ff.). Here, too, kinship, marriage, 
and fictive kinship were the social glue holding together long-term 
cooperation (Ewert and Sunder 2011, 6). In Hamburg, the mercantile 
spirit survived after the decline of the Hanse in the seventeenth century 
(Wubs-Mrozewicz 2013, 14f.) and its incorporation into the German 
Reich in 1871, thanks to the ongoing economic activity and strong 
political influence of a restricted number of highly interrelated mercan-
tile and legal bourgeois families. Thus, they successfully asserted their 
position against the aristocracy, the military, and intellectual elite until 
the early twentieth century and were attributed important political 
positions after the fall of the German monarchy in 1918 (Evans 
1991, 120–35).
In sum, shared professional ethics facilitated the insertion of Iranian 
merchants in the local economy. In the social organization of local and 
Iranian merchants, kinship relations were central. However, as we will 
see, the relations of Iranians with Hamburg’s well-established merchant 
houses rarely went beyond professional activities, at least for the first 
generation.
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 Pioneers in Flexible Capital Creation
After World War I and Shah Reza Pahlavi’s coronation in 1925, Iran and 
Germany, under the Weimar Republic, increased their bilateral relations 
out of mutual interest: the Shah’s cooperation with Germany, an indus-
trialized country with only a minor colonial past, was part of his inten-
tion to undermine the British and Russian influence in Iran (Azimi 2008, 
111f.). The Weimar Republic, in turn, was in search for an independent 
trade partner that exported raw material and provided a market for 
German manufactured goods. Although, from 1929, bilateral trade rela-
tions were endangered by a trade imbalance deriving from the Great 
Depression and political scandals (Mahrad 1979, 21–50; Digard et al. 
2007, 75), it was in this context that the first Iranian merchants set up 
businesses in Hamburg.9
The emerging businessman Ali came to Hamburg in 1931 and I met 
his youngest son Siavash (through an employee at the Ohlsdorf cemetery) 
at his home in rural Lower Saxony in 2013. As the practicing Muslim in 
his early sixties was very interested in my research, arguing that there is a 
lack of documentation on the history of Iranian migration to Hamburg, 
he also arranged interviews with his oldest brother Sepehr and his sister 
Gita. It was Sepehr who told me that, in migrating, their father Ali joined 
a distant relative who was already an established merchant. He arrived 
together with his friend Khalil, the son of a successful merchant from 
Tabriz—a sort of tie that represented an important social capital in the 
new city. Ali was born in Tabriz, the capital of the northwestern Iranian 
province of Eastern Azerbaijan, as the third of four sons of his father’s first 
wife (see Fig. 2.1). His father was no bazari, but the administrator of a 
large estate. According to Siavash, Ali was from a highly religious family, 
and he enjoyed education at foreign schools, which provided him with 
useful language skills in French and English. Consequently, Siavash com-
mented, “My father was the one among the brothers whose education 
9 Trade networks did not only span between Iran and Germany, but some merchant houses, as 
Keyanian Company (Keyaniyan 2014) founded in 1931 or Ghazanfar & Azad, founded in 1938 
(Handelsregister, 231-7_B1986-56 Band I, STAHH, see copy in the appendix), were partnerships 
with Iranian traders from an older hub for Iranian trade, Bombay.
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people thought would be worth to invest in  – more than the others” 
(Interview, July 2013).
Ali was a teenager when his father died, but, according to his children, 
it fell to him to ensure the financial survival of the family. Their observa-
tion hints to the fact that, not least through his education, Ali defied the 
typical hierarchy of sibling groups structured by order of birth (and gen-
der, if applicable) (Kuper 2004, 212). He entered the bazar economy 
with only a modest capital and when he was in his early thirties and 
unmarried, the self-made man started to work for an Iranian merchant in 
Hamburg, traveling back and forth to maintain contacts with trade part-
ners. Iranian trade houses came along with their own social and profes-
sional hierarchy, with import-exporters at their head, followed by 
managers (Geschäftsführer, Prokurist), scripts, and other clerks 
(Keshavarzian 2007, 78ff.). I learned from archival material (Lisowski 
03/11/194710) and from my interlocutors that it was usual practice for 
newcoming Iranians like Ali to first work for one of the established 
10 Lisowski (Stadtsekretär), handwritten comment, 03/11/1947, doc.3, indemnification request of 
Mahmout Chenavar, 351-11_54744, STAHH.
Iranian German Mexican
of bi- or multinational parents
dead
Family tree of the family Vladi. 
The symbols indicate the gender 
(triangle: male, circle: female).
live in Iran
live in Switzerland
live in the USA
Vietnamese of Nepalese origin
adopted
grew up in Hamburg to Iranian parents
died in infancy
Emma Ali
Gita Sepehr Sorush Siavash
Fig. 2.1 Ali’s family tree, all non-specified people live or lived in Germany
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bazaris, and, once they had gained sufficient social, cultural, and eco-
nomic capital, open their own merchant house. Indeed, in 1933—four 
months after Adolf Hitler became the chancellor of Germany—Ali finally 
set up his own business. His Iranian nationality thereby did not pose a 
problem, as Iranians were considered Aryans according to the Nazis’ 
racial ideology (Abrahamian 2008, 86). “Luckily they did not know that, 
as an Azeri, he was an ethnic Turk”, Siavash commented with a wink.
Jalal came to Hamburg three years after Ali, in 1936, when he was 32 
years old, and I met his daughter Solmaz, an energetic woman in her late 
fifties at the Color festival in June 2013 (see Chap. 5). She told me that, 
contrary to Ali, Jalal was not a self-made-man: he was the son of a bazari 
from Rasht, the capital of Gilan province, who traded rice and dried 
fruits to Baku, Azerbaijan. His wealthy father had 4 wives and 12 chil-
dren (see Fig. 2.2). Nevertheless, as his first son, Jalal had been much 
coddled. When his father’s enterprise ran into financial difficulties in 
1936, he was sent to Hamburg to diversify capital assets. According to a 
biographer of the family, he left his wife Mahbubeh, pregnant with his 
second son Taghi, as well as his three-year-old son Nima behind in Iran 
Solmaz
Iranian
German
of bi- or multinational parents
dead
Family tree of the family Lankarany. The symbols indicate the 
gender (triangle: male, circle: female, square: gender unknown).
live in Iran live in the USA
Mahbubeh
Anna Taraneh
Jalal Khosro
Nima Taghi
Mehran
Fig. 2.2 Jalal’s family tree, all non-specified people live or lived in Germany. The 
data for the extended family is simplified for reasons of pertinence
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(Lankarany 2009, 11). Jalal’s father’s reputation constituted social capital 
that helped him earn the trust of the local Iranian merchants and get 
employed as a typist.
Thus, Ali and Jalal both came to Hamburg in the context of dynamics 
Aihwa Ong calls “flexible citizenship”, that is, “the strategies and effects 
of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both cir-
cumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting dif-
ferent sites for investments, work, and family relocation” (idem 1999, 
112). Accordingly, to pursue their career in Hamburg and create eco-
nomic capital, they built on social capital, in particular on family reputa-
tion, kinship, and friendship ties they had at their disposal in the 
transnational social fields of Iranian merchants.
 German Alliances?
Of course, Ali and Jalal did not only strive to create capital in transna-
tional, but also in local social fields. In their professional life, they con-
ducted business with German merchants, and in the private domain, 
many married German women. Which German women?
One day in 1931, Ali went to conclude a business agreement with a 
Jewish German merchant, where he met the 15-year-old apprentice 
Emma. The young German woman, who grew up in poverty with her 
divorced mother and older sister, was impressed by the foreign merchant, 
who, according to the family’s biographer, was elegantly dressed in a vio-
let silk suit (Vladi 2004, 96). Encouraged by Ali’s new friend Mohammad, 
a son of a successful bazari family, Ali and Emma married six years later. 
Their wedding ceremony took place in one of the most prestigious restau-
rants in Hamburg, the “Uhlenhorster Fährhaus”. The couple will have 
one daughter, Gita, born in 1938, and three sons, Sepehr, Sorush, and 
Siavash, born in 1940, 1945, and 1948. Gita’s memories show that her 
parents were one among many mixed couples:
Gita “There was the consul who was in office at the outbreak of the war, 
Abol Pourvali, and his German wife Gabi.”
Sonja “He had a German wife?”
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Gita “Yes, she was an employee at the consulate (Konsulatsangestellte) and 
then he married her […]. In the Mittelweg [street in the upper middle- 
class neighborhood Harvestehude] lived the Daroga family. He was 
Persian, she was German and they had a daughter whose hair was blond 
[…]. That was in [19]46, [19]47. Then, there was a certain Mister 
Chaichi, who had married a German from Peine, near Hannover. They 
married in Hannover – in Peine, and we were invited. I think the woman 
was from a patissier family.” (Interview, March 2014)
Indeed, marrying a local, even across ethnic and religious boundaries, 
ideally, marrying into a local merchant family, was a frequent practice in 
certain historical merchant networks, such as those of merchant families 
from Ladakh. Such unions do not only secure the acquisition of locality- 
specific resources for the next generation, but also create new social 
resources through the spouse’s relatives (Fewkes 2009, 75ff.; see also 
Curtin 1984). However, marriage practices were sometimes restrained by 
local social and political prescriptions that aimed to ensure the temporary 
nature of trade colonies (Van 2011, 276ff.). It is striking that, in Hamburg, 
most German women who married early Iranian merchants were of 
rather modest background. This was the case of both Emma and Anna, 
the young German model Jalal married in the early 1950s. Following 
Bourdieu, affinal relationships “are the product of strategies oriented 
towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organized 
by reference to a particular type of economic and social conditions” (idem 
1990, 167). To better situate Ali’s and Jalal’s marriage, let us consider the 
different parties’ interests in these alliances.
First, well-established upper- and middle-class families in Hamburg 
tended to encourage endogamy, as their companies were usually passed 
on to male descendants or affines (Evans 1991, 122). Alliances within the 
social group reduced the costs caused by professional apprenticeship and 
the creation of trust (Ziegler 2000, 19ff.). Although arranged marriages 
were no longer the norm in the early twentieth century, the father’s con-
sent to a marriage was normally necessary. German commercial middle- 
class patriarchs were thus rather reluctant to let their daughters marry 
Iranian merchants: the latter had the necessary economic but not social 
and cultural resources (e.g. language skills, business codes, religious 
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beliefs) relevant in social fields of Hamburg’s German merchants—and 
they were considered as racial Other, as we can see in Gita’s highlighting 
the girl’s blond hair as something remarkable. Significantly, Parviz told 
me that, when Louise married him in 1955, she did so against father’s 
expressed opposition. Accordingly, the local industrial entrepreneur 
refrained from integrating his Iranian son-in-law into the family enter-
prise. However, the couple later lived in the family’s villa, Louise’s heri-
tage, which Parviz shows me on the drawing below (Image 2.1).
Second, for German women of modest backgrounds, Iranian mer-
chants were attractive marriage partners, in particular in times of crises 
(in the 1930s and after WWII), as, according to Parviz, these young men 
were—or pretended to be—affluent and rather generous. Significantly, 
Image 2.1 Drawing of the villa Parviz inherited from his German parents-in-law. 
(April 2014, author’s photo)
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Emma commented in her memoirs (cited in Vladi 2014, 12) that from 
the day she dated Ali “my life changed. I had a good, thoughtful  boyfriend, 
we had a canoe11 and friends and I had a full stomach.” Emma stopped 
working and experienced upward social mobility, evident in the couple’s 
new lifestyle: they moved to Harvestehude (Evans 1991, 130) and bought 
a Mercedes Cabriolet. Simultaneously, with her marriage, Emma “became 
Iranian”: she did not only get a new Iranian first name, the young woman 
had to exchange her German for the Iranian citizenship12 and convert to 
Islam,13 although, according to Siavash, she never practiced the religion. 
Emma’s mother also benefitted from the marriage: Ali covered all her 
expenses and generously bought her a house on the countryside (Vladi 
2004, 98, 2014, 31). He thus created social and economic capital both 
within and through the family. In the photo (Image 2.2), the couple’s 
claim for upward mobility is reflected in the elegance of Ali and Emma’s 
dress and the centrality of their young family within the extended 
kin group.
Finally, expatriation offered young Iranian merchants a greater free-
dom for making the marriage of their choice. At that time, it was usual 
in Iran for marriages to be arranged according to family interests, in 
 particular among merchants14 (Keshavarzian 2007, 95). An important 
factor in Ali’s life was, according to his children, his wish to move back 
to Iran, which he maintained almost until his death. In the face of the 
restrictiveness of the local Iranian marriage market, Emma was a good 
choice for Ali. As she was not from a local merchant family, she was not 
likely to expect Ali to participate in their sociability. Moreover, although 
marrying into a German merchant family would have offered important 
opportunities for capital creation, a daughter of a well-established 
 family may not have been open toward a return migration. Thus, 
11 Having a canoe meant being able to participate in middle-class leisure activities in a city with as 
many canals as Hamburg.
12 Until the marriage law was changed in 1953, German women lost their citizenship when marry-
ing a foreigner (Einbock 2015).
13 According to Shia Islamic matrimonial law, Muslim men can conclude a temporary marriage 
(siqeh) with a woman of Christian, Jewish, or Zoroastrian faith, but if the marriage is to be perma-
nent, the woman has to convert to Islam (Nayyeri 2013).
14 In diverse ways, marriages may still be arranged today in certain Iranian families (Moghaddari 
2015, 135–40).
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even though this marriage did not immediately provide him with eco-
nomic resources, nor with German citizenship15 (cultural capital), 
becoming a head of family offered him the possibility to inhabit an 
image of a responsible adult, which increased his trustworthiness (social 
capital) among merchants.
Importantly, although Ali and Jalal both married Germans, they con-
structed their families around Iranian identifications for two reasons. 
First, there was a strong social cohesion among merchants of Iranian ori-
gin that relied on multiplex relations in which professional ties inter-
weaved with kinship, friendship, and neighborly ties. Siavash told me 
that most Iranian merchant families settled in the same district, 
Harvestehude, which was also popular among local merchants. They had 
their office in the city’s commercial center, and only their stock houses at 
15 It was not before a change in legislation in 1969 that such a union offered access to German citi-
zenship for foreign men (Einbock 2015).
Image 2.2 Christmas 1938 and Emma’s mother’s place. From right to left: Emma’s 
sister’s husband, Ali, Emma’s sister with Gita, Emma, and her mother (Siavash’s 
family archives)
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the warehouse district. These links build largely on their identification as 
Iranian, and they represented their business’ competitive advantage (see 
Chap. 3 for a detailed discussion).
Second, German society posed limitations to migrants’ inclusion 
(Aumüller 2009, 191). As mentioned earlier, German wives had to take 
Iranian citizenship. Consequently, their children had Iranian and no 
German passports. Reminiscent of the introductory quote to this chap-
ter, when Ali and Jalal founded their families, a differentialist approach to 
immigration prevailed in Germany. Migrants’ cultivation of difference 
was tolerated as it was seen as a guarantee for their return migration16 
(Brubaker 2001, 537). Thus, Hamburg’s society conceded pioneering 
Iranian merchants Iranian at the expense of German identifications.
The perception of these Iranian identifications was shaped by the 
German economic interest in trade with Iran, the people’s fascination for 
the “exotic” coexisted with xenophobic and racist tendencies. Parviz, for 
instance, told me proudly that once, while he was walking on the street, 
German passersby asked him whether he was from Hollywood. Siavash, 
in contrast, reported “When I was at school, there were always two 
 swear- words: carpet trader and camel driver [Kameltreiber]” (interview, 
July 2013).
Having described the first years of Ali’s and Jalal’s life in Hamburg, I 
need to make a short digression from the analysis of kinship relations in 
order to explain the type of relationship the two men entertained with 
one another.
 Why Ali and Jalal Were Not Friends
According to Sepehr, about ten Iranian (and binational) families and a 
few bachelors lived in Hamburg before the World War II.  Given the 
small number, Ali and Jalal must have known each other. However, there 
is no record of an encounter, and their children do not remember the 
other family. To understand Ali’s and Jalal’s relation, I suggest considering 
16 As shall be discussed in Chap. 4, it was only when the German society and politics began to 
accept the durability of immigration in the late 1990s, that this approach changed.
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their different ways to engage with political powers in their strategies of 
capital creation.
According to Siavash, Ali followed what he calls the “bazari mindset” 
(Bazarimentalität) in his political positioning: even if he did not agree with 
the political line of a government, thanks to skillful impression manage-
ment (Goffman 1990),  he pragmatically kept good relations with it in 
order not to endanger his business activities. He thus attended receptions 
at the Consulate General of Iran (established in 1934), and I could iden-
tify him on a picture at the celebration of Mohammad Reza Shah’s wed-
ding at the General Consulate in Hamburg in April 1939, published in a 
local newspaper (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 26/04/1939, no 115, Staatliche 
Pressestelle I-IV (1919–1954), 135-1 I-IV_4636, STAHH). There, he was 
able to meet not only government officials, but also scientists and German 
trade professionals17 (Hamburger Anzeiger, 20/04/1934; Hamburger 
Fremdenblatt, 20/03/1936; Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 16/03/194018). If we 
are to believe Parviz, he even ordered a carpet based on a portrait of Adolf 
Hitler to be knotted in Tabriz and offered it to the Führer in person.
Contrary to the zealous newcomer and family man Ali, the grass- 
widower Jalal was a man-about-town. However, according to the mer-
chant Omid, he was a political person. His daughter Solmaz confirmed:
Luckily, father was not religious, but moralistic. He was totally politically 
interested. He also watched the news all day and only read nonfiction 
books, and newspapers, as long as he could still read. (Interview, 
July 2013)
Jalal’s political opinions had serious consequences on his opportunities to 
create capital. Although exchanges between Nazi Germany and Iran came 
to an abrupt end as the British and Russians occupied Iran in summer of 
1941 (Mahrad 1979, 117–29, 181), he stayed in Hamburg during 
17 Preparing for a war, National-Socialist Germany intensified trade with Iran between 1936 and 
1940 and became Iran’s most important trading partner (Keddie 2006, 101).
18 Hamburger Anzeiger, “Persisch-deutsche Handelsbeziehungen”, 20/04/1934 no 92; Hamburger 
Fremdenblatt, “Iranisch-deutscher Abend”, 20/03/1936, no 80; Hamburger Fremdenblatt‚ 
“Empfang des iranischen Generalkonsuls”, 16/03/1940, no 75a, all Staatliche Pressestelle I-IV 
(1919–1954), 135-1 I-IV_4636, STAHH.
 S. Moghaddari
55
WWII. In October 1944, during one of the parties he frequently orga-
nized at his apartment, he critiqued Adolf Hitler. On the following day, 
one of his German guests denounced him to the authorities. Soon, the 
Gestapo arrested Jalal. They proposed him to spy for the German govern-
ment. Jalal refused, was sent to the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen,19 
and was only liberated one year later by the British army, heavily struck 
by typhus.20 Anticipatory flexible capital creation—he had set up a bank 
account in the name of his sons in Geneva, Switzerland, to where his 
friend Nasser took his assets at his detention—saved him from losing his 
economic capital (Lankarany 2009, 25f.). However, as we will see, this 
episode will not remain the only time Jalal’s proclivity to stick to his 
strong moral and political principles posed limitations to his capi-
tal creation.
For Ali’s part, when the war started, he took his young family to Tabriz. 
After a year and a half, Emma pushed toward returning to Hamburg. 
When, in the summer of 1943, their home and the company premises 
were struck by bombs, the family moved to live with Emma’s mother in 
the house Ali had bought for her on the countryside.
In the following decades, Ali continued to pragmatically maintain 
good ties with German and Iranian political power holders. Regularly, he 
and his family participated in receptions that took place in the local 
Iranian Consulate General and assisted, whenever possible, at events 
organized around Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s visits in Hamburg in 
1955 and 1967. According to Siavash, his father also entertained good 
ties with Hamburg’s political and economic elite, and with highly posi-
tioned Iranian Shia clerics. These contacts were nourished not only 
through his thriving business but also through his leading role within the 
Iranian Shia Muslim community. In 1941, Ali co-established an Iranian 
Islamic burial ground21 in the city’s main cemetery, and from the early 
19 The concentration camp Bergen-Belsen was situated in Lower Saxony, about 100 km South of 
Hamburg.
20 According to archival sources, two other Hamburg-based Iranians were also arrested for political 
motivations and jailed in Concentration Camps (Hassan Lankarany, sworn declaration, 
05/01/1948, doc. 8, Antrag auf Wiedergutmachung von Mahmout Chenavar, 351-11_54744/8, 
STAHH).
21 According to Siavash, until then, corpses had been repatriated to Iran, which was no longer pos-
sible due to the war.
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1950s, he became the head of an association of merchants that advocated 
for and co-financed the construction of the Imam Ali mosque, which is 
today Germany’s second oldest still intact mosque (Verein der Förderer 
einer iranisch-islamischen Moschee in Hamburg e.V. 05/05/1955; Jess 
10/01/195822).
For his part, Jalal followed invitations on the occasion of the Shah’s 
visits, as archival sources confirm (Hüber 11/02/1955; Hüber 
15/02/195523), but according to his daughter without Ali’s fervor. 
Moreover, while Jalal showed himself very generous with his family and 
friends, he was not particularly interested in entertaining ties beyond this 
circle. From the mosque, he kept a critical distance as, according to 
Solmaz, he was an atheist.
Discrepancies between Ali’s and Jalal’s strategies of capital creation are 
thus apparent in the way they deal with political and religious power 
holders. They certainly reflect distinct personal values (for instance, 
political integrity versus economic security), which however interact 
with their unequal starting position: while Ali made private and profes-
sional alliances with the zeal of a self-made man with modest family 
resources, Jalal’s privileged upbringing may have contributed to him 
being more reckless in social relations, in particular with the authorities. 
On the basis of their divergent values, they strove to create capital in dif-
ferent social fields—and their interests did not coincide. Thus, foreshad-
owing an argument that I develop further in the following chapters, 
shifting boundaries among migrants not only depend on their trajecto-
ries in the country of immigration, but also on the compatibility of their 
engagement and respective positionality in  local and transnational 
social fields.
22 Verein der Förderer einer Iranisch-Islamischen Moschee in Hamburg e.V., extract from the min-
utes of the general assembly that took place on January 31, 1955, document no. 27, 05/05/1955; 
Jess (Senator), letter to the city mayor, 10/01/1958, Sonstige Glaubensbewegungen (1922–1988), 
Senatskanzlei II, 131-1 II _874, STAHH.
23 Reinhard Hüber (president of the German-Iranian chamber of commerce), letter to Senator 
Ohlendorf, 11/02/1955, doc. 020.11-15; Reinhard Hüber, letter to Naso (secretary of the Nah- 
und Mittelost Verein), 15/02/1955, both in “Inoffizieller Besuch von Mohammad Reza Schah und 
seiner Kaiserin Soraya”, Empfang und Essen im Festsaal des Rathauses, Empfänge und Besuche 
nach Einzelplan 0 (Verfassung und Verwaltung) (1947-1990.03), Senatskanzlei II, 137-1 II_4438, 
STAHH.
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To resume the discussion, Ali and Jalal’s different values were also 
reflected in the way they practiced kinship. Let us first consider how they 
involved their siblings living in Iran in their transnational strategies of 
capital creation.
 Brotherly Ties Between Solidarity and Rivalry
Ali and Jalal (re)built their transnational businesses in the years after the 
World War II, that had left Iran with a new Shah, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, and a highly damaged economy (Mahrad 1979, 189ff.), and 
Hamburg, under British occupation, in destitution and shortage of essen-
tial goods (Sywottek 1986, 384). By the early 1950s, the newly founded 
Federal Republic’s gross national product reached its pre-war strength, 
and economic growth remained unbroken until the mid-1970s—a phe-
nomenon that became known as the “economic miracle” 
(Wirtschaftswunder) (Abelshauser 2004, 275). In 1951, Iran and Germany 
resumed their diplomatic relations, and the Federal Republic returned to 
being Iran’s most important trading partner (Adli 1960, 290; Mousavian 
2008, 15f.). The favorable economic conditions represented an impor-
tant upswing in the German society. During these years, Jalal and Ali 
became successful entrepreneurs, managing five to ten employees, includ-
ing German tax advisors and accountants—but sought different relations 
with their transnational family.
Around 1950, Jalal opened a factory for electrical accessories24 with the 
newest German technology in his hometown Rasht, in addition to the 
import-export business he ran in Hamburg. Thereby, he made his 
17-year-old younger brother Khosro, who lived with him in Hamburg 
since 1946, an associate of the stock company. He also distributed further 
positions and shares among family members living in Iran. Jalal’s involv-
ing of family members living in Iran corresponded to the primordial role 
of the family within the Iranian bazar economy discussed earlier.25 For 
24 At that time, it was a trend among wealthy bazaris in Iran to invest in industrial production 
(Keshavarzian 2007, 79).
25 Similarly, the business records of the company Akbar Ghazafar indicate a large number of rela-
tives, including his German wife, most of whom living in Tehran, among the shareholders 
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him, it was a means to create trust from the important obligations deriv-
ing from exchanges in kinship relations (Sahlins 1972, 191ff.) and, at the 
same time, claim his role as the head of family after his father’s death. 
While both brothers took over formal responsibilities in the transnational 
businesses, Jalal charged Khosro with business administration, while he 
himself had a more laid-back, representative role26 (Lankarany 2009, 
144f.). As in many other places in the world, according to Christian 
Bromberger, in Iran the family is at the core of the social organization. 
Strong solidarity may develop between brothers, but it implies constant 
social control (Bromberger 2005, 136ff., see also idem 2013, 124ff.). 
Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 170) states that “the closest genealogi-
cal relationship, that between brothers, is also the site of the greatest ten-
sion, and incessant work is required to maintain solidarity”, that is, it is 
necessary to manage the tensions that may arise from conflicts of interest 
over the same resources. In Jalal’s family, it were such conflicts, growing 
from contradictory strategies of capital creation, that put into question 
the brotherly solidarity—but I am getting ahead of myself.
Ali, for his part, booked considerable economic success with his 
import-export company. According to Siavash, he mainly imported cot-
ton, licorice, tragacanth, gum Arabic, dried fruits (khoshkbâr; mainly 
apricots, but also raisins, walnuts, pistachios), intestines, and, to a lesser 
extent, carpets. Exports were construction hardware, car locks, and bicy-
cle parts (Vladi 2004, 99). Like Jalal, he also had an office in Tehran, but, 
as his sons explained, he did not involve local family members in his busi-
ness. This was because, during the war, Ali’s brothers had sold his heritage 
and invested it in commerce with Germany. When their gain was confis-
cated by the British after the occupation of Iran, it was lost forever (Vladi 
2004, 98). Indeed, social obligations and competition about resources 
may contribute to the fact that “the circle of solidarity is also that of the 
most common violence” (Monsutti 2004, 222). Research on Middle 
Eastern societies shows that it is not rare for relations among male patri-
lateral relatives, in particular among brothers, to be marked by rivalry 
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 04/04/1963, doc. 26, Handelsregister, 231-7_B1986-56 Band II, 
STAHH).
26 Also, Solmaz told me that, when Khosro married a German, Jalal offered the couple a prestigious 
villa in an upper-class district—as a way to confirm his superior position.
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(Tapper 1979; Werbner 1990, 201; Monsutti 2004, 2011). In order to 
circumvent such competition, Ali tried to balance exchanges with his 
brothers, according to Siavash:
I remember my two brothers went to Iran once by car via Turkey, that was 
1965, 1968. They carried a letter from my father to his brother, which 
featured – after many polite introductory phrases – apparently also a phrase 
whose essence was ‘When do I get my credit back?’ There is a photo of my 
brothers showing him the letter. (Interview, March 2014)
Thus, contrary to Jalal, Ali did not include his brothers into his business 
activities. Instead, he integrated first his close friends,27 and later, his chil-
dren and affines into his strategies of capital creation. It is the analysis of 
the merchants’ relations with their wives and children that the following 
paragraphs are concerned with.
 The (Image of the) Nuclear Family
From the late 1940s, not just Ali, but also Jalal needed to fulfill the role 
of the father: Jalal’s family had joined him in Hamburg. Soon, his wife 
Mahbubeh returned to Iran and the couple divorced, but his teenaged 
sons, Nima and Taghi, stayed with Jalal (Lankarany 2009, 24ff.). After a 
few years—Jalal was already in his late forties—he got to know Anna, a 
blonde and beautiful German model, by more than 20 years his junior. 
In 1952, they married and had a son, Mehran, and in 1955 a daugh-
ter, Solmaz.
By then, both Ali and Jalal had come to considerable wealth. But, as 
Bourdieu (1985, 725) argued, in order to claim upward social mobility, 
economic capital must be sustained by the acquisition of social and cul-
tural capital relevant to the specific social field. Thus, beyond their eco-
nomic activities, to generate such capital forms, the merchants invested, 
27 The reliance on—often multiplex—friendship ties has been observed as central to Pakistani 
entrepreneurs in Britain (Werbner 1990, 174ff.), as well as among Afghans of ethnic Hazara origin 
in Iran and Pakistan (Monsutti 2004, 226).
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first, in conspicuous consumption: both Jalal and Ali bought prestigious 
villas in upper-class districts, which they decorated with antique furni-
ture, art, and craftwork. On the weekends, they went to a casino at the 
Baltic seaside resort Travemüde,28 and they drove expensive and rare cars. 
Ali took his family on holidays abroad, and Jalal bought a newly built 
prestigious nightclub (Lankarany 2009, 33, 48). Second, euergetism was 
another means both used to create capital: as mentioned earlier, Jalal 
would support his friends and family29 while Ali invested into the estab-
lishment of religious and social institutions for local Iranians. Conspicuous 
consumption and philanthropy had two purposes. On the one hand, fol-
lowing Aihwa Ong (1999, 92), they constituted an attempt to overcome 
barriers to capital creation they met in German social fields, that relate to 
their lack of Germany-specific capital or their construction as cultural 
and racial Other. On the other hand, similar to Pnina Werbner’s (1990, 
304ff.) observations among people of Pakistani origin in Manchester, 
such practices aimed at creating capital through the mediation of values 
such as trustworthiness, financial strength, and religious adherence within 
the social fields of Iranian merchants.
The nuclear family was mobilized for the generation of different forms 
of capital, while being at the same time the site of internal differentiation. 
Among the numerous possible instances that have been reported to me, 
social boundaries within the family are particularly evident in the organi-
zation of weekly receptions.30 Within the display of generosity which was 
at the core of these occasions,31 in Ali’s family, each member had specific 
tasks, as Siavash explains:
28 Ali despite being a practicing Muslim.
29 For example, he financed the studies of a broke friend’s sons (Lankarany 2009, 147).
30 In line with their previously mentioned differences, according to Solmaz and Siavash, Jalal mainly 
invited family and friends while Ali hosted representatives from shipping and trading companies, 
members of associations he was involved in, Iranian and former German diplomats in Iran, as 
agents of German and Iranian banks.
31 Beginning with Franz Boas’ (1966, 77–104) study of the potlatch, there are numerous instances 
in anthropological studies showing that the staging of generosity, or ostentatious giving, serves to 
display wealth, create social capital, and thus negotiate social hierarchies. These practices were pres-
ent also among both Hamburg’s merchants (Evans 1991, 129) and bazaris in Iran (Keshavarzian 
2007, 94).
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Siavash “Who busses the dishes? The two youngest. Sorush and I. We did 
not even dine with the guests but we came and went, dished up and 
bussed. And after the chicken broth, there was chelo kabâb [kebab with 
rice]. My mother delightfully knew how to prepare the meat before-
hand. We had a Maghal, today that’s called a barbecue, right, flown in 
from Iran. And then, we had a housekeeper from Bavaria… the old 
women always touched the red-hot coals with her bare hands! Ouch! 
Sepehr, as the oldest, had to grill.”
Sonja “And Gita?”
Siavash “She ate with the guests. As a girl she had to… Or she helped 
mother fill up the rice.” (Interview, July 2013)
Siavash’s description points to how the nuclear family participated in 
these events in different ways, according to their position in the age hier-
archy and their gender. In Jalal’s family, the participation of the wife and 
children was less codified, certainly because, in contrast to Ali’s family, it 
was characterized by many personal and geographical ruptures, but the 
main lines were similar.
Jalal’s and Ali’s wife passively and actively participated in their hus-
band’s creation of social capital. On the one hand, they displayed a cer-
tain prestige. Siavash told me that during these years, his mother was a 
“lady, she made an impression” (interview, July 2013). On the other 
hand, Emma reinforced multiplex relations with other merchant fami-
lies, in joining regular meetings of other Iranians’ (merchants’) wives.32 
Anna, too, showed herself as a caring and generous host, as Solmaz explains:
Even when I was little and I think also before I was born [Jalal] lived in a 
huge apartment where he also always had guests. My mother naturally had 
to help hosting all people, who sometimes moved in there for months. 
(Interview, July 2013)
Thus, similar to wives in British Pakistani families (Werbner 1990), 
Iranian merchants’ wives represented the family’s real or aspired social 
32 Such circles of female sociability that also exist in Iran, and in particular among bazaris 
(Keshavarzian 2007, 94), but have been observed among Iranians in London as well (Spellman 
2004, 70ff.).
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position and contributed, through their socializing, to the generation of 
the family’s resources and recognition thereof as capital.
Ali and Jalal both designated their oldest sons, Sepehr and Nima, to be 
their prospective heirs or at least to take over important responsibilities in 
the family business. They were sent to private boarding schools—in the 
light of the small number of such private colleges in the post-war era 
(Vogel 2005, 259), this aimed at drawing on the prestige of the school 
rather than as a long-term investment in higher education as, after their 
graduation, the fathers incorporated them into their businesses. From 
1957, Sepehr, simultaneously worked and attended a commercial college 
in Hamburg. Nima graduated in 1951 and wanted to become a doctor, 
to what his father first agreed. Then, he changed his mind and forced 
Nima to do an apprenticeship as an instrument mechanic in Southern 
Germany. At the time, it was indeed customary among local German 
merchant families, that sons would first do an apprenticeship at a differ-
ent company, sometimes even overseas, and only be raised as partners in 
the family business once they proved their capacities (Evans 1991, 127). 
As has become clear, Jalal and Ali exerted patriarchal authority to shape 
their wife’s and children’s image and actions in a way that sustained their 
strategies of capital creation. Significantly, Solmaz says about her 
father Jalal
…he was a typical Persian patriarch, strict and barely accessible for his 
children, much less than for his friends and other people who asked some-
thing from him or who needed his help. (Interview, July 2013)
Siavash also said that during meals his father always sat at the top end of 
the table and expected his children to hand him whatever he wanted only 
by looking at the object. Following the principle of filial piety, initially 
the children accepted their father’s plans. Retrospectively, Nima remarks 
“Although I was self-confident otherwise, resistance was inappropriate for 
an Iranian son. You had to obey, it was as simple as that” (Lankarany 
2009, 37).
Ali and Jalal also had plans for their younger sons: Siavash told me 
that, while Sorush was to be a businessman like Sepehr, he was supposed 
to become a captain.
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In fact, he sent his import-export goods with a Persian shipping company, 
and he said, perhaps he trusted an Iranian more than a German shipping 
company, but it would be much better still to have his son on the ship as a 
captain, in order for the wrong goods not to be transshipped in the wrong 
harbor [he laughs]. (Interview, March 2014)
Jalal, for his part, was not as meticulous in planning and integrating his 
children in his businesses as Ali, but he projected that his second and 
third sons Taghi and Mehran would become entrepreneurs. Generally, 
however, expectations and pressure did not weigh as heavily on the 
younger ones as it did than on the first-born sons.
The role of daughters was yet distinct. Both Ali and Jalal encouraged 
their daughters to work: while Gita did an apprenticeship as a secretary 
in Ali’s company between 1957 and 1961,33 when Solmaz came of age in 
the early 1970s, Jalal wanted her to do what he had refused to Nima: 
study medicine. However, in everyday lives, Ali and Jalal monitored their 
daughters more closely than their sons.
Solmaz “Actually, I was allowed to have only few contacts to the outside. 
Female friends some, but I had to ask permission if I wanted to leave the 
house.”
Sonja “Really? That strict?”
Solmaz “Yes. I had to be at home at eight [o’clock] sharp. At eight sharp the 
Tagesschau [news] starts. If I arrived later, I got into terrible trouble. 
Then, there were curfews. He was really terrible in this regard.” 
(Interview, July 2013)
Gita was not as explicit in her description of the father’s control over her 
everyday life. As we shall see later, she had her own conflicts with him, 
but also enjoyed some protection from her mother that Solmaz lacked. 
The increased attention to the daughters’ (sexual) life serves to guarantee 
the family’s collective capital creation: in Iranian as in many other con-
texts, and in particular within the tight social networks of merchants, the 
33 In Iran, the bazar was a male dominated area (Keshavarzian 2007). In Germany, at that time, it 
was a common sign of wealth among German merchants for women not to work (Ziegler 2000, 
28). It was therefore probably the shortage of trustworthy employees that led Ali to have Gita do 
an apprenticeship.
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family’s honor—her reputation—had (and still may have) an important 
influence on their kin’s possibilities of gaining acknowledgment for their 
resources as capital (Bromberger 2003, 87).
In sum, having a wife and children in Hamburg came to play a crucial 
role in Jalal’s and Ali’s strategies of capital creation. On the one hand, the 
men used their wife and children to display economic, cultural, and social 
resources and claim recognition for them as a capital. Even the image of 
the family itself can generate capital: in founding a family Jalal and Ali 
stressed their availability to establish long-term business relations in 
Hamburg. On the other hand, the merchants also delegated capital cre-
ation to their children in practices Ong (1999, 118) calls “family govern-
mentality”. Based on the idea of a common interest in the family business, 
heads of family arrange or promote, through the exercise of patriarchal 
authority, educational, professional, and migratory trajectories; physical 
appearance; and, as we shall see, marriage alliances in order to circumvent 
legal and bureaucratic limitations posed by nation-states. The profes-
sional and private roles and opportunities the merchants’ children were 
thus attributed depended on their age, gender, and place in the birth 
hierarchy. As they grew older, these differentiations within the family 
were renegotiated.
 Dissent, Death, Disruptions
Just as trust in kinship relations can be very beneficial to business success, 
it can also be the cause of failure (Werbner 1990, 75f.), namely, when 
intersubjective conflicts lead to voluntary disruptions. Jalal had to learn 
this the hard way. It all began when his wife Anna left him in 1959, after 
seven years of marriage. Solmaz explained that her mother could not suf-
fer Jalal’s year-long stays in Iran. Moreover, she experienced rejection 
from his mother and sisters. Just as in his business strategies, outraged 
Jalal relied on transnational family ties to resolve the situation. According 
to Iranian family law, custody falls to the father. Consequently, he took 
Mehran and Solmaz to Tehran to be fostered by his mother and sister—
an experience Solmaz describes as traumatic. He did not allow them to 
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see their mother again until 1967. One year later, in 1961, Jalal married 
his third wife, Taraneh, a widow from Rasht who had three sons—the 
youngest of whom was Mehran’s age. The newly composed family moved 
into the villa in Hamburg together.
In 1962, Jalal’s brother Khosro accused him of mismanaging the com-
pany and claimed the right to buy his shares from both the factory in Iran 
and the import-export business in Hamburg. The factory had been pass-
ing through a rough patch. Jalal had declined a request of the royal 
Pahlavi foundation to buy shares, which had resulted in the government 
opening the market to foreign competitors. Plus, according to his chil-
dren, Jalal lost financial resources as he tended to give more to his friends 
and trade partners than he received in return (Lankarany 2009, 146). 
Thus, the brothers relied on the same resources while their strategies of 
capital creation began to diverge; rivalry and competition developed. 
They made an oral agreement according to which Khosro paid Jalal a 
severance as well as a monthly appanage. When, after ten years, Khosro 
stopped the monthly payments, Jalal had no means to claim his allow-
ance (Lankarany 2009, 145–49). The former merchant went bankrupt 
and the two brother’s families permanently broke all their ties.34 According 
to Solmaz, the conflict divided the loyalties of the transnational family. 
Other Iranian merchants in Hamburg tried to reconcile the brothers, in 
vain. While Jalal died impoverished in 2002 at the age of 98 while trying 
to maintain the illusion of wealth,35 Khosro remained wealthy until his 
death in 2015. Jalal’s social decline, well remembered by merchants who 
had known him, certainly augmented his expectations concerning the 
professional trajectories and marriages of his children, which were how-
ever, in Solmaz’ words, “deceived”:
It actually did not work out as he had imagined for any of his children. My 
father’s siblings are all quite well off I think, but nobody of us, his children, 
did what he had fancied he’d do. Thus, [we were] all losers, in a way, in his 
view [she laughs]! (Interview, July 2013)
34 Except for Nima, who took sides for Khosro and against his father for some more time.
35 A strategy that had been observed among downwardly mobile Iranians in Los Angeles (Kelley 
1993).
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Nima failed a study program in which he had enrolled. Then, he refused 
the marriage Jalal arranged for him with a young woman from another 
merchant family living in Iran. Instead, he entered a business school and 
married his German girlfriend. Jalal even bribed the Iranian consul in 
Hamburg to impede on this marriage, unsuccessfully (Lankarany 2009, 
41–51). His second son, Taghi, returned to Tehran in the early 1950s 
(Lankarany 2009, 36–51), but he never became successful with his busi-
ness projects. He is the only one of Jalal’s biological children who married 
an Iranian, but the couple divorced later and Taghi moved to California 
where he died of surgical complications in early 2010. His children 
remained in Iran and his daughter married an Iranian. Nima’s and 
Mehran’s children remained in Germany and the only marriage among 
them is with a German. Mehran, the third son, graduated with a PhD in 
Iranian Studies in 1983, and only later followed the father’s idea in fund-
ing a modest merchant business. Solmaz resisted Jalal’s plan for her to 
study medicine. In 1973, she dropped out of school whereupon he 
evicted her from the family home. During many years, she made a living 
with unskilled jobs, until she became a foreign language correspondent 
clerk. She never funded a family. Thus, one by one, Jalal’s children 
dropped out of the roles Jalal had assigned them to in his flexible capital 
creation.36
Compared to Jalal, Ali was more successful in realizing his plans: his 
marriage remained intact, his first-born Sepehr worked in his company 
and moved to Iran in 1967 for a marriage Ali had arranged for him with 
the daughter of a successful entrepreneur. He founded a new business 
with his father-in-law in Iran, which aimed at saving the ailing family 
business. Ali’s younger sons negotiated professional trajectories that 
slightly deviated from his original idea, but that did not cause major rela-
tional issues. All was good—if it was not for his daughter Gita. While Ali 
tried to marry her to a young Iranian business partner established in 
Tokyo, Gita became engaged to her Spanish teacher—who was a German 
and a practicing Catholic. Acting against Ali, Gita left the family enter-
36 Jalal probably did not include Taraneh’s three sons in his strategies of capital creation. Significantly, 
Solmaz called her half-brothers “brothers”, while she named her step-brothers by their accurate 
term (Stiefbruder).
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prise in 1962, when she was 24 years old, and worked as a secretary in 
Barcelona. “I won’t let them marry me off!” (interview, March 2014), she 
comments in retrospect. Only Emma, her mother, attended Gita’s wed-
ding two years later. Ali had probably convinced his sons to participate in 
a collective punishment for this transgression. Solmaz also used an inti-
mate relationship to defy her father’s patriarchal control: as a teenager, 
she engaged in a seven-year relationship with her youngest step-brother. 
It becomes clear that marriage alliances, in particular for their first-born 
sons and their daughters, were an important tool for Ali and Jalal to 
diversify their resources and generate new capital among Iranian mer-
chants. Deviations from these arrangements were thus often met with 
drastic renegotiations of kinship relations. The fact that neither Ali nor 
Jalal encouraged their children to marry a German—let alone to marry 
into a German merchant family—is emblematic of their ongoing con-
centration on capital creation in transnational rather than local social 
fields, even 20 years after their immigration.
The examination of the practice of kinship in the context of flexible 
transnational capital creation reveals an issue that Aihwa Ong (1999) did 
not consider, due to her focus on the ways filial and conjugal piety sus-
tained the patriarch’s “family governmentality”: what happens to the col-
lective project of flexible capital creation if kin defy the roles they were 
assigned to by their head of family? Two aspects may account for these 
intersubjective conflicts between the merchants and their children. First, 
the children’s defiance is an expression of the fact that they developed 
values—and resources—that diverge from those of their fathers. Growing 
up in Germany, they were shaped by a society where, in the course of the 
post-war economic expansion, individualism increasingly took prece-
dence over collectivist conceptions and women rights movements ques-
tioned patriarchalism (Attias-Donfut 2000, 663). These influences 
nourished their questioning the parents’ conception of gender and gen-
erational hierarchies (Zontini 2009, 824f.). In her study of Chinese mer-
chant families in Tahiti, Anne-Christine Trémon (2017) also indicates 
that the values and family’s collective strategies of flexible capital creation 
may shift with changing socio-economic and cultural contexts. Siavash 
comments accordingly:
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With that humanistic education I was very far away from my father’s world. 
That’s how a family drifts apart. Father said “We are Iranians, we go back.” 
For me that wasn’t even up for debate anymore. In school there was no 
other Iranian […], and, although I had one or two Iranian friends, for me 
this never implied an integration into the Iranian colony in a narrower 
sense. (Interview, July 2013)
These negotiations within the transnational family, which Bryceson and 
Vuorela (2002) call “frontiering”, led, in the case of Ali’s relation with his 
younger sons, to minor mutual adjustments that allowed to maintain the 
original project, not least thanks to the first-born’s compliance with 
his own role.
Second, the more dramatic voluntary disruptions in Jalal’s family 
(Nima and Jalal severed contact for decades) may be traced back to 
deception deriving from a disequilibrium in relations of exchange (see 
also Zontini 2009). For the (financial) support the father offered, he 
expected his children in return to play the part he had assigned them to 
in his strategies of capital creation. However, the pressure of Jalal’s 
expectations, combined with an often unfulfilled need of financial, 
and, more importantly, emotional support—accentuated by the absence 
of a caring mother37 (Attias-Donfut 2000, 673)—led the children to 
resign from an exchange which they experienced as a poisoned gift 
(Mauss 1966).
As a consequence of this dissent, Jalal’s rebelling kin disengaged from 
the collective project of flexible capital creation and invested new social 
fields in which they follow their own strategies of capital creation. Their 
individualization resulted in a loss of important resources for the family 
business. His children each began to fend for themselves. In the early 
1970s, Nima and Taghi’s resources were unavailable, unapt, or insuffi-
cient to prevent Jalal’s bankruptcy. Furthermore, these disruptions dura-
bly destabilized their practices of kinship. While some of the children 
tried to negotiate new terms to their relation with Jalal, repeated conflicts 
among the siblings, not least about financial issues, prevented them from 
recreating a collective project of capital creation.
37 Solmaz described her step-mother Taraneh was rather severe.
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Beyond voluntary disruptions, there are also the involuntary ones. In 
1969, Ali died of a stroke due, as his children suspect, to impending 
bankruptcy that has affected his enterprise. Michael Lambek (2011) 
reminds us that death represents a moment of disruption in which dif-
ferentiation within the family may be renegotiated. The sudden death of 
the father coinciding with financial failure indeed led to a period of inter-
nal restructuration in the family, as Siavash remarks:
Such a family, as it’s common among Persian families, is very much based 
on the head of family, and when he drops out then the whole barn falls 
apart, right? (Interview, July 2013)
Emma, who lost all financial resources, broke with her old role as a family 
mother, worked as a nanny in Southern Europe for many years, and never 
reinvested in Iranian social fields again until her death in 1999. As the 
formal successor, Sepehr took over Ali’s highly indebted company, but 
lost it together with his businesses in Iran in the context of the Islamic 
revolution in 1979. Two marriages with women in Iran ended in divorce. 
Finally, he settled with a Mexican woman and made a modest living as a 
carpet retailer in Eastern Germany before the couple moved to Florida 
where he collaborates in a real estate business with Sorush. Indeed, it was 
his younger brother who ended up continuing the father’s professional 
heritage. Sorush became a multimillionaire with an international real 
estate agency he founded in 1971, whose premises in Hamburg are just 
next to where Ali’s office was. Also, after a first union with an Iranian 
based in Austria, he married the member of a well-established Hamburg 
merchant family as if to strengthen Germany-specific capital. The family 
moved to Canada and then settled in Switzerland. Meanwhile his first 
daughter reinvested Hamburg’s Iranian social fields and married the son 
of a local Iranian businessman of Baha’i faith38 in 2013. In his own way, 
Sepehr’s son also carries on the family history as a maritime engineer, and 
his first daughter’s two marriages were with Iranians based in the 
USA.  Siavash moved to work as a geologist in the north German 
38 The Baha’i faith is a monotheistic religion that developed in the nineteenth century in Iran—a 
religion high Islamic clerics did not recognize and condemned, even at the time of Sorush’s mar-
riage (Brookshaw and Fazel 2008).
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 countryside, married a local, and adopted a son from Nepal. Gita lived 
with her family in the south of Germany until she divorced and returned 
to Hamburg while her two sons live in other German cities.
Thus, after Ali’s death, his wife and children developed individually 
different strategies of capital creation, and certain marriage alliances and 
religious choices led to disagreements within the nuclear family. Yet, 
however great the differences between Ali’s children were, in contrast to 
Jalal’s children, they still create capital together. For example, Siavash 
organized Gita’s move to a retirement home in 2015, and he wrote an 
article in a German travel magazine indirectly making publicity for 
Sorush’s business. Sorush, on his part, supports Siavash’s cemetery proj-
ect, and shared his wealth, for example, in inviting the whole family for 
yearly holidays. Thus, in a dynamic Trémon (2017) calls “flexible kin-
ship”, despite disruptions, Ali’s children redefined and revived the collec-
tive flexible capital creation that Ali initiated in the transnational social 
field of Iranian merchants in new forms and in different social fields.
 Descendants’ Positioning Toward Iranians 
Today
While changing values, inequality of exchange, and death led to volun-
tary and involuntary disruptions within the family and to the individual-
ization of kin’s strategies of capital creation, these events also had an 
important impact on the way the merchants’ children engage with other 
Iranians in Hamburg, in Iran, or elsewhere. The two factors by which 
they explained their contemporary positionalities was, on the one hand, 
their father’s financial decline, and on the other hand, their experience of 
the practice of kinship as a child and their experience of kinship practice.
Ali had been particularly engaged in financing the building of infra-
structures for the local Iranian Shia community. Therefore, his children 
told me that they were disappointed by their father’s local Iranian col-
leagues and friends when they faced financial hardship. Sepehr told me that
after father’s death, ties with Iranians broke. Even those who said at his 
tomb “Call on us if you need anything” never contacted us again. Although 
father did so much [for them]. (Field notes, July 2013)
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Interestingly, Ali’s first-born does not limit the experience of difficulties 
in capital creation among Iranian merchants to this particular social 
field. In our interview, Sepehr, who speaks German with an American 
accent, tells me “that he does not get along well with Iranians, with ta’ârof 
[the Iranian code of politeness]. That would not be much like him” (field 
notes, July 2013). Thus, he creates a boundary, distancing himself from 
his Iranian heritage. In doing so, he indirectly explains his failure in cre-
ating capital in Iranian merchants’ transnational social fields by his eth-
nic difference. What is the relation between experiences of kinship, 
Iranian identifications, and the engagement in Iranian transnational 
social fields?
His youngest brother Siavash chose to set aside his Iranian identifica-
tions much earlier, after Ali’s death. Commenting on his early time in a 
village close to Göttingen, in Lower Saxony, he said:
When I moved here, to the countryside, and worked for a public service 
the foreign was rather secondary, right? Other people approached me with 
it, but I didn’t make anything out of it myself. (Interview, July 2013)
Thus, Siavash’s identification as German aimed at generating capital in local 
German social fields. Significantly, he married a German of Christian faith. 
However, his comment shows that these identifications met the resistance 
of Germans who continued to construct him as ethno- racial “Other”. It 
was only when Siavash was in his early fifties—maybe as a reaction to the 
experience of being categorized as foreigner—that he engaged in relations 
with Iranians and other Muslims, as he renewed adherence to Islam. 
Building on the capital his father had created through charity work today, 
he is more involved in Iranian social fields than his siblings. For instance, 
he created an association for the maintenance of the Iranian lot of the local 
cemetery that had been created by Ali in 2017. His memory of failed sup-
port from Iranians after Ali’s death may have been gradually superseded by 
Iranian merchants’ and mosque clerks’ appreciation for the father’s engage-
ment for the Iranian Shia community and its infrastructure.
As shown in the introduction, research on transnational social fields 
highlights the importance of migration- and location-specific resources 
for migrants’ capital creation in diverse social fields (Erel 2010; Cederberg 
2015). Among Iranian merchants, to create capital Sepehr needed to 
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have Iran-specific resources such as speaking Persian or Azari or knowing 
ta’ârof in order to create capital. Conversely, in the social fields located at 
the North German countryside where Siavash lived, he needed Germany- 
specific resources to create capital. The ethnographic material presented 
here, however, allows to extend the perspective on the men’s strategies of 
capital creation by their experience of filial and affine relations in the 
context of collective flexible capital creation.
Solmaz’ comment offers a key to this understanding of the triangle of 
kinship, Iranian identity, and capital creation. While she also remembers 
the hurt of her family’s downward social mobility, it is by her experience 
of her role in kinship relations that she explains the way she engages with 
other Iranians:
For me, [anything Iranian] was a real system of oppressors, right? At the 
time, it didn’t have the quality of a culture, or something beautiful, or so, 
but it really was a symbol of total oppression, and I simply had a total 
desire of freedom. When I moved out I wished, virtually, to be a German, 
I mean, I did not want to have anything to do with Iran. (Interview, 
July 2013)
After she broke with her father over her professional trajectory, she dis-
tanced herself from her family as well as from other Iranians for about 30 
years and replaced her Iranian by a German citizenship. Her comments 
highlight what was subjacent in Sepehr’s and Siavash’s statements: the 
identification of the experience of kinship with anything Iranian. The 
association is reminiscent of the constructed dichotomies of nature and 
culture, the biological and the social, in particular in the context of kin-
ship and ethno-racial differentiation (Strathern 1992; Wade 2007). It 
reminds us of the newspaper article cited in the introduction that showed 
that the children were hegemonically constructed as Iranians by the 
German legislation and by social discourses. We saw that different, yet 
similar structural limitation was imposed on them by their father’s family 
governmentality and ongoing efforts to integrate them into their flexible 
capital creation in Iranian transnational social fields.
Strikingly, however, the diachronic perspective shows that the memory 
or experience of kinship practices and the resulting strategies of capital 
creation are not fixed, but underlie temporalities; they change within the 
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life course (Trémon 2017). Thus, similar to Siavash, it is Solmaz who, 
among the siblings, is closest to other Iranians, as she recently renewed 
contacts with some members of her extended family, occasionally goes to 
Iranian cultural events, and regularly visits a friend of her father who is 
still alive. She told me that, for the first time since 1974, she considers 
traveling to Iran. My encounter with them itself, their participation in 
this research and our discussion of an earlier version of this chapter is 
both an important testimony and element within this renewed interest 
of theirs.
In sum, the ethnographic material indicates that there is a triangular 
relationship between kinship, entangled ethnic, racial, or national identi-
fications and strategies of capital creation. In other words, not only the 
positionalities migrants take within in-group relations and the ethnic and 
national identifications they put forward are interrelated; both strongly 
correlate with changing personal experiences of kinship practices.
In this chapter, I traced the ways two merchants mobilized kin to gen-
erate capital along conceptions of generation, gender, and age in order to 
explain how these experiences influence the descendants’ own national 
identifications and their positionalities in local and transnational social 
fields constituted mainly by Iranians. Similar to the dynamics within the 
well-established Northern-German merchant family described in Thomas 
Mann’s (1993 [1901]) chronicle The Buddenbrooks, Iranian merchants 
involved their siblings and children in their flexible capital creation in 
their professional transnational social fields.
As I trace the personal trajectories of kin over two generations, I go 
beyond Aihwa Ong’s (1999) premise of filial piety, showing how volun-
tary and involuntary disruptions of kinship relations impact on collective 
flexible capital creation. While involuntary disruption through death or 
the flexible adaption of kinship to the members’ changing values or socio- 
legal condition may result in the transformation of the collective project, 
voluntary disruption based on mutual deceptions may favor its dissolu-
tion and the individualization of strategies of capital creation.
I showed that, in a triangular relationship, the changing experience of 
kinship has a lifelong influence on migrants’ engagement in social fields 
mainly constituted by Iranians as well as on their national identifications. 
I thus argue for a greater consideration of processes of “doing kinship” 
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and historically informed approaches both in the study of migrants’ 
internal differentiation and transnational capital creation.
Having closely examined professional trajectories of two merchants, in 
the next chapter my interest shifts to larger social contexts, as I look at the 
way carpet merchants of Iranian origin developed collective strategies of 
capital creation and how they influence social boundary-making among 
Hamburg’s Iranians today.
References
Abelshauser, Werner. 2004. Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945. München: 
C.H. Beck.
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
———. 2008. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adli, Abolfazl. 1960. Außenhandel und Außenwirtschaftspolitik des Iran. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot.
Attias-Donfut, Claudine. 2000. Rapports de générations. Transferts intrafamil-
iaux et dynamique macrosociale. Revue française de sociologie 41: 643–684.
Aumüller, Jutta. 2009. Assimilation: Kontroversen um ein migrationspolitisches 
Konzept, Kultur und soziale Praxis. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.
Azimi, Fakhreddin. 2008. The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle 
Against Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.
Baldassar, Loretta, and Laura Merla. 2014. Locating Transnational Care 
Circulation in Migration and Family Studies. In Transnational Families, 
Migration and the Circulation of Care: Understanding Mobility and Absence in 
Family Life, ed. Loretta Baldassar and Laura Merla, 25–59. New  York/
Abington: Routledge.
Boas, Franz. 1966. Kwakiutl Ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1985. The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups. Theory and 
Society 14 (6): 723–744. https://doi.org/10.2307/657373.
———. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bromberger, Christian. 2003. Iran, les temps qui s’entrechoquent. La pensée 
333: 79–94.
———. 2005. Famille et parenté dans la plaine de Gilan (Iran). In Famille et 
Mutations Sociopolitiques: L’approche culturaliste à l’épreuve, Colloquium, ed. 
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut and Marie Ladier-Fouladi, 125–142. Paris: Editions 
de la maison des sciences de l’homme.
 S. Moghaddari
75
———. 2013. Un autre Iran: Un ethnologue au Gilân. Paris: Armand Colin.
Brookshaw, Dominic Parviz, and Seena Fazel. 2008. The Baha’is of Iran: Socio- 
Historical Studies, Routledge Advances in Middle East and Islamic Studies. 
New York/Abington: Routledge.
Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on 
Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (4): 531–548. https://doi.
org/10.1080/01419870120049770.
Bryceson, Deborah, and Ulla Vuorela. 2002. Transnational Families in the 
Twenty-First Century. In The Transnational Family: New European Frontiers 
and Global Networks, ed. Deborah Fahy Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela, 3–30. 
Oxford: Berg Publishers.
Cederberg, Maja. 2015. Embodied Cultural Capital and the Study of Ethnic 
Inequalities. In Migrant Capital: Networks, Identities and Strategies, Migration, 
Diasporas and Citizenship, ed. Louise Ryan, Umut Erel, and Alessio 
D’Angelo, 33–47. Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Conway, Dennis, and Jeffrey H. Cohen. 1998. Consequences of Migration and 
Remittances for Mexican Transnational Communities. Economic Geography 
74 (1): 26–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1944-8287.1998.tb00103.x.
Curtin, Philip D. 1984. Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge/New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Digard, Jean-Pierre, Bernard Hourcade, and Yann Richard. 2007. L’Iran au XXe 
Siècle: entre nationalisme, Islam et mondialisation. Paris: Fayard.
Einbock, Sebastian. 2015. Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit. Jura Forum. http://
www.juraforum.de/lexikon/deutsche-staatsangehoerigkeit#Vorschriften_
aus_der_Gesetzgebung_bis_2000. Accessed 14 Apr.
Erel, Umut. 2010. Migrating Cultural Capital: Bourdieu in Migration Studies. 
Sociology 44 (4): 642–660. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038510369363.
Evans, Richard J. 1991. Family and Class in the Hamburg Grand Bourgeoisie 
1815–1914. In The German Bourgeoisi, ed. Richard J.  Evans and David 
Blackbourn, 115–139. London/New York: Routledge.
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Stephan Selzer. 2009. Commercial Super Trust or 
Virtual Organisation? An Institutional Economics Interpretation of the Late 
Medieval Hanse. Presented at the Eighth European Historical Economics 
Society Conference, Geneva, September 4.
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Marco Sunder. 2011. Trading Networks, Monopoly and 
Economic Development in Medieval Northern Europe: An Agent-Based 
Simulation of Early Hanseatic Trade. Presented at the 9th European Historical 
Economics Society Conference, Dublin, September 2. http://www.wifa.uni-
2 Cohesion and Conflict in Transnational Merchant Families 
76
leipzig.de/fi leadmin/user_upload/iew-vwl/Docs/Sunder/Ewert_
Sunder_EHESC.pdf
Fewkes, Jacqueline H. 2009. Trade and Contemporary Society Along the Silk Road: 
An Ethno-History of Ladakh, Routledge Contemporary Asia Series. New York/
Abington: Routledge.
Goffman, Erving. 1990. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London, New 
York, Victoria, Toronto, New Delhi, Auckland, Johannesburg: Penguin Books.
Dr. Gropp, Gert, and Ramin Shaghaghi. 2009. Ein hanseatisch-persischer 
Handelsvertrag aus Istanbul von 1842. In Strukturelle Zwänge – Persönliche 
Freiheiten: Osmanen, Türken, Muslime: Reflexionen zu gesellschaftlichen 
Umbrüchen. Gedenkband zu Ehren Petra Kapperts, ed. Hendrik Fenz, 
183–210. Berlin: Walter de Gryter GmBH & Co.
Keddie, Nikky. 2006. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Kelley, Ron. 1993. Ethnic and Religious Communities from Iran in Los Angeles. 
In Irangeles: Iranians in Los Angeles, ed. Ron Kelley, Jonathan Friedlander, and 
Anita Colby, 81–161. Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of 
California Press.
Keshavarzian, Arang. 2007. Bazaar and State in Iran: Politics of the Tehran 
Marketplace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keyaniyan. 2014. Kaufleute seit Generationen. Keyaniyan Company GmBH. 
http://www.keyaniyan.de/historie.html. Accessed 14 Oct.
Kuper, Adam. 2004. The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown, Routledge 
Library Editions, Anthropology and Ethnography. London/Henley/Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD.
Lambek, Michael. 2011. Kinship as Gift and Theft: Acts of Succession in 
Mayotte and Israel. American Ethnologist 38 (1): 2–16. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2010.01288.x.
Lankarany, Hossein. 2009. Der Blaue Puppenwagen: Erlebnisse Zwischen Okzident 
Und Orient. Bremen: Donat Verlag.
Mahrad, Ahmad. 1979. Die Wirtschafts- Und Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Iran 
und dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Reich. Anzali: Gilan-Publikation.
Mann, Thomas. 1993. Buddenbrooks: The Decline of a Family. New  York/
Toronto: Random House.
Massey, Douglas S., Joaquín Arango, Hugo Graeme, Ali Kouaouci, Adela 
Pellegrino, and J.  Edward Taylor. 1998. Worlds in Motion: Understanding 
International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
 S. Moghaddari
77
Mauss, Marcel. 1966. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic 
Societies. London: Cohen & West Ltd.
Moghadam, Amin. 2013. De l’Iran imaginé aux nouveaux foyers de l’Iran: 
Pratiques et espaces transnationaux des Iraniens à Dubaï. Arab Humanities 
[En Ligne] 2: 1–20.
Moghaddari, Sonja. 2015. Migrations et modernités iraniennes: Les familles trans-
nationales. Paris: Editions du cygne.
Monsutti, Alessandro. 2004. Cooperation, Remittances, and Kinship among 
the Hazaras. Iranian Studies 37 (2): 219–240.
———. 2005. War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the 
Hazaras of Afghanistan, Middle East Studies: History, Politics, and Law. 
New York/London: Routledge.
———. 2011. Au-delà de l’ethnicité et de la parenté en Afghanistan: Une 
approche ethnographique des liens transversaux de coopération. Cahiers 
d’Asie Centrale 19–20. http://asiecentrale.revues.org/1414
Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein. 2008. Iran-Europe Relations: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series. 
London: Routledge.
Nayyeri, Mohammad Hossein. 2013. Gender Inequality and Discrimination: 
The Case of Iranian Women. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 
August 3. http://iranhrdc.org/english/publications/legal-commentary/ 
1000000261-gender-inequality-and-discrimination-the-case-of-iranian-
women.html#9
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine Atherton.
———. 2013. What Kinship Is – And Is Not. Chicago/London: The University 
of Chicago Press.
Sana, Mariano, and Douglas S. Massey. 2005. Household Composition, Family 
Migration, and Community Context: Migrant Remittances in Four 
Countries. Social Science Quarterly 86 (2): 509–528. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00315.x.
Schneider, David M. 1984. A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press.
Spellman, Kathryn. 2004. Religion and Nation: Iranian Local and Transnational 
Networks in Britain. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Strathern, Marylin. 1992. After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures. Cambridge/Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press.
2 Cohesion and Conflict in Transnational Merchant Families 
78
———. 2014. Kinship as a Relation. L’Homme 210: 43–61.
Sywottek, Arnold. 1986. Hamburg seit 1945. In Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt 
und ihrer Bewohner, Band II Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Werner 
Jochmann, 377–466. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.
Tapper, Richard. 1979. Pasture and Politics: Economics, Conflict and Ritual 
Among Shahsevan Nomads of Northwestern Iran. London: Academic Press.
Trémon, Anne-Christine. 2017. Flexible Kinship: Shaping Transnational 
Families Among the Chinese in Tahiti. Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 23 (1): 42–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12543.
Tsutomu, Sakamoto. 2013. Trading Networks in Western Asia and the Iranian 
Silk Trade. In Commercial Networks in Modern Asia, ed. Linda Grove and 
S. Sugiyama, 235–250. New York/Abington: Routledge.
Van, Rachel Tamara. 2011. Free Trade & Family Values: Kinship Networks and the 
Culture of Early American Capitalism. New York: Columbia University.
Vladi, Firouz. 2004. Das Leben des Hassan Vladi. Ein frühes Beispiel für 
Migration und Integration aus Hamburg. Die Brücke: Forum für antirassist-
ische Politik und Kultur 1 (131): 96–100.
———. 2014. Blanka Sophie Dora Elise Hartmann Geb. Moritz: Nachruf auf 
unsere Liebe Oma, Großmutter und Urgroßmutter. Unpublished Manuscript.
Vogel, Regina. 2005. Bürgerliche Werte und Statuserhalt: Bildungspolitische 
Interessenpolitik von Hochschullehrer- und Unternehmerverbänden in der 
Nachkriegszeit. Berlin: Humbolt-Universität. http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/disser-
tationen/vogel-regina-2005-02-01/PDF/vogel.pdf
Wade, Peter, ed. 2007. Race, Ethnicity and Nation: Perspectives from Kinship and 
Genetics, Berghahn Series. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Werbner, Pnina. 1990. The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts and Offerings Among 
British Pakistanis. New York/Oxford/Munich: Berg Publishers.
Wubs-Mrozewicz, Justyna. 2013. The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe: An Introduction. In The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 
ed. Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz and Stuart Jenks, 1–25. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Ziegler, Dieter. 2000. Die Wirtschaftsbürgerliche Elite im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine 
Bilanz. In Großbürger und Unternehmer. Die Deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Dieter Ziegler, 7–29. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Zontini, Elisabetta. 2009. Enabling and Constraining Aspects of Social Capital 
in Migrant Families: Ethnicity, Gender and Generation. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 33 (5): 816–831. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870903254661.
 S. Moghaddari
79
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright 
holder.
2 Cohesion and Conflict in Transnational Merchant Families 
81© The Author(s) 2020
S. Moghaddari, Internal Diversity, Global Diversities, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27790-1_3
3
Narrating “Traditional Iranian Carpet 
Merchants”
In 1968, Farhad F. settled in Hamburg’s free port as an importer and spe-
cialist for hand-knotted carpets, perpetuating the tradition of the carpet 
trade in the second generation. Today, the branch in Hamburg’s 
Speicherstadt, with its 1000  m2 show room, is managed mainly by the 
third generation. We offer a large assortment of hand-knotted carpets. 
(Section “company” on a merchant house’s website, anonymized, transla-
tion by the author)
A photo of four people, presumably a family, accompanies this text. 
Before the decorative background of a warehouse with piles of oriental 
carpets, the husband and wife, in their fifties, are positioned on the left 
side of the picture and the son and daughter, in their early twenties, on 
the right. The two men wear costumes in dark colors with white shirts 
and shiny beige and blue ties, sporting confident toothy smiles. The son’s 
left hand is in his pocket, demonstrating effortless assurance. The women, 
instead, display a retained smirk, wearing a blazer and a pullover with a 
fur-trimmed collar. The mother also wears full hijab that covers her neck 
and hair, while the daughter’s long, dark hair is tied back. The image 
twines generational continuity with familial unity through similar 
82
 postures. Gender roles appear to be shaped by patriarchal and Islamic 
principles, as they show in the men’s élan and the women’s modest 
demeanor and dress. The photo reminds me of the pictures of Ali’s family 
in Chap. 2. It puts forward an Iranian identification, family cohesion, a 
long history in Hamburg as proof of business continuity and expertise, 
and (in this case) also religious adherence.
As I got to know more and more Iranian carpet merchants during my 
fieldwork, I was struck by the observation that, although their business 
strategies may be quite diverse, they offer very similar identitary dis-
courses both in immediate contact with me and in their media publica-
tions. The above online presentation of a merchant family business 
contains its main elements. How did this collective narrative develop?
Resources that sustain an ethnic or national identity may be useful for 
avoiding barriers to capital creation in the social fields related to the 
country of residence, as they allow migrants to withdraw from the main 
labor market (Moallem 2000; Bauder 2005). Otherwise, through “iden-
tity entrepreneurship” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; see Erel 2010; 
Nowicka 2013), these resources can serve to create capital within social 
fields of the society of residence. Research that traces such practices in 
transnational contexts largely focuses on the practicalities of migrants’ 
juggling resources across social fields. Yet, what motivates their strategies 
of capital creation? Considering, with Joel Robbins (2015, 28), that social 
actions is, in complex and sometimes contradictory ways, motivated by 
values, I draw on the anthropology of value to answer this question. In 
the introduction to this book, I argue that capital creation relies on evalu-
ation processes; evaluation processes take place in historically rooted hier-
archical systems of value (Graeber 2001). The notion of value thereby 
refers to “ideas about what is ultimately important in life” (idem 2013, 
224). Although extant research on migration reveals the evaluation of 
migrants’ resources in the society of residence, we know very little about 
the way systems of value interrelate within and across different social 
fields. Ultimately, what is migrants’ potential for action within the 
diverse, partly contradictory systems that define the value of their 
resources?
Omid, the 60-year-old merchant and president of the Association of 
Iranian Carpet Importers in Europe (AICE), followed his merchant 
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father to Hamburg as a teenager, in 1968, and speaks German with a 
local vernacular. In the late 1970s, he sometimes played football with the 
later president of the Islamic Republic, Mohammad Khatami, after his 
Quran class, who at the time served as an imam at the local Imam Ali 
mosque. According to the father of two young adults who also work in 
the family business, Hamburg currently counts about 37 carpet merchant 
enterprises. In 1992, there were 319. They still largely outnumber their 
colleagues trading dried fruits, nuts, and caviar—some of the few Iranian 
goods which are legally tradable after the enforcement of international 
sanctions. Despite their dwindling number, their activities became ever 
more crucial due to Iran’s marginalization in the global economic and 
political landscape. Hamburg-based Iranian carpet merchants are trans-
national entrepreneurs, that is
social actors who enact networks, ideas, information, and practices for the 
purpose of seeking business opportunities or maintaining businesses within 
multiple social fields, which in turn forces them to engage in varied 
 strategies of action to promote their entrepreneurial activities. (Drori 
et al. 2010, 4)
In Chap. 2, I demonstrated that they flexibly adapt their strategies of 
capital creation to changing socio-economic and legal conditions across 
national borders (Ong 1999). The analysis of kinship relations within the 
entrepreneurial family showed that individual ethnic and national iden-
tifications are both tools and expressions of strategies of capital creation 
within contexts of structural limitations deriving from unequal power 
relations. In this chapter, I analyze Iranian merchants’ collective identi-
tary narrative as a tool in and a reflection of transnational capital creation 
and problematize transnational capital creation as part of migrants’ cre-
ative engagement with systems of value.
Building on participant observation, archival material, media analysis, 
and oral history interviews, the aim of this chapter is to explain how the 
collective identitary narrative of the “traditional Iranian merchants” 
engages with systems of value that prevail within and across social fields 
related to the local German market, the Iranian government, and the 
transnational networks of Iranian merchants under changing local and 
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global economic and political conditions from the 1950s until today. The 
shifts of value caused by the Iranian revolution in 1979 and events sur-
rounding the political and economic crises since the mid-1990s highlight 
merchants’ possibilities and limitations to navigate structural inequalities 
and contribute to their boundary-making from newcoming Iranians. As 
they occupy a gatekeeper position in the context of international eco-
nomic sanctions on Iran, the discussion of this chapter offers reflections 
on relations between single values within the same system and between 
different systems of value. But let me first give you an idea of the setting.
 The Ethnographic Frame
On a sunny day in June 2013, I take my bike to the former free port to 
meet Akbar, a carpet merchant, whose contact I obtained through Abtin, 
the Iranian owner of a high-end restaurant. Akbar is at the head of a 
transnational carpet merchant enterprise.
Driving to his warehouse, red brick houses on my right contrast with 
tall modern office buildings with neat glass façades on my left. The his-
torical Speicherstadt, since July 2015 named UNESCO world heritage 
site, constitutes a uniform urban landscape of seven-story high red brick 
store houses and was built on 25 hectares between 1885 and 1888 (see 
Image 3.1). Formerly hosting the free port where merchant houses are 
historically located, it has been incorporated in a large-scale urban rede-
velopment project, the creation of a modern neighborhood named 
HafenCity (lit. PortCity), that runs since 2003. As I cross a newly built 
bridge, I take a sharp right to enter a cobbled side street. Curiously, it 
seems to be preserved from all the restructuration that went on around it. 
Each of its store houses bears Iranian or Middle Eastern names of carpet 
wholesale companies (see Image 3.2).
Having found Akbar’s sign, I ring the bell. The man in his late thirties 
who opens the door presents himself as Rahim, Akbar’s son. On this 
working day, he wears casual clothing: a blue button shirt, jeans, and 
sneakers. As those of most—if not all—Iranian merchants in the district, 
the rooms of the company, besides hosting the office, function as stock 
house and wholesale store at the same time. Rahim guides me to the large 
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showroom of more than 250m2. Inside, piles of pile carpets, plain and 
elaborately decorated, sober and colorful, sorted by size and pattern, lie 
stacked on the floor of the old rustic stock house. The smell of wool 
reminds me of the small carpet shop I knew in my childhood, run by an 
Iranian in the town where I grew up. Rahim tells me that most of the 
company’s customers are Europeans; Iranians usually import carpets 
through private travel. We sit down at a table in front of an open door 
looking at the canal that runs directly behind the house (Image 3.3).
While Rahim fetches black tea, I observe several men on the other side 
of the large room unloading rolled carpets from a lorry. A shipment has 
just arrived. The staff speak Persian together. Rahim comes back with a 
tea set identical to ones I previously saw in Iran (Image 3.4). It seems to 
me as if I entered a world that is distinct from Hamburg—a space which 
reminds me of sociabilities I have known in Iran. Before, Rahim explains, 
shipments were delivered through the opposite door, that is, by way of 
sea, but since several decades now, it is cheaper and faster to ship them by 
land or by air.
Image 3.1 View on the warehouse district (Speicherstadt) from the 
Poggenmühlenbrücke. (June 2013, author’s photo)
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While we wait for his father, Rahim tells me that his family is from 
Tabriz, the capital of the province of East Azerbaijan in Northwest Iran. 
Later, Akbar explains me that he first came to Hamburg in the early 
1950s. From then on, he collaborated with Germany-based Iranian mer-
chants, supplying them with carpets on consignment. It was only in 
1981, after the Islamic revolution, that he asked for asylum in order to 
bring his family to Germany and establish his own business. Rahim 
relates that he started to work in the PR section of the family business, 
Image 3.2 Street view in front of Akbar’s store. (June 2013, author’s photo)
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together with one of his sisters directly after his graduation from high 
school. Just like in the time of Ali and Jalal (Chap. 2), the transmission of 
the business within the family is still a frequent practice among Iranian 
merchants. Rahim and his father travel to Iran several times per year; dur-
ing these trips they combine private visits and the entertainment of—
“multiplex and crosscutting” (Keshavarzian 2007)—transnational 
relations with colleagues and trade partners. Marriage still sometimes 
reinforces these ties: Rahim’s wife grew up in Tabriz. He also tells me that 
Image 3.3 Akbar’s show room with view on a fleet. (June 2013, author’s photo)
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he is a member of the two most important Hamburg-based Iranian pro-
fessional associations, AICE and BIU (Union of Iranian Entrepreneurs).
While we talk, I observe a tall man in a gray costume in his eighties 
giving advice in Persian in a grave voice of authority as he supervises the 
delivery. We stand up to greet Akbar. I start introducing myself in 
German, but Rahim interrupts me, asking me to switch to Persian. Akbar 
does not speak German fluently. As we speak in Persian, I still struggle to 
understand him and thus discover an accent I did not know before, that 
of a native Azari speaker. Another man of Akbar’s age enters the show 
room. He also wears a costume. During my research, I witnessed several 
such spontaneous visits among established merchants. They also told me 
to pass by whenever I wanted and I found them available when I did so. 
Akbar talks to the visitor, apparently a long-term acquaintance, in Azari. 
Omid told me a few months later that Akbar nourishes strong ethnic 
identifications and is a skilled Azeri dancer. Indeed, due to chain migra-
tion, today many of the local Iranian merchants identify as ethnic Azeri 
Image 3.4 Tea set from Iran on a hand-knotted Persian carpet. (June 2013, 
author’s photo)
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(Rezaei 2009). Together, the men brainstorm names of early merchants 
to help me with my research. Beyond the similarities in identitary dis-
courses, Akbar and Rahim’s associational affiliation, their acquaintance 
with Omid and the friendly visitor indicate that they belong to a group 
of merchants who follow collective strategies of capital creation. Let us 
examine the development of these strategies through a diachronic review 
of the way merchants engage with changing evaluation criteria in differ-
ent social fields.
 A Golden Age?
Although known in Europe since the Middle Ages, Oriental carpets have 
become a large-scale consumer good only since the late nineteenth cen-
tury (Spooner 1986, 201ff.). In these early years, the international trade 
and, increasingly, the production of carpets were in the hands of European 
businessmen who collaborated and competed with merchants in Iran 
(Ittig 1992; Rudner 2010, 54). With the coming to power of the mon-
arch Reza Pahlavi in 1925, the carpet industry became part of his enhanc-
ing of Iran’s national identity (Rudner 2010, 53). By the 1920s, carpets 
were Iran’s most important non-oil export good—which it remained 
until today (Amuzegar 1993, 150).
As political and economic links between Nazi-Germany and Iran grew 
stronger in the 1930s, Germany replaced the USA as the first export mar-
ket for carpets (Rudner 2010, 73). In order to gradually evict foreign 
companies, the Pahlavi government nationalized the industrial produc-
tion in 1936. In Hamburg, however, German import restrictions secured 
the market dominance of German entrepreneurs and granted only small 
carpet quotas to those Iranian merchants who traded cotton.
Change came after World War II.  Through Germany’s economic 
upswing, the demand for luxury goods increased and trade was liberal-
ized (Koch-Wegener 2005, 88). As early as 1950, when Hamburg was 
still dotted with ruins, an exhibition of Oriental carpets was organized at 
the Museum of Arts and Crafts (Erdmann 1950). Soon after that, Iran 
and the Federal Republic of Germany took up bilateral relations. 
Energized by the rising oil revenues, the Iranian economy thrived between 
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the mid-1950s and the early 1970s (Abrahamian 2008, 123f.). At the 
same time, the colorful, hand-knotted Iranian carpet, the “genuine 
Persian” (echter Perser), became a must-have status symbol for upwardly 
mobile Germans (Anonym 1961, 39). Accordingly, Germany returned to 
being Iran’s main export country for carpets,1 and Iranian imports largely 
dominated the domestic market.2 As a consequence, the number of 
Iranian migrants in Hamburg grew from about 803 in the 1950s to 
2000 in the early 1980s (Schütt 2000, 4). A local newspaper report testi-
fies of the expansion of the transnational business sector:
Hundreds of new carpet merchants live on the trade with “popular- 
Persians”. Shops opened in almost all big cities, on whose façades colorful 
neon tubes blink at night, bearing Koranic suras or Oriental names as 
Soraya, Mohammed and Ahmed Ali. In Hamburg, the biggest port of 
entry for carpets on the continent, more than 300 new carpet importers 
established themselves in the past few years. (Anonym 1961, 41)
During these years, Iranian migration to Hamburg was dominantly mer-
cantile4 (and male). Many of those who initially came for studies switched 
to the flourishing carpet trade. So did Parviz, the son of a bazari from 
Tabriz. He began to study architecture in 1951, just to become a carpet 
retailer in 1962. My interlocutors liked to describe the pre-revolutionary 
period (between 1950 and 1979) as the golden days of local Iranian eco-
nomic and social life and contrast it with the contemporary situation. To 
understand why, we need to examine the systems of value that shaped the 
social fields that are relevant to their professional activity at the time.
As we saw in Chap. 2, creating capital in relations with the Iranian 
emperor, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and, by extension, the social 
1 Imports rose from 43t in 1949/1950 to 544t in 1952/1953, almost doubled to 981t within one 
year and from then on steadily increased to 1709t in 1958/1959 (Adli 1960, 198).
2 The market share of carpets from Iran was as high as 85% in 1966 (Bodendiek 1966, 1) but 
decreased to 50% in 1978 (Classen and Voss 1978, 1), probably because their prices rose due to the 
strength of Iranian Rial after the oil crisis in 1973/1974.
3 Parviz’ estimation.
4 In contrast to other German cities (Abrahamian 1982, 154), few Iranian students came to 
Hamburg before WWII as the city’s university, established in 1919, is one of the youngest in 
Germany (Universität Hamburg 2014).
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field of Iranian foreign trade relations, was crucial for merchants’ profes-
sional success. Significantly, Jalal’s bankruptcy was connected to his con-
frontation with the Pahlavi foundation. The Western model of modernity, 
prosperity, and secularism together with the pre-Islamic Persian cultural 
heritage—those were the values Mohammad Reza Shah set forth. The 
Iranian emperor largely refrained from intervening in the internal social 
system of the Iranian bazar (Keshavarzian 2007), but he valorized the 
economic importance of Hamburg’s Iranian merchants through two vis-
its, in 1955 and 1967.
The way merchants participated in the program of the Shah’s visits 
shows how they engaged with the system of value that dominated in this 
social field. Siavash remembers having been made to wear (uncomfort-
able) local seaman’s clothes as he lined up with other Iranian merchants’ 
children to greet Mohammad Reza Shah on his arrival. Parviz praised the 
elegant festivities at the five-star Hotel Atlantik, which still is a popular 
location for celebrations organized by Iranian businessmen. He remem-
bers how he shook the Iranian emperor’s hand during one of these recep-
tions. Public media documentation of these events shows Iranian 
merchants next to German officials, all equally elegantly dressed in cos-
tumes and evening gowns (Norddeutscher Rundfunk 1955). For Parviz, 
the mastery of European ballroom dances was no obstacle, as he had 
learned them in Iran, before his emigration. Building on Bourdieu’s the-
ory of inequality and Graeber’s concept of value (2001, 2013), I suggest 
that we create capital by putting forward resources that mediate values 
which are highly positioned in the system of value of a particular social 
field. In turn, it is through acts and discourses of differentiation that we 
disclose resources (Lambek 2013). Thus, in the social field of Iranian 
foreign trade, merchants boosted their capital creation by displaying 
resources that mediate values positioned highly in the Shah’s system 
of value.5
Research shows that the prevailing image of the country of origin 
influences migrants’ chances to create capital in the country of residence 
5 From 1965, the situation in this social field became more complex as the growing political conflict 
between the Shah and clerical followers of the oppositional Ayatollah Khomeini began to manifest 
in Hamburg with the appointment of Ayatollah Beheshti as an Imam at the Imam Ali mosque (Van 
den Bos 2012).
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(Ong 1996; Henry 1999). In the poor, post-war Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), people were fascinated by the image of Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi’s wealth and orientalist splendor. His second wife, Soraya 
Esfandiary-Bakhtiary, whose mother was German, regularly figured in 
the FRG’s tabloid press. So, Iranian merchants were both needed6 and 
admired for their financial strength and generosity in post-war Hamburg. 
Plus, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there was a certain fascination 
with the “exotic”, the Oriental and more particularly “things Persian” that 
is deeply rooted in European, and German, history and cultural produc-
tions (Said 1978; Dabashi 2015). According to Hamid Dabashi, in the 
German cultural context this fascination was shaped for instance by 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s West-Eastern Divan (2010 [1827]) and 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zoroaster: A Book for All and None (2003 
[1883–1885]). Significantly, an unreferenced newspaper comments 
about a basketball match in which Parviz participated from the mid- 
1950s: “we particularly liked the Persian [Parviz], one of the HSV’s [name 
of the team] numerous exotics”. Similarly, the pensioner told me that the 
owner of his preferred ball house called the table he used to occupy with 
his friends “the table of princes” (Prinzentisch).
In sum, between the early 1950s and the late 1970s, Iranian merchants 
could create capital in Hamburg’s society in as far as their Iran-specific 
resources mediated wealth and exoticism. Mayor Kurt Sieveking said in 
speech at the Senate’s reception during the Shah’s visit in 1955: “It is a 
special honor and a great pleasure for the Senate, the Bürgerschaft 
(Hamburg state parliament) and all the population of our city, to which 
we gladly count the members of the Persian colony in Hamburg, that the 
first visit of the royal couple on German soil begins in our city” (Sieveking 
07/03/19557).
6 For Hamburg, reinforcing economic ties with Iran was part of its efforts to adapt its trade relations 
to the Cold War context (Sywottek 1986, 427).
7 Kurt Sieveking, speech of the president of the Senate of the Free and Hanseatic city of Hamburg 
in the honor of his majesty the emperor Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the empress queen 
Soraya for the dinner at the city hall on February 24, 1955, 07/03/1955, Inoffizieller Besuch von 
Mohammad Reza Schah und seiner Kaiserin Soraya, Empfänge und Besuche nach Einzelplan 0 
(Verfassung und Verwaltung) (1947-1990.03), Senatskanzlei II, 137-1 II_4438, STAHH.
 S. Moghaddari
93
It is no coincidence that the Iran-specific resources which conveyed 
value in German social fields are the same resources the Iranian govern-
ment promotes. In his analysis of laicity in France, André Iteanu (2013) 
shows that values may encourage certain kinds of political hierarchies. 
Indeed, Western countries, in particular the USA, played a critical role in 
putting and keeping Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in power.8 His pro-
moting values that correspond to Western systems of value signal an 
effort to maintain their political support, thus perpetuating their unequal 
global power relations. What is striking here is that, while Bourdieu 
(1997) claims that classificatory schemes that shape social fields embed-
ded in a nation-state are largely independent from each other, we find 
parallels between these structures in social fields that are connected to 
different nation-states. Thus, some systems of value shape only one social 
field, and others transgress the fluctuating confines of social fields and 
influence conditions of capital creation across national boundaries.
Yet, a very different evaluation of Iran-specific resources appears in 
articles on the carpet business published in two weekly Hamburg-based 
center-left print media—Der Spiegel, a magazine, and Die Zeit, a newspa-
per between 1961 and 1978. Probably motivated by the defense of the 
domestic carpet industry9 and German carpet importers, their critique of 
Middle Eastern—mainly Iranian—carpet traders exceeds business 
competition:
There are many possibilities of fraud; rampant oriental fantasy steadily cre-
ates new ones. There is the lamenting student from Persia at the doorstep, 
who needs to keep his head above water by selling the “family heirloom”, 
of course far below the [market] price. And facing this seemingly so advan-
tageous opportunity melts the carpet-addicted German’s appropriate 
8 While his father, Reza Shah, promoted modernization and industrialization in Iran, he also strove 
to withstand forms of colonialization from the main imperial powers, the USA, Russia, and 
England—hence his collaboration with Nazi-Germany. In 1941, this alliance was a major reason 
for the allied forces to intervene, substituting him by the crown prince. In 1953, the USA inter-
vened a second time to keep Mohammad Reza Shah in power and remove a democratic adversary, 
Mohammad Mossadegh (Abrahamian 1982).
9 Established since the late nineteenth century, the German machine-based domestic production 
had profited by the importation of Iranian know-how and the inspiration from Iranian carpet 
designs (Helfgott 1993, 210ff.).
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 mistrust. Or even the dark-skinned academic, maybe also the Iranian engi-
neer temporarily working for the same company, offers a colleague a unique 
opportunity. (Bodendiek 1966, 3)
The article ascribes fraudulent business strategies to social (i.e. poor stu-
dents), cultural (i.e. Iranian origin), and, through the insistence on the 
sellers’ physical features, racial differences. In another article, itinerant car-
pet traders—former German army generals—express concern that the 
new Iranian competitors would downgrade what before was a “respectable 
business” (Kavaliers-Geschäft). If articles mention German participation in 
these practices, they do not condemn it with the same vehemence. Taken 
together, these articles draw the Orientalist image of the “carpet- crook” 
(Teppich-Gauner) or “Persian mat hawker” (persischer Matten- Höker), an 
untrained outsider to the business, who uses unfamiliar—and implicitly 
dishonest—methods10 to trick on the trusting customer, in order to sug-
gest Germans to rely on serious and locally established (i.e. German) retail-
ers or turn to domestic quality products, instead (Anonym 1961, 1971).
As the appellation “genuine Persian” suggests, genuineness, singularity, 
and authenticity determine a carpet’s symbolic efficiency for the cus-
tomer. Between the lines, the articles say that the carpet’s authenticity can 
be measured by the merchants’ honesty and accountability. Yet, these 
values are subordinated to the value of familiarity; mediating familiarity 
was a necessary condition to displaying expertise and accountability. In 
German society at the time, Iranian merchants were constructed as the 
cultural and racial Other, while what was familiar was anything identified 
as German or at least Western.
Thus, in German social fields in the pre-revolutionary period, the 
reception of Iranian merchants was ambiguous. On the one hand, 
resources that mediated wealth and economic growth, as well as Iran- 
specific resources mediating exoticism, were valorized, which allowed 
merchants to create enough capital to establish themselves professionally. 
On the other hand, their perception as exotic contradicted the value of 
10 One of the methods cited is, for example, granting a discount of more than the usual 3% for cash 
payment (Classen and Voss 1978). Indeed, in the Iranian market place to whose practices many of 
the traders were used, the price of a good can be influenced both in a positive and in a negative way 
by the personal relationship between the salesman and his customer (Keshavarzian 2007, 77).
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familiarity. What was exotic could not be familiar at the same time. This 
contradiction created a barrier to their capital creation, because resources 
that did not convey familiarity could not mediate honesty and authenticity.
Economic resources yes, migration-specific cultural and social resources 
no—Aihwa Ong (1999, 88ff.) reports that Asian transnational entrepre-
neurs meet similar barriers to capital creation in the USA. She makes an 
important contribution to Bourdieu’s theory of inequality by conceptual-
izing limits to capital creation: migration-specific resources that cause 
cultural and racial Othering constitute symbolic deficits, which impede 
on the recognition of migrants’ other resources as capital. The bringing 
together of Bourdieu’s approach to inequality and the anthropological 
theory of value offers a new understanding of the effect of evaluation on 
capital creation. We know since Louis Dumont (2013) about the hierar-
chical dimension of systems of value. To him, values are not only interde-
pendent, but they are ranked. The fulfillment of certain key values 
determines the mediation of others. The discussion of Dumont’s work 
exceeds the objective of this book, but I follow Graeber (2001, 16ff.) in 
retaining that relations between values are vertical, besides sometimes 
being horizontal. Moreover, I distance myself from Dumont’s holist view 
and study systems of value not within societies, but within particular 
social fields. My historically informed ethnographic data suggests that, in 
the system of value that shaped the social field of the German carpet 
market at the time, familiarity was positioned at a higher position than 
exoticism or wealth. If Iranian merchants’ chances of capital creation 
were limited, it was because while their resources exuded exoticism and 
wealth, they failed to convey familiarity. Accordingly, it follows that lim-
its to capital creation arise from the inefficiency to convey a value that is 
of crucial significance within a particular social field.
The transnational social field of Iranian merchants was where Iranians 
invested most of their efforts of capital creation, as I showed in Chap. 2. 
While foreign business partners were invited to receptions, Siavash told 
me that it was with the (binational) families of other Iranian merchants 
that his parents spend their free time. Even institutions such as Hamburg’s 
first Iranian restaurant, which opened in the mid-1950s, the “German- 
Iranian chamber of commerce” (Deutsch-Iranische Handelskammer), the 
“Union of Iranian Carpet importers” (Verband der iranischen 
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Teppichimporteure, today called AICE), and the “German-Iranian Bank 
of Commerce” (today: European-Iranian Handelsbank), all founded by 
merchants between the 1950s and 1970s, catered to this transnational 
social field. In these contexts, Iran-specific resources such as fluency in 
Persian, religious knowledge, or close kinship, business or friendship rela-
tions with the members of highly recognized merchant families were 
valorized for mediating values of family cohesion, cooperation, account-
ability, selflessness, generosity, and piety (Keshavarzian 2007). Religious, 
social, and cultural rituals that mark the dense moments of Iranian mer-
chant sociabilities play a key role in renewing their collective system of 
value over the decades (cf. Robbins 2015).
The dynamics around the construction of the Imam Ali mosque illus-
trate how merchants collectively engaged with chances and limits to capi-
tal creation in these three social fields. In 1951, a group of pious and 
successful merchants, including Ali founded an association11 and entered 
into negotiations with the Senate, that is, Hamburg’s federal state govern-
ment, in order to gain support for the mosque’s construction. However, 
archival documentation shows that the Senate skirted the Iranians’ 
request for infrastructural and financial support. In the end, the mer-
chants financed the construction of the main building with their own 
resources—thus demonstrating generosity, selflessness, and piety—
through donations from peers in Iran and with the transnational support 
of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, one of the most important Shia clerics in Iran at 
the time.12 In Boroujerdi, they chose an ally which would not endanger 
their relations with the Shah, who visited the construction site in 1967.13 
You can see the Senate’s restraint reflected in then-Senator Sieveking’s 
bodily posture at the foundation stone ceremony in 1960 (Image 3.5). 
11 The “Association of the promoters of an Iranian-Islamic mosque in Hamburg” (Verein der Förderer 
einer iranisch-islamischen Moschee in Hamburg).
12 Senatskanzlei, memorandum (Vermerk), 20/07/1951; Verein der Förderer einer iranisch- 
islamischen Moschee in Hamburg e.V., invitation to the setting of the foundation stone, February 
1960, both Senatskanzlei II, Sonstige Glaubensbewegungen (1922–1988), 131-1 II _874, 
STAHH.
13 Rumpf, Senatskanzlei, memorandum (Vermerk), 19/05/1967, Empfang anlässlich des Besuches 
des Schahs von Persien, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi und seiner Gattin Farah am 03. und 4.06.1967, 
Empfänge und Besuche nach Einzelplan 0 (Verfassung und Verwaltung) (1947-1990.03), 
Senatskanzlei II, 131-1II_4405, STAHH.
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Thus, as merchants met with barriers to their capital creation in German 
contexts, they invested further effort in generating capital in transna-
tional social fields.
In sum, the bundling of individual interests within the transnational 
field of Iranian carpet merchants worked as a collective strategy to con-
front the barriers to capital creation caused by their difficulty to mediate 
familiarity in German social fields. In concurrence with extent literature 
in migration studies (Light et al. 1994; Bauder 2005), research of Iranian 
ethnic entrepreneurship in different Western countries points to the sup-
port this occupational form can play in countering discrimination and 
Image 3.5 Foundation stone ceremony of the Imam Ali mosque in February 
1960. Hamburg’s Senator Kurt Sieveking  on the left, and Imam Hojatolleslam 
Mohammad Mohaghaghi on the right (Siavash’s family archives)
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downward social mobility (Khosravi 1999; Moallem 2000). The mer-
chants’ collective agency was sustained by their relatively small numbers, 
a common bazari background in Iran, and their participation in a system 
of reputation in which mutual trust and control relied on multiplex14 and 
crosscutting relations.
Iranian merchants’ engagement in their own transnational social field, 
but also their participation in the field of Iranian foreign trade, in turn, 
influenced the way they interacted in German social fields. They did not 
try to generate new Germany-specific resources to conform to the domi-
nant values of familiarity, reliability, and honesty. Instead, they put 
 forward certain Iran-specific resources with the aim of increasing the 
value of exoticism. Within the non-standardized carpet commerce, they 
did what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) call codifying: they advertised 
certain commercial and personal practices and objects as Iran-specific in 
14 In Hamburg, the multiplexity of merchants’ social ties relied on shared leisure activities and 
neighborly ties. Siavash told me that most merchants lived and worked in the same districts.
Image 3.6 Utility vehicle of the merchant business Hassan Vladi, probably the 
1950s (Parviz’ family archives)
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order to sustain the goods’ authenticity. You can see this, for instance, in 
a publicity bearing a bearded turban wearer who sits on a flying carpet 
(Image 3.6). In doing so, they began to market ethnicity, or rather, as 
merchants were of diverse ethnic backgrounds, an Orientalistic image of 
Iranian national identity. This attitude of reshaping the value of their 
Iran-specific resources can be described as what David Graeber (2001, 
88f.) defines as “politics of value”: people construct meaning that both 
acknowledges and resists, that is, intends to act upon, existing sys-
tems of value.
Given the barriers to capital creation they met among Germans, why 
do my interlocutors see this period of time as particularly positive? As 
part of the narrative of the “traditional Iranian merchants”, the discourse 
of the “golden age” of thriving Iranian social life and the muting of 
 experiences of discrimination were constructed retrospectively. They are 
an expression of merchants’ contemporary politics of value, to which two 
mayor historic developments largely contributed, as the next two sections 
will show.
 The Iranian Government, the Flüchtling, and Illicit 
Business Practices
Systems of value may shift over time, but there are events that bring 
about more sudden and dramatical transformation. The Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 was one such event. Parviz’ boundary-making 
toward newcoming Iranian migrants indicates key issues caused by its 
impact on the three social fields relevant for Iranian merchants:
Sonja “How was it actually like when in 1979 the revolution happened? 
Many new Iranians came here. How was that for those who had been 
here for a longer time, like you?”
Parviz “Yes, many refugees [Flüchtlinge] came. They smuggled and… and 
other things, teriak [opium, in Persian in the original] and weapons and 
all. And until then were… Persians have had a good name, but after not 
anymore [sic!].”
Sonja “This changed then, but was that maybe also because of the new 
government in Iran?”
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Parviz “Yes.” [he takes a sip of liqueur, a few seconds of silence]
Sonja “And then, new carpet traders came, too.”
Parviz “And came, and again, they didn’t make it, [and went] back [sic!].” 
(Interview, April 2014)
To understand the value shifts, let us keep in mind three issues: the 
Iranian government (Parviz’ silence is significant), refugees, and illicit 
business practices.
First, with the overthrow of the monarchy, the system of value that 
shaped the social field of Iranian foreign trade underwent drastic changes. 
Constructed in opposition to the Western-oriented monarchy, the new 
regime glorified modesty, religious piety, altruism, regime-loyalty, and 
family cohesion, while it rejected any idea or practice associated with the 
West, including conspicuous consumption and self-interest, as alienation 
and gharbzâdehgi (Weststruckness) (Khosravi 2008). It valorized the 
bazar and individual bazaris gained high positions in the government, 
namely those who had been important allies in the revolution. However, 
it sanctioned merchants who could not prove their adherence to the 
regime’s values, for instance through expropriation (Abrahamian 2008, 
179; Keshavarzian 2009). Sepehr, Ali’s son, lost his businesses in Iran and 
fled to Germany for this reason. According to Oliya, Omid’s sister (one 
of the very few women I met who work in Iranian merchant businesses), 
it was not until Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005) that 
relations between Hamburg’s Iranian merchants and the Iranian govern-
ment stabilized.
The new Iranian government began to intervene in the bazar and new, 
overlapping hierarchical structures co-opted the old system of reputation 
(Keshavarzian 2007, 107; Sadjed 2012, 120–24). Religious foundations 
(bonyâd) became major economic players. They opened branches in 
Hamburg in the mid-1980s, offering a greater variety and more eco-
nomic carpets than established merchants, thanks to their operating out-
side the bazar economy (Rezaei 2009, 92f.). Due to the government’s 
political ideology and the war with Iraq (1980–1988), restrictive and 
unstable foreign trade policies fostered corruption and smuggling (Digard 
et  al. 2007, 250; Erami and Keshavarzian 2015). Consequently, mer-
chants had to redefine their strategies of capital creation, but how they 
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did this is not something people liked to talk about, as we can see in 
Parviz’ silence.
The following example shows one way of engaging with the Iranian 
government’s system of value in the field of foreign trade. In a 2012 doc-
umentary, internationally broadcasted on the Iranian public TV channel 
“Jam-e jam”, the 78-year-old carpet retailer and former merchant 
Farhadian stresses that his aim is not primarily to make profit, but to raise 
the customers’ interest in Iranian carpets. On this, the interviewer says:
“The real labor is with the weavers…”
Farhadian “I would really like to kiss the hands of all these artistic weavers 
from afar, and I just would like to tell them that it is only for you that I 
built this [carpet shop], to represent the outcome of your work at its 
proper value.”
Journalist “Exactly, this is your service to our culture, your service to our 
traditions, to our efforts, to our values. It represents the effort and work 
needed to bring an Iranian carpet, a handwoven rug, to a sales exhibition 
in the heart of Europe. Anyways, this is a demonstration of your atten-
tion to genuine Iranian culture.” (Translation by the author (OPT1001 
2012))
The man further states that his only daughter married an Iranian (i.e. not 
a German), while his sons are going to take over the family business in 
Hamburg, indirectly stressing that he had not become “weststruck” even 
though he lived in Germany since many decades (OPT1001 2012). 
Thus, the Iranian government hails the merchants’ staging of the moral, 
that is, socially responsible, businessman15 (Amuzegar 1993, 20ff.; 
Keshavarzian 2007, 54) and presents in him the portrait of the ideal 
migrant, who promotes the values it seeks to set forth. This image is remi-
niscent of China’s discourse on its overseas citizens (Ong 1999, 43).
If merchants put forward certain values in a particular social field, it 
does not necessarily imply that they personally adhere to them. Siavash 
termed this flexibility of mediating different values in different social 
fields the “bazari mindset” (see Chap. 2). It can also be thought of as 
diplomacy (Marsden 2018) and complaisant submission in sociability 
15 Also named javânmard (Adelkhah 1999, 30–52).
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(mosâmehat). All in all, it is a form of impression management (Goffman 
1990). While it is particularly crucial in transnational entrepreneurship, 
and for migrants in general, as we shall see in the following chapters, this 
practice can be observed in many social contexts. As Graeber (2013, 231) 
argues, the distance between strategical politics of value and personal 
convictions is
what makes it so easy, in contexts characterized by complex and overlap-
ping arenas of values, for so many actors to simply stroll back and forth 
between one universe and another without feeling any profound sense of 
contradiction or even unease.
Second, the revolution in Iran, the arrival of new migrants, and changes 
in the public perception of immigration influenced the values which 
Iran-specific resources mediated in German social fields. The hostage cri-
sis at Tehran’s US embassy (1979–1981), the Iranian supreme guide 
Ayatollah Khomeini issuing a fatwa against Salman Rushdie (1989), and 
local repercussions of these international events, such as Iranian political 
murders on German territory: fascination with Iran’s Orientalist allure 
was replaced with estrangement and suspicion of its authoritarian, Islamic 
regime and openly anti-Western discourses (Hesse-Lehmann and 
Spellman 2004; Van den Bos 2012; Adelkhah 2016). While Germany 
remained Iran’s most important economic partner in the West (Bösch 
2015, 348), it abolished the visa-free entry for Iranians. Thus, most new-
comers passed through the asylum procedure—and there were many. 
Within a decade, Hamburg’s Iranian population quintuplicated to reach 
about 10,000 in 1990 (Helfer 1989).
Polemics around the notion of “asylum-abusers” (Asylbetrüger), who 
would take advantage of the social system, stirred resentments in the 
German society (Heinrich Lummer in Göktürk et  al. 2007, 113f.). 
Parallelly, the exclusion of the cultural and racial Other became more 
pronounced. Significantly, when chancellor Helmut Kohl took up his 
duties in 1982, he declared wanting to send back half of Germany’s 
Turkish immigrants because, in contrast to Italian, Portuguese, or South 
Asian migrants, they would not adapt to the German society (tkr/DPA/
DPA 2013). Through these dynamics, Iran-specific resources largely lost 
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the value of exoticism; their new estrangement to Germans threaded to 
reinforce already existing barriers to merchants’ capital creation 
in Germany.
It is thus significant that, when we talked about Abtin, a successful 
restaurateur, Akbar qualified him as a Flüchtling (“refugee”, he said it in 
German!). By his tone, I could tell that he did not hold much regard for 
people he characterized as such. In contrast, he showed respect to the liv-
ing and deceased members of early merchant families he had known. Just 
like Parviz and many other merchants, Akbar seeks to distance himself 
from newer migrants and mark his identification with early merchants, 
even more so because he himself passed through the asylum procedure. 
That different “vintages” of migrants may look at each other with 
 suspicion is an important paradigm in migration studies (Kunz 1973; see 
also Lamphere 1992; Vertovec 2015). Research on Iranian migration in 
various destinations shows that the time of departure is a frequently used 
marker in internal boundary-making (Kamalkhani 1988; Kelley et  al. 
1993; McAuliffe 2008). This internal boundary-making is related to the 
fear of what Boris Nieswand (2011, 80ff.) calls “collective devaluation”. 
We can see it in Parviz’ reference to the “name” of Iranians in German 
society, which he claimed was good until the revolution. Merchants were 
afraid that their Iran-specific resources lose the value of exoticism.
Thus, within the increasing diversification of Iranian migrants after the 
revolution, merchants stuck to their original politics of value as they kept 
displaying those Iran-specific resources which convey exoticism. These 
politics were sustained by the fact that, by the 1980s, the value of authen-
ticity, originally put forward as a critique of capitalism, has become cru-
cial in determining consumer practices (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). 
According to Marylin Halter (2007, 17),
the more artificiality, anonymity, and uncertainty apparent in a postmod-
ern world, the more driven are the quests for authentic experiences and the 
more people long to feel connected to localized traditions seeking out the 
timeless and true.
Indeed, a similar orientation toward authenticity and the marketing of 
ethnicity can be observed in many areas, such as art, tourism, and food 
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(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Cravatte 2009; Grasseni 2005). We saw 
that authenticity was already an important value in the German carpet 
market before. However, its mediation was tied to the mediation of famil-
iarity. What had changed was that Iran-coded commercial and personal 
practices and objects increasingly mediated authenticity. In other words, 
the same Iran-specific resources that accounted for Iranian merchants to 
be considered unfamiliar and untrustworthy in the 1960s came to medi-
ate values that were efficient at generating capital by the 1990s. 
Simultaneously, merchants set forth their long-term presence in Hamburg 
in their collective narrative, because this resource began to mediate famil-
iarity, reliability, and accountability. Significantly, a documentary movie 
from 1989 attributes the persistence of the warehouse district to the 
ongoing economic activity of Iranian carpet merchants and underlines 
not only their Iranian ways of doing but also their local rootedness and 
their keeping alive local merchant tradition (Helfer 1989). Interestingly, 
the otherwise very different system of value in the field of Iranian foreign 
trade intersects in the valorization of authenticity through its hailing of 
modesty and craftmanship. Hence, merchants’ politics of value within 
the social field of the German carpet market contributed to modifying 
the dominant system of value.
Finally, Parviz describes newcomers’ business strategies as illegal and 
amoral, hinting to the fact that new immigrants’ resources did not medi-
ate the values relevant in the transnational field of Iranian merchants. 
There were two types of newcomers. First, there were Muslim Iranians 
who, according to Omid, were embedded in the bazar’s system of reputa-
tion and acquired the companies who were sold because of supply diffi-
culties or because their owners were Jewish Iranians who quit their 
business in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution. Conforming to the 
values of this social field, they could generate capital and were quickly 
integrated (Rezaei 2009, 89).
The second type of newcomers who turned themselves into merchants 
and retailers lacked of social relations in bazar networks. Behruz’ father 
(Chap. 5), for example, had been a lawyer in Iran. As his diploma was not 
recognized in Germany, he established himself as a carpet merchant. In 
contrast to the family businesses of established merchants, most of these 
self-made merchants or retailers built on short-term cooperation and 
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small networks with acquaintances and friends. In doing so, they skirted 
the system of reputation, because they could not mediate crucial values, 
or simply because they privileged capital creation in other social fields. 
Importantly, these refugees identified, like merchants, with the urban 
middle class. Their mutual boundary-making was thus less tied to class 
identities than to a mismatch in the values the newcomers and the long-
standing Iranian merchants applied to their work.
Consequently, established merchants were hardly able to control new-
comer’s business strategies (see also Keshavarzian 2007, 152f.), if it was 
not through boundary-making and by strengthening their adherence to 
their own system of value. Instead of the German colleagues in the 1950s 
and 1960s, it was now the established Iranian merchants who blamed 
their bazar-outsider compatriots for unfair competition. A German doc-
umentary from 1989 shows M. Azadi—presented as an intellectual and a 
well-established merchant of antique Persian carpets—in front of a carpet 
discount shop, accusing its dumping prices of endangering reputable 
businesses (Helfer 1989). Pnina Werbner (1990, 66ff.), observes similar 
distinction of established migrant entrepreneurs from newer competitors 
through the discursive construction of moral and social superiority 
among traders of Pakistani origin in Manchester. Established merchants’ 
internal boundary-making thus served not only to protect their own sys-
tem of value, but also to sustain their collective strategies of capital cre-
ation in Germany and in relations with the Iranian government.
Strikingly, the discussion shows that the system of value in the trans-
national social field of Iranian merchants remained relatively stable 
despite important political and economic changes. This stability may 
both be the reason and the outcome of its own resourcefulness: mer-
chants drew on Iran-specific resources they had created in this social field 
to convey values, such as piety and selflessness, that had become relevant 
in the social field of Iranian foreign trade. Iran-specific resources also 
served to uphold and strengthen their effort to increase the value of exoti-
cism and authenticity in the German context.
While hegemonic systems of value may indeed change quickly and 
dramatically, for instance through sudden political events, everyday poli-
tics of value of less powerful agents across local and transnational social 
fields may also influence value systems over extended time spans. Thus, 
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modifications in systems of value rarely happen through exclusively hier-
archical processes. Agents’ power derives from their—inherently 
unequal—potential for action (Graeber 2001, 259ff.). Value systems are 
thus produced by the interaction of agents pursuing malleable strategies 
of capital creation from unequal power positions.
 Collectively Narrating Through the Crisis
Trade with Iranian carpets in Hamburg reached its height in the mid- 
1990s. Then, however, it experienced drastic market breaks. The crisis 
grew even more acute in the 2000s, as one can see in the graph (Fig. 3.1). 
Between 1992 and 2013, the number of Iranian carpet merchants 
dropped by 88%. This section will show how the Iranian merchants’ col-
lective identitary narrative in its contemporary form puts forward the 
same resources to convey diverging values in each of the three relevant 
social fields and in doing so engages with shifts in systems of value caused 
by political and economic changes.
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Fig. 3.1 German import of hand-knotted carpets from selected countries 
between 1996 and 2014 (in thousand Euro, product codes: WA57011010, /90, /91, 
/93, /99, and WA57019010, /90). (data: Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, graphic by 
the author)
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From the mid-1990s onward, the original values of the Iranian revolu-
tion that shaped the social field of Iranian foreign trade were comple-
mented by values that responded to economic, political, and social 
changes. Iran’s classification as a member of the axis-of-evil in 2002, 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s (2005–2013) fierce anti-Zionist dis-
courses and the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program (Abrahamian 
2008, 183ff.), finally the conclusion of the “Iran Deal” (Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action) in 2015, then the USA’s withdrawal 
under the Trump administration in 2018: the Iranian economy is marked 
by recession and uncertainty. As economic and political pressures grow, 
trade relations with Europe and, in particular, with Germany become 
even more important—and carpets still are one of Iran’s largest non-oil 
export products (Statistical Centre of Iran 2014, 438). Private 
 import- export enterprises, indeed, are crucial agents in circumventing 
trade restrictions and embargos (Gerhardt and Senyurt 2013). 
Significantly, in an interview from 2007, the Iranian deputy foreign min-
ister for economic affairs at the time, Ali-Reza Sheikh-Attar, explains that 
one of the reasons for the “close understanding and direct contact between 
Iran and Germany in the economic field” is the “large Iranian commu-
nity living in Germany” (Interview with the Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Minister for Economic Affairs Ali-Reza Sheikh-Attar 2007).
Today, the Iranian government continues to promote the revolution-
ary values of modesty, chastity, and piety. Simultaneously, its ever more 
neoliberal market economy, rising levels of education, the nuclearization 
of the family, and opaque, overlapping, and irregular economic structures 
(Keshavarzian 2007; Erami and Keshavarzian 2015), grant increasing 
value to wealth, autonomy, and professionalism (Kian-Thiébaut 2005; 
Sadjed 2012). Depending on the situation, resources that mediate famil-
iarity with the German context may underline professionalism as they 
may be interpreted as a failure to convey regime-loyalty. The Iranian 
regime collaborates on a regular basis with Hamburg’s merchants, mainly 
through the association AICE16 (Rezaei 2009, 91), and through frequent 
visits of officials in Hamburg. In response to the introduction of new 
16 Most merchants involved in the system of reputation are members of AICE, BIU, and/or the 
Iranian-German European Carpet-Importers Association (EUCA).
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values, the government also created alliances outside of the merchant net-
works. Javid, a 69-year-old corporate consultant who immigrated to 
Germany as a young adult in the early 1980s, told me that it was the 
then-General Consul who proposed him to co-found the “Union of 
Iranian Entrepreneurs” (Bund Iranischer Unternehmer, shortly BIU) in 
2007. The aim was to create an intermediary who could facilitate collabo-
rations between the Iranian government and the Hamburg Senate.
Iran-related political events, but also the global economic crisis as well 
as local political and infrastructural changes complexified the system of 
value that dominates the social field of the German carpet market to a 
point that a resource may simultaneously mediate value and dramatically 
fail to do so.
Iran’s marginalization from the global political and economic exchanges 
impacts on the trade infrastructure,17 but, more importantly, on the 
meaning of Iran-specific resources. Plus, by the early 2000s, the German 
politics of immigration shifted from differentialism toward assimilation, 
which represents the requirement for migrants to mediate familiarity 
through cultural closeness (Aumüller 2009). We can see the effects of 
these developments in the following example: in 2010, the BIU created, 
together with the Iranian government and the Christian democratic 
Senate, the so-called Iran House Project (Iran-Haus Projekt). Javid, its 
president, told me that the aim was to show a “positive image” of Iran and 
foster business relations. However, the local population protested against 
the cooperation with Ahmadinejad’s government (Smechowski 2010), 
condemning the Iranian government for anti-Semitism and human rights 
violations.18 The oppositional SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
joined the movement (Dobusch 2010), which, according to Javid, 
accounts for the failure of the project—alongside inconstancies in the 
Iranian state financial support. The values of democracy, equality, and 
17 Akbar, for instance, saw his dollar accounts confiscated and therefore lost clients in North 
America. Plus, the trade infrastructure is restricted, as Iranian banks in Hamburg work under sanc-
tions or closed down.
18 Among the most important critics of this project was the group “Stop-the-bomb”, mainly consti-
tuted by Zionists and pro-Israel activists (“Original and Prominent Supporters” 2015). For the 
complex connections between Anti-anti-Semitism and the discrimination of Muslims in Germany, 
see Younes (2015).
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human rights are not always relevant in the carpet trade. Here, familiarity 
does not have to pass through cultural and racial closeness but can be 
created through long-term relations. Yet, these values are crucial in the 
social field of Hamburg’s domestic politics, as they are essential to 
European and Western political identity (Guilhot 2005; de Jong 2017). 
The fact that merchants’ mediation of exoticism and familiarity—central 
values in the social field of the German carpet market—was conditional 
to the compliance with democracy, equality, and human rights indicates 
that, in this example, two social fields overlap. Their systems of value are 
different, but unequally powerful. Thus, failing to convey democracy, 
equality, and human rights threatens to compromise Iranian merchants’ 
capital creation as it increases their difficulties to mediate both exoticism 
and familiarity.
The international economic crisis of the late 2000s also influenced the 
system of value in the German carpet market. Parviz and Rahim asserted 
that the taste of Northern Europeans and Americans shifted toward sober 
colors and plain designs, which they find in more economic Indian pro-
duces (see also Piehler 2009). Their comment suggests that instead of 
wealth, mediated through expensive and colorful Iranian carpets, cus-
tomers value simplicity, plainness, and frugality.
The new obstacles for Iranians to convey exoticism and familiarity and 
the shift toward simplicity calls for other competencies, Javid explains. In 
concurrence with the new values in the social field of Iranian foreign 
trade, professionalization would help smoothing the inefficiency of Iran- 
specific resources to create capital:
It is not as if because of crisis less carpets are sold, and that all of a sudden 
people don’t want to have Persian carpets anymore. Instead, is [sic!] because 
of the crisis we heard much more negative things about Iran, than about 
the positive carpet. Until now, all people… How to say? Analphabets, came 
from Iran, had some money, about 100,000€. Then, they borrowed another 
500, 400[,000€] from an Iranian, brought carpets in, imported them, and 
sold them. You did not need any expertise for this, nor did you need to do 
anything. But these times are over! (Interview, June 2014)
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He thus suggests, in a depreciative tone that stresses his own educational 
and professional resources, that a participation in the merchants’ system 
of reputation no longer guarantees business efficiency. Merchants indeed 
adapted their business strategies in various ways: Akbar and Rahim 
included cheaper Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, or Afghan carpets into their 
range of products and invested in new markets, like the Saudi Arabian 
market. Omid, who holds a Master in Business Administration, instead, 
sets forward a focus on Persian quality imports and antique carpets. They 
told me that other colleagues downsized their stocks, shifted to online 
sales, moved their premises to cheaper locations close to the airport, or 
switched to the retail or interior equipment business. Some moved on to 
the USA or elsewhere, or returned to Iran.
The marketing of Iranian culture is a way for Omid to mediate the 
failure to convey the values of democracy, equality, and human rights. 
“This is also why I say ‘Persian’ [i.e. instead of Iranian] carpets,” he told 
me. “What is identity good for if I can’t even pay the rent for my store?” 
(field notes, October 2013). Following a similar rationale, several press 
portraits of merchants characterize them as “politically impartial” 
(Spillmann 2003; Hertel 2011; Fründt 2014). Correspondingly, Omid’s 
large show room is decorated with Iranian cultural artifacts: a dummy 
with a colorful, embroidered vest and a huge book on a holder, probably 
by the poet Hafiz. When I first visited him, he told me that he awaited a 
group of people belonging to a German private club of which he is a 
member for an Iranian dinner. While staging cultural Iranianness is a 
popular way for people to redefine the values Iran-specific resources 
mediate (Sanadjian 2000; Mobasher 2006; Gholami 2015), in the case of 
carpet merchants, they have to fine-tune their politics of value so as to 
not impede on their capital creation in the social field of Iranian for-
eign trade.
I argued above that Iran-specific resources increasingly fail to create 
capital due to Iran’s image in the international political landscape. Yet, 
merchants have been coding Iran-specific resources to convey authentic-
ity through exoticism since pre-revolutionary times, and from the 1980s, 
their efforts have shown positive results, sustained by the rising interest in 
authenticity in the larger society. In addition, through their long-term 
presence, they began to mediate familiarity despite cultural difference. 
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The nostalgia of the “golden days” in which the image of Iran still reflected 
the attraction of the Oriental, yet, Western-orientated, wealthy and secu-
lar monarchy, through a selective “reordering of the past” (Guillaume 
1990), is part of the merchants’ politics of redefining the value of Iran- 
specific resources.
Since the early 2000s, local infrastructural changes second the Iranian 
merchants’ capital creation. Granted, the integration of Hamburg’s free 
port into the aforementioned, newly created, hybrid HafenCity entails 
rising rents and new administrative procedures. However, in its course, 
the local press came to valorize Iranian carpet merchant houses as last 
upholders of the historical ways of doing trade in the neighborhood:
Coffee, tea, and carpets – these are the “elements” which had marked the 
Speicherstadt for decades. One can still find the coffee sector, even though 
one must take a close look. The tea sector no longer marks the landscape 
behind the red brick houses, either. The carpet, however, survived visibly 
with its small-scale structures and great variety […]. The restructuration 
process is ongoing, the stocks dwindle. Will this wonderful piece of Orient 
remain with the Hanseatic city? (Hertel 2011)
Indeed, the restructuration managers declare wanting to preserve the car-
pet stock houses, which became a tourist attraction (Wolf 2005; Schmidt 
2013). The nostalgia one can sense in this discourse is often combined 
with a romanticization of the carpet business, stressing the cultural alter-
ity—the exoticism—and the historical continuity—the familiarity—of 
the merchants’ practices:
The lorry that rolls through Hamburg’s Speicherstadt on this winter morn-
ing drove for eight days and took several thousand kilometers. Now it stops 
in front of a red clinkered stock house. A scuttle opens in the first floor. 
Warehousemen descend the rope on a simple winch and start heaving the 
precious cargo piece by piece to where it is warm and dry: 1650 hand- 
knotted carpets just arrived from Tehran. A scene from times long past. 
(Fründt 2014)
Not only in discourse but also in practice, the long-term presence of 
Iranian merchants strengthens their mediation of familiarity. In a recent 
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documentary (Schanzen and Keunecke 2018), the head of one of the old-
est Iranian carpet merchant enterprises and the German manager of a 
transportation business state that ongoing collaboration over generations, 
which is facilitated through their neighborhood relations in the ware-
house district, also helps to confront the defamiliarization of Iran-specific 
resources and the shift of values in the context of the economic crisis.
Thus, in the social field of the German carpet market, merchants create 
capital (and circumvent the failure to mediate democracy, equality, and 
human rights), on the one hand, through Iran-specific resources that 
refer to apparently apolitical commercial and personal practices and 
objects stressing family cohesion and tradition, as well as Germany- 
specific resources that reify Hamburg merchants’ historical ways of doing, 
convey authenticity and exoticism. On the other hand, Germany-specific 
resources that refer to their long local presence and business history medi-
ate familiarity, expertise, and accountability. Strikingly, in this context, 
exoticism and familiarity are no longer mutually exclusive values, as they 
were during the pre-revolutionary years. However, the merchants’ capital 
creation remains particularly precarious as their politics contest domi-
nant systems of value and the interpretation of their resources may hence 
be reversed at any time.
Finally, in the transnational social field of Iranian carpet merchants, 
the drive toward authenticity in German social fields, and the instaura-
tion of trade barriers in the Iranian context reinforced the existing system 
of value, as it strengthened the comparative advantages of those who were 
embedded in the merchants’ system of reputation. As Parviz mentioned 
in the conversation cited at the beginning of the previous section, the 
number of bankruptcies among wholesalers operating outside of long- 
term trust relations largely exceeded those among its members. This was 
because trade networks based on long-term relations built on mutual 
credit are highly interdependent: the insolvency of one member may 
affect the viability of other firms (Werbner 1990, 59–66). Moreover, 
family enterprises offer a workforce that more readily accepts flexible 
working conditions and salaries (Werbner 1990, 58f.; Jacques-Jouvenot 
and Droz 2015). In order to sustain collective business efficiency, mer-
chants within the system of reputation have more flexible terms of pay-
ment, that is, credit, delayed payment or other forms of generalized 
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exchange (Sahlins 1972, 196ff.), and better value for money. Outsiders to 
the network, instead, have to comply with the conditions of balanced 
exchange, that is, no delays or only short delays allowed for settling 
accounts, as they are considered untrustworthy (Keshavarzian 2007, 
151f.). Significantly, a TV documentation from 2008 shows Omid as he 
buys a precious carpet at the Tehran bazar. He kisses the wholesaler on 
the cheek when the price is settled as a symbol of respect and long 
acquaintance. A German retailer asks the wholesaler how much the car-
pet would have costed if he had bought it instead. The merchant names a 
price exceeding by €1000 what Omid paid. The latter, in turn, com-
ments: “He knows me for forty years. He knows you for forty minutes. 
That’s the problem” (Demurray 2008).
Yet, here too, the drive toward the segmentation of the post- 
revolutionary bazar and the professionalization of merchants outside of 
the traditional social networks introduced new values, which are appar-
ent through the role of BIU and Javid in boundary work. I witnessed 
Omid and one of his merchant friends value Javid’s connections to 
German politicians, but also scoff his friendship with the Imam Ali 
mosque’s imam. His sister Oliya, a trained biologist in her mid-sixties 
with hair dyed in blond who speaks Persian and German to her two white 
terriers, volunteered as a treasurer at BIU for five years. She critiqued its 
high membership fees and low political impact, and Omid predicted that 
BIU is going to lose its influence. Yet, I could tell that my interlocutors 
withheld the whole extent of their accusations, which suggests that their 
system of reputation, in which inner conflicts are resolved out of sight 
from the public (Keshavarzian 2007), had come to include BIU and 
its members.
The valorization of internal social coherence and cooperation among 
merchants largely accounts for the success of their collective strategies of 
capital creation. I witnessed merchants visiting each other, or listened to 
them telling me they saw such and such at a wedding lately. Several inter-
locutors told me that the mosque for many remained an important set-
ting for sociability. Merchants defer diverging identifications, religious 
beliefs, and moral and political convictions19 and maintain multiplex and 
19 For example, as mentioned above, Omid entertains long-term business relations with German 
retailers, and is member of a local private club.
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crosscutting social relations, often over several decades and generations. 
Their reduced number further contributes to a greater cohesion and con-
trol (see also Erami and Keshavarzian 2015, 126). The high level of inte-
gration within this social field explains why it has not been necessary for 
Akbar to speak German fluently.
To resume, the Iranian carpet merchants’ collective identitary narrative 
promoting the resources such as Iranian identification, family cohesion, 
a long history in Hamburg, and (sometimes) also religious adherence 
caters to systems of value in three social fields. Strikingly, it largely draws 
on resources that were originally created through relations within their 
transnational social field. Here, they mediate the values of family 
 coherence, accountability, selflessness, generosity, and piety (Keshavarzian 
2007), which are crucial in their internal system of value since the early 
years of immigration to Hamburg. More recently, professionalism con-
veyed through good contacts to political and economic powerholders, as 
well as educational attainment became another important value. In the 
social field of Iranian foreign trade, these resources convey, besides piety, 
altruism, and family cohesion, also professionalism and wealth. In the 
German carpet market, in turn, they mediate authenticity and exoticism, 
but also familiarity, expertise, and accountability, while they may dis-
simulate their piety and their relations with the Iranian government. 
Thus, Iranian merchants’ collective politics within systems of value that 
change often unexpectedly and in unpredictable ways led to a conver-
gence of their collective agency in the Iranian and German social fields of 
the carpet trade that promotes some of the same resources on which they 
build their internal cohesion.
The collective narrative of the “traditional Iranian carpet merchants”, I 
argued in the introduction to this chapter, puts forward Iranian identifi-
cations, a long business history in Hamburg, family cohesion, and pro-
fessional know-how. During my fieldwork, I worked, for a few weeks, as 
a waitress in an Iranian restaurant in Hamburg. One day I had a memo-
rable customer, a huge man in his fifties, who was accompanied by a 
heavily made-up woman with long, blonde hair. I noticed the Rolex he 
had ostensibly positioned in the middle of the table. He told me that he 
was a carpet merchant, and added that he was not Iranian but an ethnic 
Roma from a Balkan country. When I told Omid about the encounter, I 
was surprised by the vehemence of his reaction:
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Stay clear of these people! These gypsies lie! They always try to pass them-
selves off as Iranians. They say they are the nephews of such as such known 
carpet dealer and take the piss out of people. You should be very careful! 
(Field notes, October 2013)
The appropriation of the merchants’ narrative—in particular its two 
main pillars, Iranian origin and business continuity through kinship 
ties—by people who identify as Roma but are not of Iranian origin, 
underlines its efficiency in creating capital.
The narrative is efficient, because it allows merchants to draw (in large 
part) on the same resources to create capital in the three social fields in 
which they are involved, although these are shaped by highly diverging 
systems of value. Indeed, due to changing local and transnational politi-
cal, economic, and infrastructural conditions, and thanks to the mer-
chants’ collective politics of value, their migration-specific resources that 
represent an Iranian identity building on ideas of tradition and family 
cohesion today mediate the respective values that enhance the creation of 
capital for business purposes in each of the professional social fields. 
Conversely, following the principles of diplomacy and complaisant sub-
mission—acts of impression management—merchants downplay 
resources that fail to promote crucial values in these social fields and thus 
threaten to create barriers to capital creation. These are, for instance, reli-
gious piety in the German carpet market and oppositional political 
engagements in the social field of Iranian foreign trade. Ultimately, the 
efficiency of politics of value relies on creating a maximum of capital 
from existing resources, while keeping the effort of generating new 
ones minimal.
The discussion of the way Iranian merchants engage with shifting sys-
tems of value in the local and transnational social fields of Iranian foreign 
trade, the German carpet market, and among their peer Iranian mer-
chants throughout seven decades sheds light on the workings of systems 
of value. As agents’ power derives from their—inherently unequal—
potential for action to determine the meaning of resources (Graeber 
2001, 259ff.), I argued that value systems are produced by the interaction 
of agents pursuing malleable strategies of capital creation from unequal 
power positions. It became clear that both values and systems of value are 
ambiguous, ambivalent, contradictory, and, because they may shift at any 
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time, transitional. Values do not stand for themselves. Their relations are 
shaped by interdependence, and, as some values occupy key positions 
respective to the mediation of other values, their strength and importance 
is unequal (cf. Dumont 2013; Hickel and Haynes 2018). Thus, for 
agents, mediating one value influences the mediation of others. The study 
of value in the context of capital creation shows that, just as values are 
ambiguous, so are resources: they can convey a single value or several 
values. They may as well convey a key value and simultaneously fail to 
mediate another crucial value. Barriers of capital creation come from 
unfulfilled crucial values.
As values are unequally important in one social field, so is the impact 
of barriers to capital creation unequal. The more central the value, the 
greater is the barrier to capital creation if it remains unfulfilled. Finally, I 
showed that dynamics in transnational social fields are highly interdepen-
dent and they mutually shape value systems. Systems of value interrelate 
when, as in the example to the Iran House project, social fields are over-
lapping, or when, as in the case of the values put forward by the Iranian 
monarchy, systems of value transgress the confines of a single social field. 
The potential for action of individual or collective agents lies thus in dip-
lomatically crafting connections across systems of value through (some-
times arbitrary) value shifts with the help of fine-tuned politics of value 
in different social fields.
Karim, a 30-year-old barista of rather modest background, who came 
to Germany in 1986, told me that, among local Iranians, “the social sta-
tus plays an important role. There are the upper classes: carpet merchants 
and intellectuals. They do not want to have anything to do with the oth-
ers” (field notes, May 2013). Iranian merchants present a very particular 
case of collective capital creation, as their politics of value allow them to 
convey both familiarity and exoticism, that is, values that tend to be 
mutually exclusive in most social fields related to the German society. The 
next two chapters will show that post-revolutionary migrants who iden-
tify as “intellectuals” struggle with the opposition of these two values. 
The negotiation between different systems of value accounts for boundary- 
making between these two “groups” of Iranians.
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4
An Association Between Diversity 
and Exoticism
At the end of the last concert of the three-day FusIran festival, which the 
Golestan association co-organized in one of Hamburg’s most important 
nightclubs, Shahrokh Moshkin Ghalam dances to the music of the Italy- 
based classical Iranian music group Barbâd. He wears a dark grey dervish- 
like dress; his waist-long hair is swirling. Spontaneously, the dancer invites 
female members of the association to join him onstage. Shahla is the first 
to join. I am surprised, because she told me that she did not know how to 
dance to Iranian music at a party a month earlier. Then, Said Shanbehzadeh, 
who performed the previous concert of Southern-Iranian Bandari-style 
music, jumps on the stage. The Paris-based musician has exchanged the 
simple cloth reminding African tribal clothes for a beige costume. As I walk 
around in the crowd of about 200 persons (according to Sadegh the public 
was constituted to 70% of Iranians and 30% of Germans), Yalda meets me 
and says: “Go, join the others on the stage!” I am embarrassed, but I go 
anyways as virtually all Golestanis including some of their family members 
are dancing together with the artists, thus symbolically concluding the fes-
tival. (Field notes, October 2013)
The moment I stepped on the stage, it felt as if I was part of a group 
united not only by the celebration of the successful completion of three 
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intense days of volunteering. Dancing with these internationally 
renowned Iranian artists—Moshkin Ghalam and Shanbehzadeh reinter-
pret Iranian traditional and folk culture1 for Western and Iranian migrant 
publics—was also a way for each member to individually show his iden-
tification with neo-traditionalist Iranian cultural elements in front of the 
public. In that instant, we, the dancing Golestanis, were united through 
our situational collective identification.
Since the mass immigration of the 1980s, Iranians’ continuously grow-
ing diversity of social backgrounds, levels of education, ethnic identities, 
religious and political beliefs give rise to a proliferation of Iran-related 
associations in Hamburg. There are cultural and ethnic associations, pro-
fessional unions (like the Union of Iranian Entrepreneurs, see Chap. 3), 
religious groups (the association of the supporters of an Iranian-Shia 
mosque), and political associations. During my fieldwork, I repeatedly 
heard people report about conflicts within these associations. For exam-
ple, Ehsan, a 50-year-old academic, told me that, several years ago, the 
literature circle Hamneshast split over the disagreement of two board 
members. Babak, an artist in his early forties, told me that he did not join 
Hamneshast although the topics it treated interested him, because “there 
are always people who spoil it [for me]; conservative people who play to 
the gallery” (field notes, April 2013). Given the great diversity of indi-
vidual trajectories and the multiplicity of identifications among Iranians 
in Hamburg, what boundaries do people mobilize to create and maintain 
collective identifications within such a migrant association?
According to Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 182, 355), in associations and 
clubs organized around a common activity or feature, social distinction 
can be studied through processes of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, 
associations are spaces where members can create capital (idem 1979, 
533). More specifically, one can build networks and acquire new skills 
and cultural knowledge, for example, organizational know-how and lan-
guage skills, and thereby gain a greater participation in the society of resi-
dence, and, if applicable, in transnational social fields (Cattacin and 
1 While Moshkin Ghalam mixes traditional Iranian, Sufi, Flamenco dance elements with martial 
arts styles, Shanbehzadeh performs folklore music and dances from the southern Iranian province 
of Bushehr.
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Domenig 2014; Prashizky and Remennick 2015). While migrant asso-
ciations are mostly based on a shared identification with a national or 
ethnic category, their collective identity references often contain elements 
both of the society of origin and of the place of residence (Cattacin and 
Domenig 2014).
So far, my research illustrated that ethnic and national identifications, 
informed by personal experiences and professional trajectories, are tools 
within flexible strategies of capital creation. In the context of carpet mer-
chants of Iranian origin, I showed that collective identifications—in the 
form of professional narratives—may emerge, as a way to engage in poli-
tics of value that serve to fine-tune the values certain resources mediate 
and thus navigate the simultaneous capital creation in several social fields. 
Consequently, agents’ politics of value constitute the motivation that 
drives their performance of capital creation. Extant research shows that, 
in providing collective identity references, migrant associations propose 
cultural representations that may help to overcome certain barriers to 
capital creation (Ghorashi 2004; Amelina and Faist 2008, 113f.). My aim 
in this chapter is to examine how processes of evaluation within an 
 association relate to systems of value that prevail in the social fields rele-
vant for the association’s activities.
Understanding boundary-making as the denial of a resource’s value, 
and the deconstruction of a boundary as the valorization of a resource as 
a capital, I examine the inclusion and exclusion of people in the Hamburg 
branch of the German-Iranian association Golestan, from its foundation 
in 2011 until 2015. Through a diachronic analysis, I trace how members, 
post-1979 highly educated first- and second-generation migrants, indi-
vidually and collectively put forward different identifications in relations 
with German media, among established Golestanis, and in contact with 
prospective members. Thus, interrogating the formation of group identi-
fications from within, I aim to shed light on the way unequal individual 
resources drive the collective potential for action in politics of value in the 
German public sphere, in the local Iranian social field, and the transna-
tional social field of Iranians identifying as honari.
I first learnt about Golestan through Roshan, a woman in her early 
thirties, who had been my flatmate a few years before the association was 
founded. She posted an advertisement for their annual Nowruz festivity 
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on Facebook. Intrigued by its venue, unusual for Iranian events (a Steiner 
school), I joined the celebrations that took place in March 2013. In this 
frame, I met Babak, who invited me to join Golestan’s first Stammtisch2 
in May 2013, after we met several times over a coffee or a beer. Situations 
in which I felt included in group dynamics became more and more fre-
quent in the course of research. This was not only due to my regular 
attendance of the monthly Stammtisch, but also to my participation in 
private meetings, barbecues, and nights out with some of the Golestanis. 
My involvement became more important through my volunteering in 
the organization of the three-day-long FusIran festival and the 2014 
Nowruz festivities. Yet, to learn about the beginnings, I had to draw on 
interviews and media documentation.
 New Beginnings in Old Familiarity
In the frame of the 2009 protests in Iran that accused the government of 
election fraud, Donya, a physician, and Sadegh, a successful poet and 
writer, respectively 34 and 39 years old, engaged in different forms of 
transnational activism in Hamburg. Their move reflects a growth of inter-
est in Iran-related associations among young people of Iranian origin all 
over the world within this social upheaval (Alexanian 2011; Kelly 2011, 
450f.). However, both told me that they soon reached the social and polit-
ical limits to this kind of activism. As they shared the idea of engaging in 
cultural, rather than outrightly political work, their common friend Babak 
introduced them to each other. Sadegh suggested founding a local branch 
of Golestan, an association his friend Davud, an editor, was creating in 
Munich. In doing so, he explained me, he wanted to reduce administra-
tive work and prevent struggle over the association’s leading principles:
The [Golestan association] intends to be a place where German-Iranians 
can pursue those longings which they are not able to fulfill elsewhere. 
2 Stammtisch is a German concept, referring to the regular meetings of a stable group of people in 
the frame of associational or friendship circles—a concept that has parallels to the Iranian dowreh. 
Distinct from Golestan’s official members’ meetings that took place behind closed doors, the idea 
of these gatherings is to offer an open space for people interested by the association in which they 
can get acquainted with its members in an informal setting.
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At [Golestan] we would like to create a space where we can further develop 
our individual concept of the term “home” […]. It’s [Golestan’s] goal to 
provide a place for […] diversity. A place where it can be experienced not 
only by German-Iranians but also by “native” Germans as well as people 
with a German-French, German-Turkish, German-Ghanaian (etc.) back-
ground […]. One of [Golestan’s] main goals is to provide a forum for a 
dialogue between cultures. It is a place of mutual respect and common 
experiences, where different views and concepts of life are tolerated. 
(Website of association Golestan, assessed 07/11/20153)
In other words, the association’s declared aims were to provide identifica-
tions for people of Iranian origin, and a space where people of any ethnic 
background can live and experience the diversity of what is defined as 
“Iranian culture”.
Seven people of Iranian origin, aged between 25 and 41, and linked by 
kinship or long-term friendship, created Golestan’s Hamburg branch in 
2011: Donya, her sister and brother, Sadegh, Roshan, her brother Afshin, 
Yalda, a female journalist called Shahla, and Babak. Some came to 
Hamburg as young adults; others were born in Germany or raised in dif-
ferent countries in the West. Donya explained “these were all people I 
knew and trusted” (interview, November 2015). She said that all were 
either themselves left-wing Iranian regime-critical activists, or their fam-
ily members, or both. They were university-educated professionals or stu-
dents and shared an interest in art. Many actually had personal ties in the 
Iranian artist milieu: Donya had set out to be a professional piano player 
before her migration, Sadegh and Babak had participated in art produc-
tions in Iran, and Yalda occasionally worked as a piano teacher in Tehran. 
Others, like Roshan and Donya’s brother, were amateur dancers. Plus, 
Donya’s uncle had worked with Yalda’s father in Iran. Thus, as frequently 
observed in research on migration (Moya 2005; Kelly and Lusis 2006, 
841), the association was originally based on pre-migratory social networks.
Their shared ties to Iranian artist subculture testify of an urban salaried 
middle-class background in Iran (Tehran and Shiraz), and identitary 
links to the intelligentsia (rowshanfekrân). Ervand Abrahamian (2008, 
3 In order to maintain the anonymity of the association, I do not indicate the web address.
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34ff.) dates the origins of this identitary group, which draws on a dialecti-
cal opposition to the propertied middle class, the merchants, back to the 
presence of foreign military and economic powerholders in Iran in the 
nineteenth century. A picture from 2012 that figures on the association’s 
website shows some of the foundation members including Yara. They 
pose in front of a building covered with graffiti, probably located in the 
Schanzenviertel, a district marked by undergoing gentrification, where 
alternative subcultures meet yuppie lifestyles (Naegler 2012), thus under-
lining their linkage to local alternative culture. Moreover, Yara’s green 
jacket and Yalda’s green scarf support the protestation movement against 
the elections in 2009.4
Associations serve as sites of distinction; this is also the case for migrants. 
Anna Prashizky and Larissa Remennick (2015), for instance, show how 
among young people of Russian origin in Tel Aviv create an association to 
collectively reinterpret a culturally hybrid Russian intelligentsia lifestyle. 
In doing so, they draw boundaries to Russians with different social and 
migratory trajectories, and they aspire for upward social mobility through 
the recognition of their Russia-related cultural capital by local Israelis. 
Such a recreation of socio-professional identities after migration is remi-
niscent of Iranian carpet merchants’ politics of value. Trust created through 
long-term relations plays a crucial role here, too. However, we shall see 
why, at the difference of carpet merchants, Golestanis seek to stress their 
Germany-specific capital or claim cosmopolitan, rather than primarily 
Iran-related tradition-orientated identifications. Thereby, the mobiliza-
tion of the system of value that prevails in the transnational social fields of 
Iranian artists, in other words, the local reinterpretation of the “honari 
imaginary”, plays a crucial role in the association’s original politics of value.
 A Honari Imaginary
When I attended Golestan’s Nowruz festivities in 2014, I had just come 
back from a research stay in Iran. The event featured a stand on which I 
recognized some of the same handcrafted goods—jewelry, scarves, key 
4 Green was the color of the unsuccessful reformative candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
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fobs, and so on—I had seen on one of the biggest markets of small artisans 
in Tehran, pâssâj parvâneh. I was told that one of the newer members had 
brought them back on her last visit. As this instance indicates, the mem-
bers’ personal connection with the transnational Iranian art milieu influ-
enced the choice of Iran-specific resources Golestan put forward. 
Significantly, according to Donya, one of Golestan’s initial aims was to 
offer a platform to contemporary young artists, who lack the permission 
of the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance to work legally in Iran. The 
FusIran festival was supposed to be such an occasion.
To understand the role of this identification in dynamics within the 
association, we have to take into account which values these art-related 
resources mediate in Iranian contexts. Obviously, the complexity of the 
social dynamics in Iran’s art milieu would require a research on its own 
(see Emami 1986; Grigor 2012). For the purpose of this chapter, I con-
fine myself to drawing the great lines of the honari imaginary which 
developed around this artist milieu. I chose the term “imaginary” to 
account for the constructiveness and fluidity of the ideas and practices 
that shape identifications with artistic subcultures.
I first got in touch with people who call themselves—and are identi-
fied as—honaris5 thanks to some of my family members living in Iran, 
who are art professionals or amateurs. Ideas and practices that refer to 
honari identifications are highly diverse, but, without falling into simpli-
fications, I will identify a few recurrent markers. First, the common 
ground on which such identities rely is an interest in the fine arts, at least 
in the general sense. This interest implies a rather high level of education, 
often linked to a middle-class background.
Second, many people who identify as honaris valorize Iranian tradi-
tional (sonnati) cultural elements (in particular literature, folklore music, 
folkloric designs) as well as European high culture (e.g. Italian architec-
ture, French literature). This neo-traditionalism may go together with a 
distancing from the global Western-oriented consumer culture (Sadjed 
2012, 156). Babak, for example, told me that when he is in Iran, he likes 
to spend his evenings at the café of the “Mohsen art gallery” located in a 
5 The term is best translated as “arty people”, which, in contrast to artists, honarmandân, includes 
also amateurs.
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high-end quarter in Northern Tehran and specialized in avant-garde art, 
because “you can meet people there who are less consumption-oriented 
as the rest of the society”6 (field notes, March 2014).
In Iran and abroad, people enact the honari imaginary through con-
sumption practices,7 which may contain elements that can be found in 
Western alternative subcultures. For example, wearing colorful and large 
clothes inspired by Iranian folklore may evoke Western hippie styles. 
Large glasses, as well as beards and mustaches for the men do not only 
reflect Iranian neo-traditionalism but also the influence of the Western- 
originated hipster trend (Image 4.1).
Gendered behavior that contests patriarchal and Islamic norms is also a 
way for honaris to seek distinction from urban mainstream lifestyles. For 
6 Babak “Da trifft man Leute die nicht so konsumorientiert sind wie der Rest der Gesellschaft”.
7 Public locations in which I could observe people displaying such a lifestyle are (clandestine) cafés, 
tea houses, parks, art galleries, theaters, or handicraft markets in Tehran and Mashad.
Image 4.1 Young men whose clothing and hairstyle mark their honari identifica-
tion at Khâneh honarmandân, center of contemporary art, Tehran. (February 
2014, author’s photo)
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example, while physical closeness between non-related persons is consid-
ered sinful (harâm) according to Islam, in winter 2013, I saw a male friend 
and colleague of a female graphic designer—ten years her junior—spon-
taneously kiss her on the forehead on a street near Tehran’s Vanak Square.
In sum, identifying as honari tends to mean putting forward certain 
social and cultural resources that would mediate education, knowledge of 
Iranian (pre-Islamic) traditions, literature, acquaintance with Western 
high culture, and its values of democracy, equality, human rights, and 
sometimes even socialism (Abrahamian 2008, 35). Simultaneously, the 
same people downplay resources that would convey Islamic piety, politi-
cal loyalty to the Iranian government, patriarchy, but also global cultural 
hierarchies, or capitalism as these contradict the aforementioned key val-
ues within the system of value that shapes honari contexts (see also Sadjed 
2012, 156f.).  It thus tends to express opposition or at least a critical 
stance toward the Iranian regime.
In recent years, however, the honari lifestyle became part of a more 
mainstream urban neo-traditionalist trend in Iran. Significantly, 15 years 
ago, shops selling artistic and craftwork could be found only in rare tour-
istic places or traditional workshops. However, I noticed a burgeoning of 
stores selling (rather expensive) pottery, jewelry, locally designed folklore- 
inspired clothes and leatherwork in big cities since the mid-2000s (Image 
4.2).8 This development is the result of several—quite contradictory—
social and political influences. First, the government encourages a revival 
of “authentic Iranian culture” as a nationalist resistance against 
Westernization, in particular in artistic productions (Keshmirshekan 
2010, 492). We saw some of this politics in the governments’ hailing of 
carpet knotters in Chap. 3. Second, the identification and revival of pre- 
Islamic Iranian cultural elements among people of Iranian origin living in 
Western countries, which Kathryn Spellman (2004, 43) calls the “syn-
cretic re-archaization”, stimulates this interest.9 Thus, the neo-traditional 
tendencies in Iran led to the increasing commercialization of artists’ and 
8 Shahram Khosravi (2008, 69) also testifies about the appearance of traditional tea houses (châi 
khâne-ye sonnati) in Tehran’s Northern high-end districts.
9 There is, for example, a new interest in Zoroastrian festivities such as Tirgân and Mehregân among 
urban middle classes. Significantly, my father told me in 2013 that he had participated in an out-
door Tirgân festivity with a hundred other people in the Northern province of Mazanderan—a 
festivity which he had known neither in his youth in Iran, nor during the time he lived in Germany.
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artisans’ work, bringing images linked to their lifestyle to the center 
of society.
Having thus outlined the Iranian identifications the founder members 
sought to promote, I move on to examine the interaction between indi-
vidual members’ identifications within a German public media appear-
ance, in order to set the context for the subsequent analysis of internal 
boundary-making.
 A Public Negotiation of the Limits 
to Identifications
One year after its foundation, in mid-2012, the Golestanis Afshin and 
Yara participated in a TV program, which has the aim to present non- 
profit organizations’ projects to prospective donors and sponsors. Besides 
members of Golestan, there was also the vice-president an association of 
people from Burkina Faso.
Afshin, a founding member, is an introverted 28-year-old student of 
law. As opponents to the Islamic Republic, his parents sought asylum in 
Image 4.2 A store in central Tehran selling honari artifacts. (February 2014, 
author’s photo)
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Hamburg, where he was born and raised. Like Roshan, Afshin was my 
flatmate a few years before I started this research. Three years older Yara, 
who I met during my fieldwork, joined Golestan a few months before its 
first public event. The educator was born in Iran, came to Germany with 
her family at the age of five, and grew up in Lüneburg, a city south of 
Hamburg. The family then moved to Hamburg in the mid-2000s. 
Contrary to Afshin’s parents who strictly oppose Islam, Yara told me that 
her mother, today member of a local female Iranian folklore band, regu-
larly took her to the Iranian mosque in Hamburg when she was a child. 
Afshin never went to Iran, but Yara traveled there once when she was 21. 
However, she told me that, in engaging into anti-government activism in 
Hamburg in the frame of the 2009 upheaval, she resigned to not being 
able to go there anymore. Thus, both Golestanis can be considered 
second- generation migrants with German citizenship. However, their 
stances toward Iran and their engagement in  local Iranian social fields 
could hardly be more different: Afshin has been keeping distance from 
Iranian contexts, and his friends are of various ethnic and national ori-
gins. His participation in Golestan was a first step toward an engagement 
with local Iranians. As for Yara, she has been strongly engaged in Iranian 
social fields since 2009.
In her introduction to the talk show, the journalist—a German with-
out migration experience—quickly introduces the associations. Then, 
however, she questions Afshin and Yara about their Iranian identifica-
tions, asking:
Where are you from?
and to Afshin,
You were born here – how much Iranian is there actually still in you?
and to Yara,
You came to Germany at the age of five. How do you feel? Somewhere 
in between?
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The journalist sets out to focus on Afshin’s and Yara’s Iran-specific 
resources. Her first questions show her interest in their mediation of exot-
icism. As we saw in the previous chapter, this value was created through 
centuries of exchanges between Europe and the Middle East and closely 
connects to the quest for the culturally authentic (Halter 2007).
How did the Golestanis engage with this categorization? Afshin’s strat-
egy is to withdraw any ethnic or national significance from resources 
which the journalist interprets as Iranian:
I absolutely don’t like to speak with [i.e. in terms of ] “somehow being 
German or Iranian or so”. Um, of course there is some kind of rootedness, 
my parents are from there, but ultimately, I was socialized here, I grew up 
here, and it is here that my life takes place […]. So, it’s not that we [i.e. 
Golestanis] only address Iranians – if you want to speak like this, in these 
categories – but actually all people who somehow identify with and who 
somehow look for a platform where this mix, precisely this “not clearly fit-
ting somewhere” is echoed.
Afshin’s refusing to adhere to any strictly defined ethnic or national 
identity is infused by his postcolonial understanding of nationhood and 
identity, not least through his sister’s anti-racist activism in the group 
kanak attak (“wog attack”). Afshin tries to redefine the value mediated by 
non-European resources from exoticism toward diversity, and ultimately, 
familiarity. In doing so, he participates in a form of activism that grew 
popular in German-speaking contexts in the 2000s, as Fatima El-Tayeb 
(2004) and Sabine Strasser (2006, 2008) document. To be precise, I am 
here referring to diversity as a value10 (that is increasingly used in politics 
and public discourse (Schiller 2016; Bührmann and Schönwälder 2017)), 
which implies an acknowledgment of variety from the vantage point of 
adherence to a particular local cultural context. Significantly, in trying to 
turn the conversation away from his individual case, toward the identity 
of Golestan, Afshin defines the association as “not exclusively Iranian”. 
Contrary to Afshin, Yara presents herself as German, but simultaneously 
indicates the limits to this identification:
10 When I refer to diversity among Iranians, I intend the diversity of positioning in internal rela-
tions in the sense of plurality.
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I always say “I’m German” and then… I mean it is funny because people 
look at me and say “Well, you don’t really look German.” My question then 
is always “What does ‘German’ look like?” I mean, I’m German! If I feel 
this way, that’s also what I am [she laughs].
Yara has black hair, dark, brown eyes, her skin has an olive tone, and she 
speaks German without any accent. The evaluation of her racial features 
thus became the reason why her interlocutor did not recognize the value 
of familiarity in her Germany-specific resources (see also Ong 1999, 91). 
In this TV show, she recounts these dynamics as a funny anecdote, but 
during my fieldwork I witnessed her being deeply affected by similar 
experiences. Boundary-making based on racial and religious difference is 
very common in German society and it constitutes important obstacles 
to migrants’ capital creation (Weiss 2001; Goldberg 2006; Mandel 2008; 
Shooman 2014; Çelik 2017).
The first interactions between the journalist and the Golestanis raise a 
dichotomy prevalent in conceptions about immigration in Germany, 
which Martin Sökefeld (2004) termed the “paradigm of cultural differ-
ence”: identifying as German and having other ethnic or national identi-
ties tends to be seen, if not as impossible at least as incompatible. I 
previously argued that, within German approaches to immigration, 
assimilation ultimately promotes the value of familiarity (see Chap. 3). 
Let me elaborate on this argument. In comparing the nature of symbolic 
boundaries against immigrants in Europe, Christopher Bail (2008, 49) 
shows that in Germany, education, occupational achievements, and, 
importantly, Germany-specific cultural resources, such as language skills 
and cultural knowledge, are seen as criteria for successful integration. 
Thus, familiarity is a key value and its mediation is essential to capital 
creation in dominantly German social fields.11
Moreover, the exotic and the familiar are perceived as  mutually 
exclusive. Assimilation tends to be seen as the migrants’ responsibility 
rather than as a collective process (Gruner 2010, 285; El-Tayeb 
2016). This development is reflected in recent modifications in 
11 A similar importance of location-specific resources and the tendency to deny recognition of 
resources created abroad was observed in Sweden by Maja Cederberg (2015)—in spite of the gov-
ernment’s political valorization of diversity.
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German citizenship legislation. Until the year 2000, citizenship was 
acquired primarily through filiation, based on the jus sanguinis.12 
After that date, a legislative reform introduced the jus solis—the 
acquirement of citizenship through the birthplace (Bundesministerium 
der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 2015). However, dual citizen-
ship is restricted to only those few nationals, whose country of origin 
makes expatriation difficult if not impossible, like Iran (Gaserow 
1995). In short, the legislation suggests that you can be a German or 
a foreigner, but only with great  difficultly can you be both. 
Correspondingly, resources created in transnational social fields tend 
to be perceived as unfamiliar and thus as a proof of a failure to assimi-
late (Ehrkamp 2006; Çelik 2015). Hence, in the system of values that 
shapes the German public sphere, that is, the social field in which the 
TV channel’s production participates, Golestanis cannot both be 
Germans and be Iranians, nor can they be neither.
Because of this dichotomy, both Afshin and Yara resist the identifica-
tion as Iranian and thereby contest their Iran-specific resources mediating 
exoticism. They aim to create, within Golestan, something Nicholls and 
Uitermark (2016) termed “counterpublic”. We can think of it here as a 
social field whose system of value builds on an opposition to contexts in 
which their Iran-specific resources and racialized difference is perceived as 
a lack of familiarity. Yet, we will see in the following that, beyond the 
interest in not conveying exoticism, Afshin’s and Yara’s politics of value, 
and consequently, their strategies of capital creation, diverge.
Initially, the journalist shows interest in the Golestanis’ contestations, 
for example, in suggesting the creation of a new social category that may 
reflect their cultural in-betweenness. However, instead of talking about 
the work of Golestan, or about aspects of Afshin’s and Yara’s life that are 
not related to Iran, she soon returns to inquiring about their “Iranianness”, 
but now addresses Iran-related political issues:
12 Accordingly, people who, like Afshin, were born to foreign nationals on German territory had to 
go through a formal citizenship application procedure to gain a German passport. This contributed 
to the categorization of children of migrants born and/or raised in Germany as foreigners, rather 
than Germans (Çelik 2015).
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Iran unfortunately also makes the headlines. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the 
dictatorship… that is unfortunately what the normal citizen knows about 
Iran since 2005. Do people ask you frequently about this?
And
How do you feel when you are, so to say, in Germany and talk is about 
Iran? With what feelings do you follow such news?
Essentially, the journalist refuses both Afshin’s and Yara’s identifications 
and continues to consider them as Iranian. Moreover, she uncritically 
raises popular preconceptions about Iran (and Burkina Faso13), judging 
the right and wrong of ideas and practices that do not correspond to the 
values of democracy and human rights. To defuse the journalist’s judg-
ment, Afshin and Yara state that, in their own social environment, people 
would have more nuanced images of Iran. In other words, the systems of 
value that shape the social fields in which they are engaged in their every-
day lives are distinct from those prevailing in the German public sphere.
The journalists’ evaluation of Iran-specific resources brings us to the 
second reason for the Golestanis’ rejection of their categorization as 
Iranians: while these resources may convey exoticism, they also may be 
perceived as failing to convey the values of democracy, human rights, and 
equality—ultimately, familiarity with German contexts. Moreover, in the 
German public sphere, the value of exoticism is subordinated to the cen-
tral importance of familiarity. In the case of carpet merchants, I showed 
that failing to mediate these values tends to create a barrier to Iranians’ 
capital creation, for instance in the context of the Iran House project. 
Building on Iran-specific resources to convey exoticism is thus a risky 
strategy. Thus, Afshin’s and Yara’s politics of value aim at circumventing 
this potential barrier to capital creation by trying to convey familiarity, 
either in emphasizing the non-ethnic character of their Iran-specific 
resources and conveying diversity, or by putting forward Germany- specific 
resources. As the interview continues, Afshin sticks to his rejection of 
13 For example, in talking about Burkina Faso, the journalist inquires about female genital 
mutilation.
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national or ethnic categories against the journalist’s quite insisting ques-
tions in an increasingly sarcastic way:
It’s not as if, because my parents are from Iran, I am the one in charge of 
informing people about the actual state of the nuclear conflict. This is 
absurd, really.
He rebukes the journalist:
Journalist “Is there something where you would say [two seconds of hesita-
tion] ‘Iranians are really good in this, or one has to see that’?”
Yara [laughs].
Afshin “Now you hit on exactly the same line of argumentation that I just 
mentioned. I mean, there is no such thing as a ‘typical Iranian this or 
that’.”
At this point, Yara changes her politics of value. She gives up on trying to 
mediate familiarity. In a cheerful tone, she presents her Iran-specific 
resources in a way for them to convey the value of exoticism by putting 
forward Iran’s ethnic and linguistic diversity.
We want to show a different image of Iran. I mean, um, our Iranian nation 
is a potpourri [kunterbunt], we have a multiethnic state, we have many, 
many languages in Iran that I even may not understand… we are really a 
potpourri, and that’s exactly what we want to convey.
The effort to redefine the meaning of resources is a collective response to 
stigmatization frequent among ethnic minorities (Fleming et al. 2012). 
Significantly, like Yara, the invitee from the Burkina Faso association also 
engages in “identity entrepreneurship” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). 
Research on Iranian associations and public events in the USA and the 
Netherlands equally suggests that they are sites for the production of 
Iranian identifications alternative to negative images prevailing in the 
media (Ghorashi 2004; Ghorashi and Boersma 2009; Malek 2011). As 
Yara draws an ethnic, that is, tentatively non-political, picture of Iran, 
and explains that her family identifies as ethnic Azeri, she accepts her 
categorization as Iranian (note also the usage of the first-person plural in 
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the previous and the following citations). She distances herself from the 
Iranian government in order to sustain the values of democracy, human 
rights, and equality. In sum, Yara ends up complying, instead of engaging 
with the system of value that shapes this public media broadcast. As 
Nicholls and Uitermark (2016, 9) indicate, “rather than carving open a 
space in the public sphere, the expression of an identity that stood in 
opposition to dominant norms resulted in closure” and most often 
migrants resolve to conform to the expectation of exoticism and the 
struggle toward the impossible fulfillment of assimilation and familiarity.
For his part, Afshin successfully continues to reject any strictly defined 
national or ethnic identification, until, at the end of the interview, the 
journalist touches on his parents’ political exile. As he shows personal 
affectedness for the first time, she comments in a pitiful tone that those 
who are forced to flee “leave something behind”—a statement that 
reflects stigmatization of people categorized as political refugees. This 
time, Afshin does not contest the journalist. However, Donya remembers 
that he was very angry after the broadcast, asking what the point of his 
participation was. Ultimately, in drawing on the value of diversity, he 
uses a concept that is itself a substantial part of discriminatory approaches 
to immigration, as Suzanne Hall (2017) notes. The Golestanis’ persistent 
ascription to an assumed cultural alterity reveals that, within the system 
of value that shapes the German public sphere, resources that convey 
exoticism are less efficient, lasting, and versatile in creating capital than 
those who convey familiarity. The ultimate failure of both Afshin and 
Yara to mediate familiarity highlights their limited potential for action 
within social field that are shaped by this system of value.
Finally, their individual ways of engaging this system of value in the 
context of this TV show also indicates diverging ideas about Golestan asso-
ciation. While Afshin sees in the association a space for celebrating diversity 
as familiarity through activities that only loosely relate to the Iranian cul-
tural context, Yara views it as a platform for exclusively Iranian contempo-
rary art and cultural performances that cater to the mediation of exoticism.
It is on the background of navigating systems of value that promote 
familiarity while making it quite impossible for migrants to convey that 
we need to understand the negotiation of collective identifications within 
the association.
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 The Conflict
In the process of collective identity formation, a conflict led to a split in 
the group between late 2012 and early 2013 and set the common ground 
on which collective identifications from then on would be negotiated. 
Roshan, who has a critical distance for being a PhD student abroad since 
2012, resumed the conflict as follows:
As I think about it now, it was really a lot about identity negotiations, both 
about personal Egos, and about collective Egos in relation to Iran. (Private 
message on Facebook, October 2015)
Roshan’s brother Afshin was the first to quit Golestan in late 2012. As 
became clear in the previous section, in the association, Afshin wanted to 
create a counterpublic which could reshape the dominant systems of 
value in German society by promoting diversity as familiarity. Significantly, 
Babak commented about him:
When he was at Golestan, he only complained about everything – the typi-
cal problem of leftist people. He wanted to make it more intercultural. 
What do I have to do with North Koreans? An association has a goal. I do 
that for a specific reason. To build up a network. [For me it is] not like [for] 
people like him, who are familiar with the place – this is their country, their 
language, their parents live here. But we need such networks. (Field notes, 
April 2013)
Thus, Babak attributes the difference between his own and Afshin’s con-
ception of Golestan primarily to the latter’s political orientations which 
he qualifies as being too left-wing, or him being born in Germany—in 
other words, disposing of more Germany—compared to Iran-specific 
resources. As became clear in the preceding sections, the national or eth-
nic origin of resources plays a major role in their evaluation in the German 
society. Therefore, they are also highly relevant in social differentiation 
between Golestanis (see also Ehrkamp 2006).
In the case of the two men, their different disposition and volume of 
resources and their engagement in distinct social fields gave rise to poli-
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tics of value that engendered conflicting strategies of capital creation. 
While both men met with barriers to capital creation based on their cat-
egorization as Iranians in many German contexts, German-born Afshin 
disposed of less Iran- and more Germany-specific resources than Babak. 
His chances to circumvent these barriers by mediating familiarity, through 
his local rootedness for instance, were thus relatively better than those of 
his older peers. For his part, Babak, who grew up in Iran, had accumu-
lated frustrations for failing to overcome the barriers his Iran-specific 
resources posed to his capital creation. In co-founding Golestan, he told 
me that he wanted to create a network of Iranian professionals in the art 
sector—a social field whose system of value would acknowledge both his 
Germany-specific and his Iran-specific resources as capital, and which 
would help to balance barriers in German contexts and simultaneously 
sustain the value of exoticism.
Initially, Roshan, Donya, and her siblings supported Afshin’s non- 
exclusive approach to the association’s Iranian identifications, while 
Babak, Sadegh, and Yara, who entered the association in early 2012, 
argued for a greater focus on Iran. This relative balance changed when, 
after its first public event in March 2012, more and more people joined 
Golestan (through a mandatory written application): there was Golzar, a 
41-year-old makeup artist, who came to Hamburg in the early 1990s, 
and brother Mahyar, a recently graduated lawyer on job search. Ayda, a 
woman in her early thirties plays the santur,14 and Farzan, an engineer in 
his mid-thirties, were also among the new members. All of them nour-
ished Azeri identifications, but ethnic identities never played a role in the 
association. Finally, there were 23-year-old Said, a student of informatics, 
and Younes—respectively German-born and born to a binational couple 
in Iran. Except for Younes, the newer members, although mostly 
university- educated, were of more modest origin, less politicized, less suc-
cessful in generating capital in German social fields than most of the 
founders. On the whole, the newcomers were interested in fostering spe-
cifically Iranian collective identifications, following politics of value simi-
lar to Babak’s. Thus, Afshin’s interest in promoting non-ethnic diversity 
as familiarity conflicted with the interests of a growing number of mem-
14 A hammered dulcimer of Iranian origin.
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bers. The same barriers to capital creation do not necessarily bring agents 
to develop the same politics of value. In the end, Afshin dropped out. 
Much effort, resilience as well as Germany-specific capital is required to 
sustain politics of value that aim at promoting diversity as familiarity and 
thus redefine the system of value that dominates in most German contexts.
Donya’s disengagement in March 2013 marked the second rupture. 
In our discussion, the physician explained her withdrawal by a personal 
conflict with Yara which was mainly related to value politics within 
what may be defined as the social field formed by local Iranians. While 
trust based on long-term mutual acquaintance and a shared honari 
identification was the working principle of the group’s social organiza-
tion, in Donya’s view, Yara was an outsider. She argued that  no one 
knew Yara long enough to vouch for her trustworthiness. Indeed, prior 
to 2009, Yara had not been engaged in local Iranian social fields. She 
once told me: “Before 2009, I was German” (field notes, June 2013). 
Donya became suspicious of Yara’s political allegiances, because had the 
impression that Yara was involved “everywhere”, as she disposed, by 
2012, of a large social network among locals of Iranian origin including 
important stakeholders.
The conflict between Donya and Yara increased as they disagreed on 
the values which they wanted the association to promote. Donya wanted 
Golestan to promote education, knowledge of Iranian (pre-Islamic) tra-
ditions, literature, acquaintance with Western high culture, democracy, 
human rights, and equality. In doing so, she wanted mark Golestan’s 
adherence to the honari system of value that she defined in distinction to 
local “Iranian mainstream culture”. However, Yara began to take over 
more and more responsibilities within the association. For example, 
Donya told me that Yara took over the organization of a party around the 
theme of Iranian music from the 1970s, which was initially Donya’s proj-
ect. After the event, Donya learnt that the DJ, an acquaintance of Yara, 
put on contemporary Iranian pop music, displayed the flag of the Pahlavi 
regime, and played the pre-revolutionary national anthem (Ey Irân). The 
former national anthem—a frequent element in Iranian public events in 
various locations of immigration (Gholami 2015, 90)—as well as the flag 
serve for people to distance themselves from the contemporary Iranian 
government  and position themselves as royalists. Yet, the Iran-specific 
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resources Yara put forward failed to mediate most of the values that were 
crucial to Donya.
These differences in taste relate to the women’s diverging social ori-
gins: Yara told me that her sister is a hairdresser and I saw that her 
mother lives in a flat in a simple suburban three-story apartment build-
ing. Yet, she rents an apartment in the central upper middle-class neigh-
borhood Rotherbaum, and explained me that a good economic situation 
was very important in her choice of a partner. Thus, through her engage-
ment in Golestan, Yara aspired to upward social mobility from a social 
origin that endowed her with less inherited cultural resources than the 
founding members. Outraged, Donya had the impression that Yara had 
not only taken her place in the association, but changed Golestan’s 
identity to one that fit her own strategies of capital creation. Not only 
newer, but also some of the founder members of Golestan acknowl-
edged Yara’s resources and supported her politics of value, and Donya 
left the association.
In sum, as people with different personal trajectories face similar bar-
riers to creation capital in the country of residence, new alliances develop 
around shared strategies of capital creation. These observations confirm 
that “migrants actively create dynamics of validating cultural resources as 
capital, resulting in new forms of intra-migrant distinction” (Erel 2010, 
656). For example, although Babak originally had a greater trust and 
affinity with Donya and Afshin, in dealing with barriers to the generation 
of capital in German social fields, he chose strategies of capital creation 
that sustained politics of value that were more similar to Yara’s and those 
of the other new members.
Sharing the same politics of value is not a necessary condition to agree-
ing on collective strategies of capital creation, but certainly strengthens 
the group’s potential for action, as we saw in the case of merchants. The 
conflicts considerably changed the group configuration, as Afshin and 
Donya’s siblings followed their move and quit. Thus, as a result of the 
disputes, the group shifted from a space for the celebration of diversity as 
familiarity and the local recreation of—not exclusively Iranian—honari 
identities to a platform in which professionals of heterogeneous back-
grounds collectively mobilize, through honari artifacts and identities, a 
4 An Association Between Diversity and Exoticism 
146
neo-traditionalism which helps them to enhance their mediation of exot-
icism and, through assimilation, familiarity with German contexts.
 Collective Identifications Through Inclusion 
and Exclusion
Having outlined how diverging strategies of capital creation and chang-
ing configurations within the association led to the withdrawal—the 
(self-)exclusion—of five founding members, what do subsequent pro-
cesses of inclusion and exclusion tell us about the remaining members’ 
collective identifications? How did they engage with systems of value that 
shape the social field of the German public sphere and the local Iranian 
social field?
Golestan’s very first Stammtisch took place in an Iranian-run café in the 
Schanzenviertel in May 2013. I was sitting around a table with Babak, 
Ayda, and Said, while little by little Golestanis and prospective members 
arrived and introduced themselves. Everybody was of Iranian origin, 
most had immigrated as adults, and the common language was Persian. 
Then, a white-haired bearded man in his early seventies arrived.
Babak asked Ayda in Persian “Is that the guy you told me about?”
The man came towards our table and asked [in German] “You look like 
Persians, are you from association Golestan?”
We said “Of course”, and he sat down at the far end of the table […]. I was 
surprised that everybody continued to speak in Persian. The man later 
told me that he was a retired engineer and that he only very limited 
knowledge of Persian.
After a while, Babak said to Ayda “Ask the German what he wants with this 
calendar.”
Sonja “Why don’t you ask him yourself?”
Babak “I have no idea what this was about, it’s you who have been in con-
tact.” They continued to talk about the man in Persian.
Finally, Babak addressed him in German and the man explained that he 
was looking for a Persian-speaker to help him with creating a culturally 
universal calendar. The man came over to us and asked Babak for help, 
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but the artist evaded with an excuse and gave him the contact of an 
elderly acquaintance, instead. Before he left—much earlier than the rest 
of us—he tried to engage a group discussion in German.
He said that he took a picture of Golzar’s mother, because she sat next to 
him at Golestan’s Nowruz celebration. Half joking, half serious, Golzar 
commented in Persian “What do you want from my mother?” (Field 
notes, May 2013)
Golestanis thus made fun of and excluded the German man from group 
discussions. Of course, his advanced age compared to the other 
 participants, as well as the fact that he talked lengthily about things that 
were not of great interest to others also contributed to his exclusion. 
These particularities aside, I noticed on several occasions that Golestanis 
made fun of people they categorized as Germans and intentionally 
excluded them through language barriers.
Strikingly, Golestan’s public events were always bilingual or in German 
only, and took place in venues which testify of a high level of Western- or 
Germany-specific cultural resources (e.g. a Steiner school, a Museum), or 
in collaboration with prestigious local German cultural organizers. Thus, 
while access to group membership was restricted to people who spoke 
Persian or, at least, disposed of resources that conveyed an Iranian identi-
fication, events had the declared aim to target besides Iranians also a 
highly educated and well-situated German public.
Thus, Golestan’s public events were geared toward the system of value 
of the German public sphere: they tried to get acknowledgment for their 
Iran-specific resources as capital for conveying exoticism, and yet fulfill 
the expectation of assimilation and familiarity with German cultural ele-
ments. For this purpose, they needed a German public. Yet, within the 
association, Golestanis created a different system of value, where resources 
that mediated familiarity with Iranian cultural elements, such as lan-
guage, cultural references, and humor, were key. Consequently, people 
who, like the elderly German man, lacked these resources, were unable to 
create capital. In a similar way, Çetin Çelik (2015) finds “reactive ethnic-
ity”, that is, forwarding resources related to the country of origin in order 
to exclude Germans, to be a common response to the experience of 
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 exclusion among working class male youth of Turkish descent in Germany. 
In our case, another reason for the exclusion of Germans is that their 
incorporation would impede on the Golestanis’ collective staging of 
Iranianness in German social fields. Thus, while Golestanis created an 
internal system of value that, as it seems here, opposes the one that domi-
nates the social field of the German public sphere, they contradicted this 
counterpublic in (at least apparently) complying to the hegemonic evalu-
ations in their public events.
A month later, I got to know Navid, a stout 34-year-old, with a round 
face, big, black-framed glasses and brown hair at shoulder length, at an 
exhibition which featured some of his posters. He told me that his father 
was a factory manager from Iran and that he was raised partly in the 
southern Iranian city of Shiraz, partly in the USA, and came to Germany 
as a student three years before. One of his grandmothers, however, was a 
Native American. It struck me that he has a rather English than Persian 
accent in German. When speaking Persian, he frequently interweaves 
English words. When I told him about Golestan, its artist identity, and 
their monthly meetings in a bar in the Schanzenviertel, reflecting identi-
fications with local alternative and artistic subculture, he was surprised: “I 
never thought Iranians would meet there” (field notes, July 2013). Adding 
“I might work for them as a graphic designer”, he accepted my proposi-
tion to join the next Stammtisch.
When Navid and I arrived at the bar, seven people were sitting around 
a table: the official members Babak, Yara, Farzan, and Golzar, as well as 
their friends Karim, Kaspar, and Shahram. When I introduced Navid, 
someone asked for his family name. After hearing the answer, Babak 
inquired “Are you related to the famous writer?” Navid confirmed that he 
was. We took a seat, and the group decided to make a round of introduc-
tions. Yara explained that Kaspar, a Munich-grown 24-year-old law stu-
dent and child of a binational German-Iranian couple, does not speak 
Persian. She translated for him during the meeting. When it was 
Navid’s turn,
he began to explain [in Persian] that he had recently finished his master, 
and that he wants to start a PhD in the following months. In Iran, he 
had studied at Tehran University (dâneshgâh tehrân). He said that he was 
half-American. 
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Someone asked “Did you come here directly?”
Navid “No, I lived in the US and in London before.”
Someone “Where about in the US?”
Navid “In New York, Ohio, and Louisiana. Because of my father’s jobs.”
Babak “What subject did you do your Master’s in?”
Navid “Graphic design.”
Yara “So you’re an artist (honarmand)? Welcome! We already have some 
artists.”
Navid “Why? Who else is an artist?”
Yara “We have Sadegh but he isn’t here today, and Babak.” (Field notes, 
July 2013)
The Golestanis’ evaluation of Navid’s resources gives more detailed 
insights into the internal system of value which their collective identifica-
tions relied on after the conflict. First, inquiring about his family name—
a practice I frequently witnessed in Iran as well as among people of Iranian 
origin living in Germany—allowed the members to identify him as a 
relative of a renowned writer and as a member of an urban upper middle- 
class family.
Second, as they ask him about his migratory trajectory, they indirectly 
evaluate the volume and distribution of his Western- and Germany- 
specific resources. The apprehension of this evaluation is probably the 
reason why Navid spoke Persian even though he knew that Kaspar did 
not understand the language—he avoided exposing his accent in German. 
Indeed, I repeatedly noticed that Golestanis sought distinction from 
Iranians who they found lacking Germany-specific resources. For exam-
ple, Babak and Yara frequently imitated the Persian accent in German 
language,15 which gave rise to much laughter among their public.
Third, a criterion on which Navid was evaluated but which does not 
appear in the vignette was his age. A friend and social scientist explained 
me that his father was a Golestani by exception: the board had told him 
that it does not want people of his age in the association. Research in 
other national contexts shows that the objectives of Iranian associations 
change with the age of its members (Van den Bos and Achbari 2007; 
15 For native Persian speakers, combinations of different consecutive consonants in German are 
difficult to pronounce if they are not preceded by a vowel. This is why they often add a vowel, say-
ing, for example, Estrasse instead of Strasse (street).
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Ghorashi and Boersma 2009; Maghbouleh 2013). This observation needs 
to be understood in the context of constructed generational divides rela-
tive to political, social, and economic conditions in Iran: those who expe-
rienced the Islamic revolution in Iran as young adults are called the “first 
generation”. Correspondingly, the category “second generation”, with 
which Babak identifies, refers to people who were children at the time of 
the revolution, and whose youth was shaped by the new political order 
and the Iran-Iraq war. Finally, people who claim to belong to the “third 
generation”, or the “burnt generation” (nasl-e sukhte), stress that they 
never knew any other political order than that of the Islamic Republic 
(Khosravi 2008, 4f.). Golestan’s aim, as declared by Yara in the talk show 
and on videos published on the association’s website, is to address the 
younger generations, regardless of whether they grew up in Germany or 
in Iran, supposedly in order to bridge political differences that caused 
divisions among their parents.
Finally, only when Navid revealed that he was an artist did Yara explic-
itly welcome him to the group. When we left, Yara asked Navid for his 
email address and when I met him two weeks later, he told me that she 
had proposed him to take over a mandate for a friend. In the valorization 
of an artist background, the interests of different members conflate. First, 
some of the founding members, like Babak, still aim at establishing pro-
fessional networks which sustains the founding members’ tentative to 
build Golestan’s identity on the honari imaginary. Plus, adherence to the 
honari imaginary is a way for people with modest inherited resources, like 
Yara, to claim belonging to the intelligentsia and enact upward social 
mobility. Second, the system of value of the honari imaginary has the 
advantage of sharing some of the key values prevalent in German social 
fields, that is, democracy, equality, and human rights, but also Western 
high culture. For example, the female Golestanis made up less and dressed 
more casually than most local women of Iranian origin. In doing so, they 
showed adherence to the value of gender equality that is important both 
in honari contexts and in German society, where women tend to value 
rather practical dress styles. People in Hamburg, in particular, are known 
for the Hamburger Understatement, that is, privileging modesty to osten-
tation—a value presumably dating back to the time of the Hanse (Knödler 
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2014). This trend is even stronger among people who consider them-
selves to be a part of the artist and alternative subcultures. Third, and 
relatedly, the internal system of value shifted from the importance of 
transnational political engagement toward staging exoticism in German 
contexts (Ghorashi 2004; Kelly 2011; Maghbouleh 2013; Gholami 
2015). Significantly, out of six bands in FusIran’s lineup, only one was 
actually based in Iran and it can perform legally.
Thus, Navid’s resources mediated values that were key in the social 
field of the association, namely an Iranian identification, an upper 
middle- class background, education, youth, professionalism, adherence 
to the honari imaginary, and familiarity with Western cultural contexts. 
On this basis, Golestanis wanted to include Navid in the group. However, 
he did not want to become a member of Golestan and spent most of the 
Stammtisch talking with Karim and Kaspar, who are not officially mem-
bers of Golestan, and who nourish strong German identifications.
These two instances of boundary-making show that, while Golestan’s 
internal system of value is distinct from the one that shapes the German 
public sphere, the latter shapes the former to the extent that, here too, 
Germany-specific resources that mediate familiarity are key for capital 
creation. Moreover, as the honari imaginary is historically shaped by sys-
tems of value which highlight Western cultural elements, the systems of 
value within the transnational social field of Iranian artists and arty peo-
ple as well as those prevalent in German society overlap. Thus, while 
Golestan’s internal system of value opposes the one that dominates in the 
German public sphere in valuing certain Iran-specific resources, it con-
curs with it in highlighting the importance of Germany-specific resources. 
The pervasiveness of systems of value in which familiarity with the West 
is central across diverse local and transnational social fields tends to limit 
migrants’ possibilities to agree on collective politics of value.
Yet, even if Golestanis’ room for creative action is restricted for these 
reasons, their politics of value may be very subtle, as we will see in the 
way they are staging Iranianness in a second public media representation, 
almost two years after Afshin and Yara’s participation in the talk show.
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 Staging “Iranianness in Hamburg”
In April 2014, a film team producing short documentaries for a German 
public channel, making diverting portrays of migrant “communities” liv-
ing in different German cities, contacted Golestan to propose the partici-
pation in a new production. The members agreed and Golzar invited the 
film team, as well as 12 Golestanis and friends, 9 men and 3 women, for 
dinner at her place. When I arrived, I found the Golestanis sitting on 
chairs and sofas along the walls of the living room—a spatial configura-
tion that reminded me of receptions (mehmunis) I experienced in Iran in 
rather traditional contexts—with a blond and jocular German journalist 
in their midst. A cameraman, a sound technician, and a program  manager, 
a women in her late twenties who was herself of Iranian origin, stood in 
the center of the room, filming. After everybody presented himself, the 
journalist asked questions like
What do you talk about when you’re among yourselves?
or,
What do you say about Germany?
or,
Don’t you think Germans are cold and unfriendly? As a Southerner, I per-
sonally find Northerners cold, too.
Although we had just presented ourselves and our heterogeneous trajec-
tories, the journalist defined us as Iranians, and not as Germans. When 
talk came to the code of politeness (ta’ârof), we explained at length its 
particularities. In showing a critical distance from an element central to 
sociability in Iranian contexts, we displayed important Germany-specific 
resources and collectively claimed their recognition as a capital. Golzar 
had cooked an Iranian dinner. While the Golestanis and the journalist 
remained in the living room, holding their plates in their hands, the film 
team was eating apart from us in the kitchen. I sat next to Babak, when
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he suggested, in Persian, “Guys, let’s all stand up and do a quick dance. On 
three!”
Golzar “They will take us for fools!”
Babak “That’s the whole point!”
Golzar “Where do we get the music from?”
Babak “We do it ourselves.”
Golzar “But I can’t do that!”
The program manager, who understood Persian, alerted her colleagues 
“Film! They’re going to dance!”
The Golestanis wanted to dance although the surprise was spoiled. Kian 
stood up and acted as if he got upset by Golzar “Pedareman-o dar âvordi 
[You go on my nervs]! You stop arguing now!”
We counted to three, then stood up, clapping hands and half-dancing. 
Golzar danced alone in our midst [Image 4.3].
After two minutes Kian said “And now we sit down and do as if nothing 
had happened.” That was what we did. (Field notes, April 2014)
Image 4.3 Golzar dances in front of German journalists in her living room. (April 
2014, picture taken by a member of the film crew with the author’s camera, 
anonymized)
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What the film team had expected—despite the program manager being of 
Iranian origin—was the display of collective cultural difference. In the ini-
tial discussion, however, this difference was mediated, because we showed 
that we dispose of important Germany-specific resources. However, uncon-
sciously or consciously, the Golestanis understood that in order to be inter-
esting for the film team, there was a need to stage Iranian identifications—in 
a way, a need for self-exoticization. Strikingly, however, we staged the dif-
ference in a way that its performative character became obvious. Ultimately, 
in a very subtle way, we thus ridiculed the Germans’ interest in the exotic, 
as a sort of incomplete and disavowed critique (Li 2019). The producer 
may have understood these discreet politics of value, because the final doc-
umentation did not contain any of the scenes shot during that evening.
In the face of the difficulty to their having Germany-specific resources 
valorized because of the Golestanis’ categorization as culturally different, 
appropriating the category by staging secular and apolitical Iranian iden-
tifications became increasingly important to the association’s activities. 
Cattacin and Domenig (2014, 724) stated:
Having and defending something like a culture thus becomes a way to tell 
others that they do not possess a monopoly on culture, which turns culture 
into a topic of sameness, and no longer of difference. The lack of recogni-
tion is, therefore, the reason why associations invent culture and invest in 
the marketing of a specific cultural image.
Golestanis thereby had a critical distance toward their self-exoticization 
and tried indirectly to act upon the system of value prevailing in the 
German public sphere. The context of associations is particularly favor-
able for claiming recognition of Iran-specific resources as capital. 
However, the fact of complying, even if in incomplete ways, with the 
dominant system of value tends to, if not perpetuate, at least prolong the 
barriers to capital creation that derive from migrants’ perceived lack of 
familiarity in combination with their construction as racial Others.
 Epilogue
In our Skype interview in November 2015, Donya told me that after 
much consideration, she went to the concert of one of her favorite bands 
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from Iran, Pallett, organized by Golestan in Hamburg in the fall of 2015. 
“There were not even three likeable faces”, she commented. When I asked 
her what she meant by that, she said “They were all highly made up.” 
Moreover, she explained me that when she recently told Babak that she 
considered rejoining Golestan, he replied “There is nothing for you to 
find there anymore, people are all the same, there is no diversity” (field 
notes, November 2015). In spring 2014, Sadegh told me that he would 
prefer Golestanis to be older and more settled.
Sonja “But many are also artists.”
Sadegh “Yes, but that’s not necessarily good.”
Sonja “Why not?” I thought that was what he wanted.
Sadegh “They expect something that does not correspond to reality. Many 
will leave again. Several already left. Some people only participate 
because they find it useful. At the moment I help Zian, and I will help 
Parham when the time has come. But I would have helped them even if 
they were not members of Golestan.” (Field notes, April 2014)
Their statements confirm a development I traced in this chapter: dynam-
ics taking place within Golestan take it ever further away from its initial 
left-wing artist and honari identifications in order to provide images that 
speak to a larger public—both German and Iranian.
While the previous chapter was about the way migrants’ collective 
identifications develop as a collective engagement with changing systems 
of values in different social fields, in this chapter, my aim was to show, 
how such a collectivity develops from an in-group perspective. How do 
processes of evaluation within an association relate to systems of value 
that prevail in the German public sphere, the local Iranian social field and 
the transnational social field of Iranians identifying as honari?
German approaches to immigration rely on a paradox: they require 
assimilation to and familiarity with what is defined as German, but the 
racialization of migrants simultaneously makes this objective barely 
attainable, as being German and having other cultural identifications 
tends to be seen as mutually exclusive. In this context, associations pro-
vide spaces in which migrants may find ways to contest or circumvent 
barriers to capital creation they meet in the society of residence.
Collective identifications may be part of politics of value that engage 
with hegemonic valuations through the formation of so-called counter-
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publics (Nicholls and Uitermark 2016). They emerge between people 
whose strategies of capital creation share the same objective in the same 
social field at a given time. I showed that through internal boundary- 
making, Golestanis created an internal system of value. However, their 
system of value only partly opposes the one that prevails in the German 
public sphere. Both systems of value as well as the one that sustains the 
honari imaginary intersect in granting familiarity with Germany or the 
West a key position. The pervasiveness of the valorization of Western- 
specific resources across local and transnational social fields and migrants’ 
unequal individual resources pose important obstacles to their collective 
politics of value. I showed in Chap. 3 that migrants’ politics of value do 
have the power to redefine the value of their resources, but an important 
key to their success is long-term engagement and collective action.
Confirming related ethnographies (Graham and Khosravi 1997; 
Sanadjian 2000; Ghorashi 2004), I showed that Golestanis tried to stage 
Iranian identifications alternative to the image of the Islamic Republic. 
After members who promoted non-ethnic diversity as a value connected 
to familiarity left the association, the collective strategies of capital cre-
ation which the remaining Golestanis agreed upon are part of politics of 
value that aim at enhancing Iran-specific resources’ exoticism and medi-
ating assimilation and familiarity through Germany-specific resources. 
This may temporarily help to overcome certain barriers to capital cre-
ation. However, it barely acts on the cause of the barrier, that is, prevail-
ing systems of value. An active contestation of ethnic and national 
categorizations requires more Germany-specific resources, and may be 
more laborious and protracted, but ultimately more efficient in acting 
upon systems of value that produce and sustain structural racism.
In this chapter, I observed that people may implement incompatible or 
even competitive strategies of capital creation to engage with the systems 
of value that highlight familiarity with the West. In the next chapter, I 
interrogate its causes and effects through a micro-perspective, examining 
boundary-making between three colleagues and friends working in the 
film business.
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5
The Overlapping Uncertainties of Film 
Professionals
On a sunny day in July 2015, I passed a grey-haired man in his late sixties, 
pushing a buggy with an about three-year-old boy in the center of Geneva. 
Overhearing him teaching the child Persian language, I became intrigued. 
The man must have noticed my interest because he greeted me in English. 
My response in Persian initiated a discussion: loquaciously, he began to 
explain that he lives in Tehran, and that he and his wife came to Geneva for 
a month to see their two daughters. Without me asking for details, he said 
“My first daughter studied business administration at [some university in 
Switzerland] and her husband is a lawyer. My second daughter studies 
medicine. What do you do?” Not in the mood for long explanations, I 
limited myself to telling him that I was a student. He continued “I work 
for Iran Air at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini Airport. In case you have any issue 
when you are there, just ask for me.” Then, he told me his name. (Field 
notes, July 2015)
Education and Western-specific resources, independence, but also coop-
eration are the values that emerge through this short dialogue. The man 
put forward his own and his daughters’ professional achievements, calling 
for my recognition of their resources—in particular those acquired in 
Switzerland—as capital and invoked comparison by asking me to do the 
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same. Would he have done so if I had not revealed my Iranian identifica-
tions? I think that it is our common Iranian origin that led the man to 
vaunt in particular those resources created in Western countries and to 
suggest some kind of cooperation.
Extant research underlines that, for many migrants, education and 
professional success is a way through which they try to overcome racial 
barriers to capital creation (Ong 1996; El-Mafaalani 2012; Schneider 
and Lang 2014; Olwig and Valentin 2015). However, as their new 
location- specific resources mediate independence, that may contradict 
the value of cooperation in relations with fellow migrants (Portes and 
Landolt 1996). In Iran itself, as well, people hail personal accomplish-
ment and competition about professional success (Adelkhah 1998, 
199–247; Bromberger 2003, 2009; Sadjed 2012, 90–94), whereby the 
display of resources that mediate familiarity with Western cultural con-
texts plays an important role (Mahdavi 2007; Khosravi 2008; Sadjed 
2012). It is thus no coincidence that the grid the man used for promoting 
his own resources and evaluating mine reminded me of the way the film 
professionals Hushang, Zian, and Milad talked about their own and each 
other’s work. What does the boundary work of migrant professionals 
who are engaged in several of the same social fields say about the way 
their strategies of capital creation interact with competing and contradic-
tory systems of value?
The interplay between internal boundary-making and transnational 
capital creation, I asserted, is motivated by individual and collective poli-
tics that engage with systems of value prevalent in local and transnational 
social fields. So far, the case studies of Iranian carpet merchants and 
members of association Golestan respectively showed how migrants’ col-
lective identifications could bring divergent systems of value to acknowl-
edge the same resources in different social fields, and how intersecting 
systems of value largely determine migrants’ collective identifications. 
Having thus drawn the different ways systems of value interact on 
migrants’ capital creation across social fields, I change the perspective and 
use the boundary approach in order to trace the effect of these dynamics 
on the everyday negotiation of internal diversity.
In this chapter, I take up the intra-relational perspective from Chap. 2 
to explain what happens when people who consider themselves friends 
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and colleagues follow competitive strategies of capital creation within 
and across local and transnational social fields. To this end, I examine the 
interactions between three film professionals of Iranian origin—a techni-
cian in a precarious occupational situation, an ambitious student of film-
making, and a newly exiled director—in the context of their professional 
trajectories. Hushang, Zian, and Milad live in Hamburg and are all 
engaged in the transnational Iranian and the German social fields of film 
professionals, as well as in the local Iranian social field. Tehran-grown in 
middle-class families, they have the same gender and age—they are all in 
their thirties. As we shall see in the following, what distinguishes the film 
professionals is the amount and volume of their professional resources 
and the place of their creation (Germany or Iran), deriving from different 
professional and migratory trajectories. The analysis suggests that, while 
the men’s success in generating capital in the society of residence strongly 
shapes their possibilities to do so in the local and transnational Iranian 
social fields, there is also a great individual variation in the way they navi-
gate these systems of value and their interrelation, depending on their 
age, their professional position, and in how far their past experiences of 
exclusion influence their contemporary behavior.
 The Social Fields of Film Professionals
Much about the dynamics that shape the social fields of film professionals 
will become clear in the discussion of Hushang’s, Zian’s, and Milad’s tra-
jectories. However, at this point, I point out two things that form the 
context of the following analysis.
First, the working conditions in the film business are characterized by 
a high level of uncertainty—although to different degrees depending on 
individual positions in professional hierarchies. As I learned through my 
contact with film professionals, this derives from several sources: first, 
filmmaking mostly takes place in specific time-restricted projects, for 
which a team of professionals is constituted and works together inten-
sively, only to be dissolved after the task is finalized (see also Apitzsch 
2010, 410ff.). Different work units are thereby highly interdependent, 
increasing thus, as we shall see below, the social embeddedness of 
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 economic action (Granovetter 1985). Plus, the team has to be efficient 
quickly, despite long working hours and often while being geographically 
mobile.1 Second, as Hushang explained to me, fixed work contracts are 
very rare. Most of the time, people get employed—for independent “low- 
budget” or “no-budget” projects also paid—only for the time of a specific 
project. Third, just as in the carpet trade, the film business has relatively 
low levels of professionalization. In other words, there are no standard-
ized educational curricula, access to the job market is not based on formal 
qualification, and there is a lack of institutional supervision. Informal, 
experience-based learning and access through auxiliary jobs prevails 
(Apitzsch 2010, 413; Ortner 2013). In a nutshell, with little interna-
tional variation, working in the film business demands very high flexibil-
ity and independence deriving from the unstable demand of film 
productions, but also, somewhat conflictingly, alliance and cooperation.
Second, for the following analysis, it is important to note that, through 
their engagement in the transnational social fields of Iranian film profes-
sionals, Hushang, Zian, and Milad are indirectly acquainted to or in 
direct contact with numerous film professionals of Iranian origin, be they 
actors, technicians, camera operators, directors, or producers, living in 
Germany, in Iran, or in any other country.
Sonja “Did you watch the movie ‘Women without men’ [Neshat 2009]? 
Probably, didn’t you?”
Hushang “Yes.”
Sonja “How did you like it?”
Hushang “Mmm, so-so. The story was good but the implementation 
wasn’t. Did you notice that two of the actors also figured in my 
documentary?”
Sonja “Really? No. Which ones?”
Hushang “One of them was “the General”. He was supposed to be the foil 
of the protagonist […]. And then Zahra.2 Originally, she was my assis-
tant but she appeared once in the discussion round.”
Sonja “Ah ok!” It seemed important to him to have these two actors who 
acted in internationally screened movies participate.
1 For an ethnography of independent film sets, see Sherry B. Ortner (2013, 213–27).
2 Pseudonym.
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Hushang “They shot the movie [Women without men] in Morocco. A 
friend is now shooting a movie at the same location.” (Field notes, April 
2013)
We can see that the transnational social field of Iranian film professionals 
has specific geographical hubs. Different places in Morocco, for example, 
serve as sets for the growing number of movies shot outside Iran to pre-
vent government censorship.3 For different reasons, Hamburg is another 
hub for Iranian film professionals: it has three colleges and universities 
that offer technical and artistic curricula in the field,4 and its interna-
tional film festival regularly features Iranian movies for many years now. 
Two local actors identifying as Iranians, Arash Marandi and Ramin 
Yazdani, work in international film productions. Besides numerous 
German-run businesses, the presence of Sina, a director of international 
renown, and the Germany-wide successful film-producing company of 
Hessam5 certainly are another contribution.
 Hushang, Between Contesting 
and Conforming to Assimilation
Hushang is a 39-year-old man, single when I first met him, and always 
dressed with care. His spacious apartment, decorated with artifacts he 
brought back from his international travels, is situated in a middle-class 
neighborhood close to the port of Hamburg. Hushang, who is a friend of 
the artist Babak (see Chap. 4), loves to learn about history and society. He 
likes both sarcastic jokes and good coffee. This is why we often met in his 
preferred café-bar in the central, formerly alternative, now yuppie 
Schanzenviertel.
3 For studies on Iranian cinema, see Hamid Naficy (for instance 2012).
4 These include the semi-private Hamburg Media School, the public HfBK, the University of 
Applied Sciences (Hochschule für angewandte Wissenschaften, in short HAW).
5 To my knowledge, the first filmmaker of Iranian origin who lived in Germany was Sohrab Shahid 
Saless, who settled in Berlin in 1974, fleeing persecution by the Pahlavi government. He made 
numerous successful feature movies in German, before he moved on to the USA in 1992 (Langford 
2016).
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Hushang told me that his father was a gun seller and landowner from 
Mazanderan, a northern Iranian province, but he himself grew up in 
Tehran. He came to Hamburg in 1992, when he was 18 years old, 
together with his older brother. Only much later, I learnt that he did not 
come as a student but sought asylum—I will come back to this. Most of 
his remaining four siblings also live outside Iran. His elderly parents, 
however, still live in one of Tehran’s northern high-end districts, which is 
one of the main reasons why Hushang goes there regularly.
As his Iranian high school diploma was not recognized in Germany,6 
after obtaining asylum, he had to do a one-year foundation course 
(Studienkolleg) before being able to enter college. He graduated from the 
Hamburg University of Applied Sciences (HAW) in the early 2000s. 
Thus, having spent half of his life in Iran, and the other half in Germany, 
Hushang acquired significant cultural resources that can be considered as 
Germany-specific, that is, a college diploma and German citizenship, and 
he speaks accent-free German.
Today, Hushang is a freelance light and sound technician and explic-
itly claims focusing on capital creation in the German job market, that is, 
in the German social field of film professionals. Indeed, during the time 
I was in Hamburg for fieldwork, he accepted more mandates from 
German then from Iranian employers. His missions often involve travel-
ing within Germany or to other European countries. Several times, he 
mentioned that the high level of uncertainty inherent in living from 
short-term mandates is not always easy to bear. However, he prefers time 
flexibility to financial stability, and therefore refuses full-time employ-
ment. He values his independence as a freelancer.
Notwithstanding these career choices, Hushang frequently talks about 
difficulties to generate capital in the German professional social field. For 
example, during one of our first meetings in spring 2013, when we took 
a walk through the Schanzenviertel, he said that some classmates who 
had done worse in school than him now have a more successful career. He 
explained this perceived disadvantage by his categorization as 
Iranian, saying
6 This is the case for most degrees obtained in non-Western countries (Nohl et al. 2014).
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Compared to German colleagues I have to do double: to each new employer 
I do not only have to prove my qualification, but I also have to show that I 
am not as they expect Iranians to be like. (Field notes, April 2013)
In particular, he has to prove accuracy and punctuality—values employ-
ers would take for granted in German competitors. In other words, just 
like Yara in Chap. 4, he reported that his assumed cultural and perceived 
racial difference impeded on his capital creation. Hence, in his profes-
sional social field, accuracy and punctuality are subordinated to the key 
value of familiarity with German cultural elements. In Chap. 4, I showed 
that the assimilationist approach to immigration leaves little space for 
culturally pluralistic identifications, the perception of cultural or racial 
difference often leads to the exclusion even of those migrants who have 
with significant Germany-specific resources (see also Sadeghi 2018). 
Hushang’s gender certainly adds further disadvantages. According to 
Aihwa Ong (1996), in the USA the trajectories of migrant men, more 
than those of women, are measured against neoliberal ideals of self- 
sufficiency and efficiency. In addition, people tend to associate men from 
predominantly Muslim countries with patriarchal domination, which 
fails to mediate the value of equality and thus reinforces barriers to their 
capital creation (Khosravi 1999; Çelik 2015). Based on these experiences, 
Hushang developed a certain reluctance and cynicism in his engagement 
in the German social fields of film professionals.
However, contrary to his claims, Hushang is not simply passively being 
Othered. Indeed, earlier in the same discussion, he mentioned that his 
relations with German colleagues never go beyond a certain level of 
acquaintance. For example, he criticized that German film professionals 
have a sober attitude at work, and restrain from enjoyable leisure activi-
ties, even when abroad. His tendency to seek distinction from German 
colleagues is reflected in a picture Hushang took during a shooting in the 
south of France and posted on his Facebook account. It shows three pairs 
of men’s feet leisurely positioned on a low table—he and his colleagues 
enjoy a Feierabendbier (literally: “after-work-beer”)—a ritual frequent in 
German work contexts. Hushang exposes his blue plastic slippers 
(dampâi), which look as if he brought them from Iran. In the Iranian 
urban middle class, such slippers are worn mainly at home or during free 
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time. In this photo, Hushang underlines a laid-back ethos that contrasts 
with his German colleagues’ street shoes. In short, in wearing these slip-
pers and, more importantly, publishing the photo, Hushang sought to 
differentiate from his German colleagues. The latter probably saw in his 
slippers the value of exoticism, while his Iranian friends on Facebook 
likely understand it as a comical critique of the system of value that 
pushes racial Others to perform cultural difference.
Yet, Hushang’s stressing cultural difference does not only aim to medi-
ate the value of exoticism, nor does is it always a critique of the prevalent 
system of values. In some situations, it is also a way for him to create capi-
tal from his Iran-specific resources by mediating cultural expertise that is 
sought after in the German social field of film professionals. For example, 
in August 2013, I joined Hushang at a beautiful, old cinema in the city 
center at the premiere of a documentary shot in Afghanistan. Except for 
the two of us, all attendees seemed to be of German origin. A middle- 
aged woman, probably a member of the crew, came to tell him “Without 
you the movie wouldn’t have been the same” (field notes August 2013). 
Later, he explained that he had taken the initiative to find and interview 
locals in order to enrich the documentary, building on his Persian lan-
guage skills, his Middle Eastern physical appearance (he also donned 
Afghan clothing), and his professional know-how. Thus, he succeeded to 
have his Iran-specific resources valorized as capital. However, he told me 
that during the premiere, the presenter introduced him as an Afghan—
an inaccuracy that renewed his feelings of discrimination. Hushang cor-
rected the presenter, explaining that he was from Iran. Building on his 
cultural difference for capital creation is risky, as the meaning of his Iran- 
specific resources easily switches from expertise to a lack of familiarity.
Thus, in the German social field of film professionals, depending on 
the project and the team, Hushang’s Iran-specific resources may mediate 
a lack of familiarity and exoticism, or convey cultural expertise. Although 
he claimed not to believe that integration is possible, his politics of value 
consist in circumventing the barrier posed by his lack of familiarity by 
putting forward Germany-specific resources within the limits of his racial 
othering. Simultaneously, he exaggerates the performance of exoticism as 
an indirect critique, and mediates cultural expertise by acting as a broker 
in missions connected to the Middle Eastern context or migration in 
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Europe. His boundary-making toward Germans also serves to build on 
Iran-specific resources for finding employment through cultural 
brokerage.
To return to our original discussion, I thus asked Hushang whether he 
thinks that the reason for the limitation of his professional opportunities 
could be that these colleagues have been able to build up more social 
capital among people in important positions in combining professional 
with friendship ties than him. Other than in classical, stabile working 
relations, where “weak ties” serve for professional ascension but are not 
essential to employment (Granovetter 1973, 1373), in the face of the 
high uncertainty that structures the film business, professionals need to 
rely on their social networks both to secure employment and to recruit a 
crew. Thereby, not only professional qualifications, and social skills, but, 
in order to increase work efficiency, also matching personalities, working 
morals and, in general, sympathy are taken into account (Apitzsch 2010, 
414f.). Hushang acknowledged my point but insisted that he could not 
build such private ties with his colleagues. As we shall see later, his 
boundary- making toward German colleagues does not only derive from 
his feeling of cultural alienation or his efforts to act as a broker, but it also 
relates to the characteristics of work relations in the film business. Let me 
note at this point that Hushang and his German colleagues dispose of 
unequal potential for acting on the system of values that shapes the 
German social field of film professionals; both contribute to the creation 
and maintenance of social boundaries based on the idea of cultural and 
racial difference. Yet, in a context where “weak ties” are crucial for capital 
creation, their mutual boundary-making happens at the expense of 
Hushang’s professional success.
Hushang also works within the transnational social field of Iranian 
film professionals: he occasionally accepts mandates from two successful 
directors living in Germany, whom he first met at an (today dissolved) 
association for Iranian film professionals in Hamburg in the mid-1990s. 
The producer Hessam offered him the only full-time job he ever accepted 
at his production company in Hamburg. Hushang also collaborated with 
Iranian film professionals outside Germany, in Iran and England. For 
example, he contributed to a video for an art gallery in Tehran. Besides, 
he sometimes does the German subtitles for internationally screened 
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Iranian movies, some of which are produced by Milad. Finally, in his 
short documentary on the onward migration of an Iranian couple that 
does not find inclusion in Germany, he relied mainly on Iranian profes-
sionals. He claimed, that, in contrast to people he qualifies as his acquain-
tances, his friends are all Iranians.
It seems like a contradiction that Hushang claimed preferring sociabil-
ity with Iranian colleagues, but also told me that he seeks to limit his 
relations with Iranian film professionals to the professional domain. The 
separation between the two is, of course, blurry, but, for instance, while 
he welcomed Milad to a day out with his close friends, he did not want 
to invite him to his home for dinner. This type of relation is reminiscent 
of his reluctance in ties with German colleagues, but the reasons he put 
forth are different:
You always have to see to move on yourself. Also, with Iranians, private and 
professional things often get mixed up. For me that’s a reason why I don’t 
want to get involved with Iranians too much. Everything gets mixed up. I 
just want to get along with you job-wise. But there everything works with 
relationships. Just like in Iran. “You do this for me, so I do that for you” I’m 
not up for this. I am very clear with that. (Field notes, April 2013)
Hushang’s conflict between closeness and distance in relations with 
Iranian professionals results from his engagement with systems of value 
in the local social field of Iranian migrants and the German social field of 
film professionals.
First, through his boundary-making in his relations with local Iranians, 
we can see that Hushang values accurateness and punctuality. For exam-
ple, he critiqued that Iranian working environments are chaotic and 
stated having adopted more structured German work ethics. Further, 
Hushang values economic independency and familiarity with German 
cultural contexts. We can see this reflected in the following discussion, 
when he told me that he had a new girlfriend.
Sonja “Nice! I’m happy for you! What does she do?”
Hushang “She is a salesperson for a pharmaceutical company. She moves 
around a lot.”
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Sonja “So, she’s from Iran as well?”
Hushang “Yes, she has been here for five years. But she speaks German flu-
ently. That’s important to me.”
Sonja “That means, she’s financially independent, does not wait for you to 
help her…”
Hushang “Simply, there are so many Iranians here who depend on welfare, 
don’t speak German and so on.”
Sonja “Oh, really? A lot?”
Hushang “Yes.” (Field notes, February 2016)
His evaluation of other people’s resources mirrors the values he himself 
tries to convey, which are some of the same he also seeks to mediate in his 
relations with German colleagues.
As we saw in Chap. 4, the system of value that prevails in  the local 
Iranian social field coincides with those that shape numerous fields in 
Germany in prioritizing familiarity with German cultural contexts. The 
interpersonal perspective indicates another reason for this intersection, 
besides the historical valorization of anything Western among the trans-
national Iranian intelligentsia: the actual overlapping of social fields in 
everyday life. If German colleagues associate him with people who lack 
familiarity with German contexts, for example, by accidentally meeting 
him in their company on the street, this would stress Hushang’s own 
unfamiliarity and enforce barriers of capital creation he meets in German 
contexts. In other words, what he does in relations that connect to the 
local Iranian social field may be perceived by agents with whom he shares 
an engagement in the German professional social field and thus influence 
his chances to create capital there. Patricia Ehrkamp (2006) observed a 
similar influence of the German hegemonic system of value on relations 
among Turks living in a socially disadvantaged neighborhood in Duisburg. 
However, in contrast to Hamburg’s Iranian-Germans, Ehrkamp’s inter-
locutors tend to reject the idea of assimilation and exclude Turks who 
convey too great a familiarity with German cultural context.
Second, Hushang’s tendency to refrain from taking his relations with 
Iranian colleagues to the private level is inherent to the characteristics of 
Iranian film professionals’ transnational social field. I suggested in the 
previous chapters, multiplex relations based on trust are an important 
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element in Iranian sociability in Hamburg, not least as a reaction to the 
experience of barriers to capital creation in German contexts. Research 
observed similar trends in other migrant labor markets (Faist 1998; 
Bauder 2005, 92; Bloch and McKay 2014). In professional domains 
lacking formalized mechanisms of evaluation, the role of informal ties is 
similarly important as among migrants. Just as in the case of Iranian car-
pet merchants, the transnational social field of Iranian film professionals 
is both shaped by the context of international migration as well as by 
increased personal interdependency typical for the professional field. In 
both cases, cooperation and alliance are key values. As a result of these 
overlapping uncertainties, trust developed in multiplex relations is more 
important among Iranian film professionals compared to ties with and 
between their German colleagues.
Yet, social capital has its downsides. Alessandro Portes (1998, 15ff.; see 
also Portes and Landolt 1996) is among the first social scientists to study 
them in the context of migrant economies. Tight social networks often 
rely on boundaries that may also impede on insiders’ engagements in 
other social fields. Furthermore, in what he calls “downward leveling 
norms”, the valorization of alliance and cooperation within the group 
may engage the more successful in important material and immaterial 
social obligations that come at the expense of their own capital creation. 
For such reasons, migrants sometimes take distance from their peers 
(Zontini 2009; Cederberg 2012). Strikingly, Apitzsch (2010, 420) 
observed similar negative dynamics among German film professionals. 
Here, informal ties, in particular hierarchical ones, create obligations that 
prevent professionals from diversifying their resources and reduce their 
ability to adapt to changing conditions on the job market. These social 
obligations contradict the value of independence, which is central to 
Hushang’s strategies of capital creation both in the local Iranian social 
field and among German film professionals. Thus, he seeks to separate 
professional and personal ties in order to mediate both collaboration and 
independence in the transnational social field of Iranian film 
professionals.
In doing so, Hushang tries to avoid the conjunction of uncertainties in 
the social field of Iranian film professionals. Significantly, he thinks about 
doing business with his two closest friends, Hossein and Amir, who are 
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not in the film business. Moreover, both migrated at about the same time 
as him and dispose of an amount of Germany-specific resources more or 
less equal to his own. Based on these considerations, Hushang’s relations 
with Iranian film professionals are analogous to relations between broth-
ers discussed in Chap. 2: while ties between those who try to generate 
capital from the same resources tend to be ridden by competition, rela-
tions between people whose strategies of capital creation do not concen-
trate on the same social fields, like distant relatives or friends, may more 
easily be shaped by collaboration and solidarity (Bourdieu 1990, 170; 
Monsutti 2004, 2012). Hence, the idea to avoid obligations is the third 
reason, besides exclusion, cultural alienation and the aim to find employ-
ment as a cultural broker, why Hushang does not engage in friendship 
relations with German colleagues, either. Therefore, concentrating the 
main of his efforts to create capital on German contexts not only helps 
him to retain a greater independence, but, as we shall see later, paradoxi-
cally also sustains his chances to generate capital among Iranians.
While Hushang’s struggle with the idea of assimilation contains his 
effort to balance dependence and independence in his relations with 
German and Iranian colleagues, how do the other film professionals 
engage with the conditions to capital accumulation in German and 
Iranian professional fields?
 Zian: What Barriers?
Aged 34, Zian is the youngest of the film professionals, with least profes-
sional experience but great confidence in a successful career. Short and 
thin with black hair and eyes, he wears a designer-stubble, black-framed 
Ray-Ban glasses, speaks very fast, and preferably tells jokes. When I first 
met him, in May 2013, he lived in the HafenCity, a prestigious newly 
built high-end neighborhood in downtown Hamburg in a flat he shared 
with a friend, an Iranian who runs an international retail company. For 
financial reasons, he moved to Barmbek, an off-center middle-class 
neighborhood a few months later.
Tehran-grown, his family is originally from the northern Iranian prov-
ince of Gilan. In Iran, he had studied natural sciences. During our first 
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meeting, which was a formal interview, he told me his migration narra-
tive: as he wrote articles for a regime-critical newspaper, he was perse-
cuted and several times imprisoned by the Iranian state. In 2006, he came 
to Germany where he joined his brother and father who live in Frankfurt 
but then came to Hamburg and successfully applied for asylum. Since 
then, Zian did not return to Iran. He did the same foundation course as 
Hushang to study filmmaking, explaining the shift in his curriculum 
with the objective to find a different way to express political critique. At 
first, he applied to the renowned HfBK, where Hessam had also studied. 
As he received a refusal, Hessam and Hushang recommended him to 
study at the HAW. When I met Zian, he was finishing his bachelors and 
argued that university was mainly about building a professional network, 
as he could gain the skills through practice. Ambitious, for his masters he 
hoped to switch to a more prestigious university in Germany or abroad. 
Indeed, in 2014, he went to pursue his studies in Zurich for a few months.
Like Hushang, Zian mainly aims at creating capital in the German 
social field of film professionals. Stressing the value of professionalism, he 
discursively dissociated himself from Iranians whose company he shared 
during his early years in Germany:
Zian “There are many weird people here (Âdamhâ-ye ajib-gharib ziâd dâre 
injâ).”
At first, he got to know people who helped him in the asylum process, 
“miserable people (âdamhâ-ye badbakhti)”, who struggled with their 
own asylum request. At that time, he got to know many Iranians who 
were in the same situation as himself. “You have much free time and 
rush into mischief.” The way he talks about them suggests that he does 
not think of these contacts as positive.
I ask “What do you mean?”
Zian “Drugs and such kind of things.” Before, he often went to Iranian 
discos. But today it annoys him that many women are highly dressed up 
and had gone under the knife (amal kardeh). He prefers natural beauty. 
Besides, they would also directly ask where you live and what kind of car 
you drive. “What business is it of theirs?” (Field notes, May 2013)
During his studies, in contrast, Zian got to know other students who 
were acquainted with the local conditions. “There you entered a different 
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level” (field notes, May 2013). Through his contact with German and 
international fellow students and through professional experiences, he 
generated Germany-specific social and cultural resources. The fact that he 
is not yet officially on the labor market also preserved him from its com-
petitive environment. A cover photo7 he posted on his Facebook account 
in early 2013 testifies to his good relations with young German profes-
sionals. It shows him amidst the crew of a short movie he directed. Most 
of the team look like Germans or at least Europeans, and two or three 
may be Middle Eastern. Among them is his close friend Parham who 
came to Germany at the age of 16, today speaks German without an 
accent, studies sound technology and is, like Zian, involved in Golestan 
association. Thus, he has good professional contacts with some of his 
German classmates, which probably also extend to the private domain. 
Significantly, I once met him at a local film festival, and he was accompa-
nied by a German colleague.
Putting forward Germany-specific social and cultural resources, he 
stated that, instead of going to Iranian discos, he now preferred to go to 
bars in the Schanzenviertel. Clearly, since several years, Zian endeavored 
to move out of exclusively Iranian social circles, not only in professional, 
but also in private life. While we talked, he played with a leather pocket 
full of cards in his fingers. It opened through the movement and I saw a 
German identity card inside.
Sonja “Did you become German?”
Zian “Yes.” He took out the ID and showed it to me. ‘So fast, after only six 
years!’ I think. Without his glasses, without the beard and his hair 
appearing more brown than black, he somehow looked more German 
on the photo.
“I also changed my name into Mark Bar.”
Sonja “Why?”
“Because I wanted it to sound more German.” ‘Why did he choose this 
name?’ I ask myself. Mark sounds like mard, which means “man” in 
Persian, and bar is German for “devoid” – a free man. Only someone 
who speaks both Persian and German can understand this 
signification.
7 That is, one of the two most visible pictures of his account.
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Sonja “So, do you identify as German?”
Zian “No. In Germany, one always remains a stranger. I have many German 
friends. Good friends. They are also not very satisfied with the society 
and would like to go away. However, I also have many Iranian friends. 
In many other places, people are more open. It is still not ‘normal’ when 
someone is not from here. Many of my friends live in Canada and if they 
are asked where they are from, they say ‘Canada’. Everybody there is 
from elsewhere and therefore people do not constantly ask you [where 
you are from].” (Field notes, May 2013)
In trying to generate capital from Germany-specific resources, Zian not 
only became a German citizen, but he also “Germanized” his name. His 
friend Parham did the same. They continued to use their Iranian names 
in Iranian contexts, however. Thus, not all Germany-specific resources 
are recognized as capital in the local Iranian social field. Such name 
changes are very rare among my interlocutors, compared to Iranians in 
other locations (Bursell 2012; Khosravi 2012). Zian also met limits to his 
capital creation among Germans, but, unlike Hushang, he does not draw 
boundaries based on cultural difference in order to convey exoticism or 
cultural expertise. He pointed out that he shares his feeling of alienation 
in German society with some of his friends who are of German origin; 
their relations are shaped by a system of value in which familiarity with 
German cultural context is not a key value, but cooperation and cosmo-
politanism. Let me clarify that I understand the value of cosmopolitan-
ism as distinct from that of diversity in that the willingness to engage 
with unfamiliar cultures is paired with a certain personal autonomy from 
the cultural context(s) one grew up with (Hannerz 1990). Thus, despite 
experiencing social exclusion in certain German contexts based on his 
cultural  and racial othering, Zian successfully generates capital among 
German fellow students and junior film professionals.
Zian’s engagements among German film professionals did not keep 
him from building up relations in the local Iranian social field. Many of 
his close friends, like his fellow student Parham, and his girlfriend, are 
Iranians. However, like Hushang, he privileges contacts with Iranians 
who dispose of important Germany-specific resources. For example, he 
told me that he now only goes to Iranian parties which are open to a 
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selected public, such as the high-end “platin lounge”. Thus, like Hushang, 
he is conscious about the importance of resources conceived of as 
Germany-specific for capital creation among Germans and possible 
downsides to tight social relations with Iranians who dispose little of these.
Nevertheless, he is not as wary as Hushang of social obligations in 
Iranian professional social fields. On the contrary, Zian is rather anxious 
to create ties among Iranian film professionals. In these professional con-
texts, the volume of their Germany-related resources is a priori secondary. 
Significantly, in his relation with Hushang and Milad, who are seniors in 
the field, he valorizes both their Germany- and Iran-specific resources. 
For example, when he first joined a meeting of Golestan association at 
which Hushang was also present, he told the group that a German short 
movie in which Hushang had collaborated was nominated for an interna-
tional student award. Another example is a photo he posted on Milad’s 
Facebook page in February 2013, when Milad was still based in Iran. It 
pictures himself, Milad, and his friend Parham discussing technical details 
on the set of Zian’s short film. Following comments accompany the post:
Milad: I really liked the backstage of your film, Zian, and I am waiting for 
the shooting of your [first] motion picture. Say hello to everybody and 
well done!
Zian: Dear Milad, it was your presence that enriched our backstage.
Milad: My pleasure! (translated from Persian by the author)
Interestingly, Zian mobilized Milad’s support for a movie realized with 
primarily German staff. This suggests that he must have created enough 
cultural and social capital among the team for him to be confident enough 
not to fear that his association with Milad, who disposes of important 
professional know-how but barely of Germany-specific resources, would 
enforce barriers based on his racial Othering.
Zian’s valorizing his seniors’ knowledge, and mediating cooperation, 
but also Germany-specific resources, helped him to create capital in the 
social field of film professionals: thanks to Sadegh’s support, he got a 
mandate for making a documentary about Golestan’s FusIran festival in 
the fall of 2013. During the event, he got to know two Iranian musicians, 
who subsequently hired him for realizing music videos or filming con-
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certs. Also, thanks to Yara, he became one of the presenters of the local 
film festival’s section for historical Iranian movies in the same year. Thus, 
he does not shy away from building multiplex relations with Iranian pro-
fessionals. His openness toward new contacts in the film business relates 
to the fact that he is a newcomer both in the German and in the transna-
tional Iranian social fields of film professionals. Possibly because of his 
newness, he does not seem to expect obligations that follow from close 
relations.
In sum, solidarity and competition among Iranian film professionals, 
the tendency to build boundaries toward fellow Iranian film professionals 
or to deconstruct them is not only related to the primary importance of 
Germany-specific resources for the generation of capital among Germans 
and among local Iranians. It is also influenced, first, by their trust in the 
stability of inclusion in German contexts, that is mainly created in 
 long- term multiplex relations with Germans, and, second, by their posi-
tion in professional hierarchies.
 Milad, and the Protection of Façades
I got to know 37-year-old Milad a mere few weeks after he came to live 
in Hamburg, in May 2013, during an afternoon we spent hanging out 
with Hushang and some other mutual acquaintances. The stout single 
with brown hair at shoulder length and blue eyes is rather introverted. As 
a passionate cook, he likes to talk about recipes. Milad does not speak 
German and has only a quite limited command of English. In the begin-
ning of his stay in Hamburg, he mostly wore checked shirts and stone- 
washed jeans as they can be frequently seen on Tehran’s streets. However, 
after one year, he cut his hair and adopted plainer, more local fashion. 
During the time I stayed in Hamburg, he lived in different places. First, 
he rented a room in the flat of a German cultural professional in Altona, 
an arty middle-class neighborhood. Then, he subleased a grim apartment 
full of dusty seventies furniture, situated in Hamm, a monotonous resi-
dential neighborhood. He liked to precise that the owner of this flat was 
a German professor at Oxford University. In between, he did not have his 
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own room but squatted at different friends’ places for a few weeks, mainly 
at Hossein’s, who is also Hushang’s friend.
Milad told me that his family is part of the Turkish-speaking Azeri 
minority, but I did not notice ethnicity to play a role in his relations with 
local Iranians. Back in Tehran, his hometown, he studied sociology before 
entering the film business. Milad made much of his career in collabora-
tion with Sina, who is a director, just like himself. Together, they made 
several movies critical of the Iranian government some of which were 
rewarded at international film festivals. They shot the latest film without 
a government license. When the movie’s participation in an international 
film festival was announced unexpectedly early, Milad left Iran on the 
spur of the moment to avoid imprisonment and  came to Hamburg. 
Contrary to Hushang and Zian, he does not have family members in 
Germany. Still, he told me that he knew Hamburg well: as Sina had 
developed a foothold there, since 2008, he frequently came for festivals. 
Hamburg was also a location where they did shots for scenes of movies 
for which they did not have a government license.
At his arrival in 2013, however, Milad knew that his stay would have 
to be longer than the ones before. Nevertheless, he decided not to apply 
for asylum. Over a coffee we had in a bakery in spring 2013, he explained 
that he does not want to depend on German social services, and, distanc-
ing himself from asylum seekers, he argued that it is not truth, but a good 
story that is the basis for asylum decisions. Indeed, as I explained in 
Chap. 3, being considered a refugee (Flüchtling) can represent an impor-
tant stigma and barrier to capital creation in German social fields, and, as 
a consequence, also among local Iranians. Moreover, he said “There is no 
point in being a filmmaker outside Iran” (field notes, June 2013); the 
sense he saw in his work was related to the socio-political situation in the 
country. He hoped for political change after the elections in June 2013, 
which may allow him to return. Thereby, an asylum request would have 
been a hindrance. Thus, he applied for a one-year work and residence 
permit with the help of a lawyer, instead. In late August 2013, he proudly 
presented me his newly issued document in the queue of a supermarket 
checkout. Thanks to his international professional success and to his eco-
nomic capital, the German institutional system considered him a desir-
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able immigrant (Nohl et al. 2014, 3ff.). However, by that time, he already 
had new plans, and told me:
I want to have a base (pâgâh) in Hamburg, and the residence permit (eghâ-
mat). Ideally, I would like to travel back and forth between here and Iran, 
and besides it is much easier to travel with a German residence permit. 
(Field notes, July 2013)
Indeed, with the idea to build on the cultural and social resources he had 
acquired through his work in Iran, as well as thanks to international 
rewards, he declared that his long-term aim was to open a film produc-
tion company in Germany.
Therefore, he tried to invest in capital creation in the German social 
field of film professionals. As he once told me, he thought it was impor-
tant not to limit his social life to contacts with Iranians. Through his 
previous stays, in particular thanks to Sina, he knew a few Germans in 
Hamburg working in the cultural sector and tried to build on these rela-
tionships. Indeed, Hans, the German editor of a local cultural magazine 
in his mid-fifties, not only rented out to him a room in his flat, but also 
remained a reliable friend after Milad moved out. For example, Hans 
invited him to spend Christmas together with his family. Through the 
older man, Milad tried to make new professional connections. For 
instance, once
he told me that he cooked âb-gusht [a very popular hearty mutton soup] for 
his landlord’s guests. Hans had invited some friends, mostly Frenchmen. 
He showed me pictures (most of them seemed to be around fifty years old) 
and explained that, aside for a small remainder of rice, there were no left-
overs. (Field notes, June 2013)
Putting forward Iranian recipes, his cooking talents, and hospitality, he 
sought to create capital among his invitees. Familiarity with German cul-
tural contexts is, as we saw in Zian’s case, not always a central value among 
German film professionals. Iran-specific resources may be interpreted as 
mediating the value of cosmopolitanism. However, his lack of language 
skills was an important obstacle to this effort. Arguing that he had lim-
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ited financial means, he did not go to language school, but tried to learn 
German by himself. He once went to a free class organized by a refugee 
help center, but he said that it was not well organized. After a year in 
Hamburg, he was still not able to have a simple conversation in German.
Instead, however, he had developed a knowledge of prevalent trends in 
German films: he told me about a plot he had in mind for a movie that 
seemed to represent the mix of comedy and romance that characterizes 
successful northern German movies made by, and dealing with, migrants 
and their descendants, such as Kanak Attack (Becker 2000), Kebab 
Connection (Saul 2004), Head-On (‘Auf der anderen Seite’) (Akin 2004), 
and Soul Kitchen (idem 2009). Indeed, Hessam also adopted this type of 
scenario in his productions. However, Milad told me that, before he 
could realize such a film, he had to get to know German infrastructure 
and working methods—“culture” (farhang), as he said—better. Frustrated, 
he added that he only began to understand the social life of Iranians in 
Hamburg, not to speak of getting to grips with that of Germans. Indeed, 
the locally successful producer Hessam once told me that he had known 
many Iranian film professionals in Germany who could not “adapt to the 
tastes of the German public”. He said, “You can’t make films in Germany 
the same way as in Iran. You have to have an understanding of German 
taste and what the German public likes to see” (field notes, April 2014).
Contrary to Hushang and Zian, Milad did not complain about meet-
ing barriers to capital creation based on his cultural or racial othering by 
Germans. What he did complain about is that he did not have access to 
German contexts other than the small circle of already acquainted inter-
nationally orientated film and cultural professionals. Instead of question-
ing the importance of conveying familiarity through Germany-specific 
resources, Milad put the blame on himself, for example, in saying that he 
is too old to learn the language. In sum, to his disillusion, Milad had to 
find out that his lack of Germany- or Western-specific resources impeded 
on the acknowledgment of the social and cultural resources he had gener-
ated among film professionals in Iran and among international film crit-
ics as a capital in German contexts.
The barriers Milad encountered in the social field of German film pro-
fessionals increased his expectations in relations with Iranians in general, 
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and local Iranian film professionals, in particular. Significantly, when I 
once found him lonely and depressed, he argued
Sonja “I know, being new in a country is difficult. You need time to find 
friends and find your way around.”
Milad “Yes, but it is not as if I started from scratch. Luckily, I was in 
Hamburg and Europe many times before and I know many people here. 
I know Hushang for six years, and Yara for three years. That makes it 
easier.” (Field notes, September 2013)
Upon his arrival in Hamburg, Milad thus hoped to build on social rela-
tions he had created during his previous stays. However, this turned out 
to be much more difficult than he thought, especially in the professional 
domain. The analysis of his relationship with Hushang will offer insights 
in the different reasons for Milad’s difficulties.
Hushang was one of the persons Milad said he was closest to when he 
came to live in Hamburg. When Milad still lived in Iran, they met during 
Hushang’s visits and the technician acknowledged the director’s profes-
sional success, maybe with a hint of envy. To Milad, Hushang was one of 
the persons he looked up to as he thought he had realized to find his place 
in Hamburg. From the moment Milad immigrated there, however, an 
imbalance slowly developed between the men. Milad hoped for Hushang 
to help him create capital both among Germans and Iranians. For his 
part, however, Hushang was disappointed, as Milad had failed to employ 
him in his successful projects. Significantly, Hushang told me that it 
would always be a surprise when Milad and Sina released a movie. It was 
through his contact with local Iranian film professionals that Milad cre-
ated Germany-specific social and cultural resources, such as knowledge 
about the dynamics of the German film business and its key figures. 
However, Milad told me that he was very secretive about his own projects 
and he did not involve these people in his professional projects although 
he was more advanced in the occupational hierarchy. He told me that this 
was because these films were illegal, “the team needed to be held small” 
(field notes, June 2013). Nevertheless, he continued to do so when he 
lived in Hamburg. For a documentary he wanted to realize in September 
2013, he rented a camera from an Iranian friend who was based in Dubai 
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and decided to film himself rather than to collaborate with Hushang or 
Zian. Thus, Hushang probably had the impression that their exchange 
was imbalanced—to his disadvantage.
As time passed, Hushang took his distances, and the two men saw each 
other ever more rarely. For example, in late August 2013, I was at a bar 
with Milad when Hushang called to invite me to the premiere of a docu-
mentary later on the same evening. He suggested me to bring Milad 
along, but when I told Milad, he was surprised that Hushang had not 
invited him personally and found some excuse why he would not be 
able to join.
In reference to the two dimensions of Hushang’s boundary-making 
with Iranians, the first reason why the two men drifted apart was related 
to their strategies of capital creation in German contexts. In contrast to 
Zian, Hushang was insecure about his inclusion among German film 
professionals and did not want his association with someone lacking 
Germany-specific resources to add further difficulties. Milad, however, 
was dependent on contacts with people like Hushang in order to find an 
entry into the German social field of film professionals. The second rea-
son is related to the important obligations in the field of Iranian film 
professionals: Hushang sensed that Milad had developed expectations 
from their relationship he was not ready to fulfill, on the one hand, 
because, as mentioned above, he evades important engagements with 
Iranian colleagues to maintain his independence. On the other hand, 
because, in Hushang’s view, their exchanges were imbalanced. Tellingly, 
when I asked Hushang whether he had heard of Milad in February 2016, 
he told me:
Hushang “No, he did not get in touch. I contacted him once when I was 
in Iran [after Milad had temporarily returned there], but he didn’t 
answer. Another time I met him on the street in Hamburg by chance.” 
Milad had told me the same.
Sonja “But did you argue?”
Hushang “No, it’s just like this. I don’t want to talk badly about Milad, but 
I realized that, in general, people who come here from Iran expect that 
you do this and that for them. But that’s not the way things work here. 
I first have to take care of my own life before I help others. They don’t 
understand that.” (Field notes, February 2016)
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Crucial to the argumentation of this chapter, the third reason for the dis-
solution of their relationship is related to the role of Germany-specific 
resources in boundary-making in the local Iranian social field. A discus-
sion I had with Milad over a coffee almost a year after his arrival in 
Hamburg was revealing in this regard. At this point, the men had already 
stopped to see each other and Milad was disappointed by Hushang’s lack 
of emotional support:
Milad “Hushang is always pessimist (bad-bin). He gives me little hope for 
professional success in Germany.”
Sonja “He probably made bad experiences, feels disadvantaged in relations 
with Germans.”
Milad “But he always says how good Germany is!”
I think ‘Well, he can hardly admit that.’
Milad “Does he actually have a strong accent (lahjeh)?”
Sonja “Hushang speaks really well [German], almost without an accent.”
“And Zian?”
“Zian… yes, Zian has an accent. He does not speak very well. It’s funny, in 
Persian he always speaks so fast.”
“Yes, and he eats his words.”
“Hessam also speaks almost without an accent.”
“Yes, they all came here as twenty-years-olds. As refugees.”
“Hushang and Hessam came as refugees?”
“I don’t know for Hessam, but Hushang yes.”
“He never told me about this!”
“Then better not tell him I told you. But Zian also came as a refugee and 
tells everybody. He doesn’t have a problem with that.” (Field notes, 
March 2014)
To understand the complex dynamics this quote reveals, Erving Goffman’s 
(1990) concept of “impression management” is useful: we can conceive 
of Milad and Hushang as actors in a performance of self that was destined 
at each other. Other Iranian friends and acquaintances, as, for example, 
Yara and Hossein, sustained the impressions each one created of himself. 
Within these dynamics, Hushang tried to generate capital building on his 
actual Germany-specific cultural resources, while creating a fiction of 
having social capital in German contexts he actually lacked, because, as 
 S. Moghaddari
187
we saw earlier, he was not close with his German colleagues. Significantly, 
Hushang once told me
Iranians learnt how to adapt throughout the history of the region. So, they 
do it here [in Germany] too. But this often is only superficial. In work and 
everyday life, one gets along with Germans, but in private that’s often dif-
ferent. Here, people treasure Iranian ways, but often Iranians don’t want 
others to know or find out. (Field notes, April 2013)
Importantly, by “others” Hushang meant not only Germans but also 
people he categorized as Iranians. Thus, some of the Germany-specific 
resources Hushang had put forward and Milad had acknowledged as 
capital were not actually at his disposition. In the previously quoted dis-
cussion, I unwittingly created a disruption to Hushang’s performance: in 
his absence, I offered insights into its “backstage”, revealing his difficul-
ties to generate capital in German contexts.
Correspondingly, Milad was truly surprised, inquired on the validity 
of his Germany-specific cultural resources (language skills), and revealed 
a part of Hushang’s impression management he had sustained so far, 
namely the fact that he came to Germany as an asylum seeker. As he 
gained a greater insight into Hushang’s backstage, he probably felt 
betrayed in his trust, because he contrasted Hushang with Zian’s honesty, 
and thus greater trustworthiness. This also explains why Milad withdrew 
from his commitment to this performance and told me Hushang’s 
“secret”. In leaving out this episode of his life in our conversations, 
Hushang probably tried to suspend this categorization, as he had often 
experienced it as a reason for exclusion (Goffman 1963, 54ff.).
For his part, Milad also tried to manage the image Hushang (and other 
Iranians) had of him: in refusing professional collaborations with local 
Iranian film professionals, and building on resources he had created in 
Iran, he tried to sustain the image of himself as a successful producer. At 
first, I think that Milad was not completely aware of, and later tried to 
hide the fact that he was an even newer newcomer to the social fields of 
German and transnational Iranian film professionals than Zian. Once, 
Milad and I went to the Imam Ali mosque together, where we met an 
Iranian who told us boldly that he had lived in many different countries 
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before settling in Sweden. He must have recognized Milad as a recent 
migrant from his way of speaking Persian and his clothes, and asked 
whether he was in a different country before, or came to Hamburg 
directly. To try to create Western-specific capital, that is, in this case capi-
tal other than Iran-specific, Milad explained that he had been in Turkey 
before, although this was only a two-month sojourn. As he tried to hide 
his unfamiliarity with Germany, he emphasized his independence and 
failed to convey collaboration, which, as we saw earlier, created barriers to 
his capital creation in his relation with Hushang.
The two men’s impression management reveals a crucial observation. 
As we saw earlier, cultural and social resources which mediate familiarity 
with German cultural contexts are central for Iranians’ capital creation 
both in most German contexts and among themselves. Therefore, most 
Iranians favor creating ties with people who have at least as much 
Germany-specific resources as themselves. These dynamics, however, may 
represent a vicious circle for people who experience barriers to the 
 generation of capital in German contexts, as Hushang and Milad: to 
overcome barriers to capital creation among Germans, you try to gener-
ate capital among well-established Iranians, which in turn requires 
Germany-specific resources. In this situation, people may resort to 
impression management. This, in turn, leads them to be warier of close 
relations with other Iranians in fear that, through these exchanges, they 
discover the backstage of their performance. Beyond the key value of 
familiarity with German contexts, to create capital in the Iranian social 
field, people need to balance the mediation of both independence and 
collaboration. The equilibrium between these contradictory values, how-
ever, gets disturbed with such a withdrawal, as we saw in Milad’s case. To 
sum up, the need to keep up impression management is the third reason 
why people like Milad and Hushang keep greater distance from other 
Iranians, in particular those engaged in their professional field.
In the light of this analysis, how can we explain Hushang’s defeatism 
regarding Milad’s professional plans in Germany? One, two, or maybe all 
of the following three reasons played a role in Hushang’s discouragement. 
First, it may be the well-intended council of a friend, in which Hushang 
tried to tell him—based on personal experiences but without letting go 
of his own façade—that creating capital among Germans is not as easy as 
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Milad thought it was. Second, it may be motivated by competition over 
professional success, insofar as it reflects Hushang’s expectation that, if 
Milad realized his goals, he might outperform him without offering him 
any benefit from this success.8 Third, the fear may have played a role that, 
if Milad gained professional success among Germans, he might discover 
Hushang’s true uncertainties in German contexts, which would devaluate 
the capital he holds in Milad’s eyes. Thus, in alignment with my previous 
argument, as Milad and Hushang tried to generate capital in the same 
social fields, and reacted similarly to difficulties, that is, in trying to dis-
simulate them, their interests began to conflict and they ceased their 
exchanges.
Resuming shortly with Milad’s trajectory, Hushang was not the only 
person who took distance from him. Yara, for example, also took her 
distances and even excluded him at several occasions. Looking back at his 
first year in Hamburg, he told me
that this period was difficult for him. That he spent much time being alone. 
That at the beginning he hung out more with the people, but then they all 
returned to their own businesses [donbâl-e kâr-e khodeshun budan]. He said 
that the people did not support him, the other Iranians. Most of them said 
“You won’t find work here anyways.” Hossein was supportive that is why 
Milad spent more time with him. He said his problem was that he was too 
old to learn the language well and that he did not know enough people. 
This was why anybody wanted to collaborate with him. He was not able to 
reach enough people. (Field notes, March 2014)
As the difficulties he met in creating capital both in local German and 
Iranian social fields impacted on his psychological well-being, he retired 
even more from sociability among Iranians. Of course, a few people did 
support him. One such person was Sina, with whom he was linked not 
only through long years of professional collaboration, but also through 
personal confidences. However, Sina soon returned to Iran. The other 
8 This was Milad’s explanation: “It is difficult to make good movies abroad. But I want to try. 
Several people tell me: ‘You are not going to make it; this won’t work.’ They are those who did not 
make it themselves. If they do not support me, then they should at least not discourage me. It’s not 
as if I made €200,000 with that movie and I lead an easy life in Hamburg, as some people may 
imagine” (field notes, June 2013).
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helpers were not involved in the transnational social fields of Iranian film 
professionals. None of these efforts however allowed Milad to create 
enough capital to feel comfortable in Germany. After one year and a half, 
he decided to return to Iran temporarily to renew his social ties and bring 
more money with him, despite the risk of travel and occupational bans. 
To his luck, Milad met mildness from the part of the new Iranian govern-
ment, and today, he moves between Tehran and Hamburg as he wishes.
What happens intra-relationally when friends and colleagues pursue 
individually competitive strategies of capital creation within and across 
local and transnational social fields?
The analysis of cooperation and competition between Hushang, Zian, 
and Milad showed that the local and transnational social fields of Iranian 
film professionals are marked by overlapping uncertainties deriving from 
migration and from the characteristics of the social fields of film profes-
sionals. Trust and reputation play an important role in sustaining 
 cooperation in social relations among these professionals. We can see here 
an analogy to the structure of the transnational social fields of Iranian 
carpet merchants. At their difference, however, film professionals’ profes-
sional success does not depend on their engagement in transnational net-
works, nor is it necessarily based on Iranian identifications. In contrast to 
carpet merchants who tend to maintain tight knit and multiplex rela-
tions, these film professionals rather seek a personal balance between 
cooperation and independence in order to navigate flexible capital cre-
ation in diverse professional social fields simultaneously.
Just like in the context of association Golestan, the generation of capi-
tal from Germany-specific resources was a major aspect of all three men’s 
relations in the German and transnational Iranian social fields of film 
professionals as well as in the local Iranian social field. In Chap. 4, I 
showed that the importance of such resources is the result of the interplay 
of systems of value structuring social fields in Germany and Iran. The 
analysis of interpersonal boundary-making in this chapter indicates a sec-
ond reason for the valorization of familiarity with German cultural con-
texts among Iranian, namely the actual overlapping of social fields in 
everyday life: Iranians tend to privilege being associated to others who 
have at least as much Germany-specific capital as themselves, in order not 
to enhance the Germans’ perception of cultural and racial difference. In 
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contrast to research among socially disadvantaged Turks (Ehrkamp 2006; 
Çelik 2015, 2017), this research joins extent studies in that my Iranian 
interlocutors reluctantly comply with rather than question the prevailing 
systems of value and the requirements of assimilation in their contact 
with Germans (Sanadjian 1995; Sadeghi 2018).
However, the comparison of the three men’s boundary-making also 
shows that, while systems of value shape social fields, their effect on each 
agent may vary depending on his own professional position, but also on 
his gender, racialization based on individual physical features, but also on 
the extent to which past experiences of exclusion influence contemporary 
behavior. Comparing the two men’s trajectory, we see that Hushang’s 
own boundary-making toward Germans and his staging of Iranianness 
contributed to his (self-) exclusion. Brokerage, just like staging Iranianness, 
has relatively limited potential for changing existing systems of value. In 
contrast, the social ties Zian was able to create with Germans diluted the 
importance of perceived cultural difference and allowed him to present 
his Iranian identifications in a complementary, that is, non-exclusive, 
way. Thus, familiarity with German cultural elements does not have the 
same weight in all the German social fields of film professionals: among 
students and among higher ranked professionals in which Zian and 
Milad are involved, cosmopolitanism to a certain degree outweighs 
familiarity.
It is important to note that not all kinds of Germany-specific resources 
are similarly efficient in generating capital. In the German social field of 
film professionals, cooperation is a crucial value and disposing of 
Germany-specific cultural capital alone does not help migrants to medi-
ate familiarity. As we saw in the case of Hushang, to overcome these 
limits, cultural need to be combined with social resources. Thus, depend-
ing on the social field, not only the volume but also the distribution of 
location-specific resources conditions successful capital creation.
Finally, the conflict between Hushang and Milad showed that the lack 
of Germany-specific resources may create a vicious circle. To avoid stig-
matization and exclusion from their peers, migrants may resolve to 
impression management (Goffman 1990), in which problems in the gen-
eration of these kinds of resources become tabooed. This is also why, as in 
the introductory anecdote, narratives of successful Iranians rarely contain 
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the difficulties they actually needed to overcome in order to create these 
educational and professional achievements.
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6
A Festival at the Interstices of Value  
Systems
It is a sunny but chilly day in April 2013. Behruz, a 27-year-old student 
who carries out his first project as a cultural organizer, his sister, his girl-
friend, myself, and two other volunteers are on a promotional tour in 
Hamburg’s commercial center. We distribute flyers and ask people to take 
pictures with the festival poster. We just reached a moment of disorienta-
tion, as we wait for Behruz to decide where to go next. He is hesitating.
I see three women in their late fifties and approach them spontaneously in 
Persian “Are you Iranian?” They are plainly but elegantly dressed, and 
one of them has a broken arm. Their hair is dyed in black. They stop.
“Yes.”
Sonja “Mâ ye festivâl… [I switch to German] um, sorry, I cannot say this in 
Persian too well. We organize a festival, three days in June, classical 
Iranian music.” They look interested.
The one with the broken arm asks in Persian “Please say it in Persian, if 
possible.”
I comply “Okay, I’ll try. We want to make a festival –”
One of them corrects me “Organize.”
Sonja “Organize. Iranian music at Hochsieben, during three days in June.”
The same woman says “Hochsieben is very good, it’s a very good place.”
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I hand them a flyer. “This is our chef [sic!]” I point to Behruz, who was 
talking to Jan, a German friend of his. He was crouched down, and 
stands up.
“How young he is!” they say.
The one with the bandaged arm “When is the festival?”
Sonja “June 11 to 14.”
“Oh, what a pity, I’ll be back in Canada!” Behruz still keeps himself in the 
background. I show them the flyer and read the names of the musicians. 
They know [one of the bands] and the woman with the bandaged arm 
cheers when hearing the name of Taghi,1 the headliner coming from Iran 
“I would have loved to come.”
The one in the middle asks me to give her some more flyers “I have many 
friends; I’ll give it to them.”
Afterwards, Behruz asks me “How did you know they were Iranians?”
Sonja “You could see it. Besides, they spoke Persian together.” (Field notes, 
April 2013)
In this situation, I was struck not only by Behruz’ lack of planning and 
professionalism, but also of the fact that he was reluctant to approach 
Iranians and speak Persian—a language I thought was his mother tongue. 
I assumed that displaying familiarity with Iranian cultural contexts was 
necessary to create capital among Iranians. Significantly, two months 
later, one of these women indeed came to the festival on two evenings. 
She greeted me and told me that our friendly encounter had inspired her 
to come. Even though the exchange was short, my personal interaction 
and my trying to speak Persian thus displayed Iran-specific cultural 
resources that mediated familiarity as well as cooperation. Behruz, how-
ever, was not as interested in putting forward Iranian cultural elements. 
Which were Behruz’ politics of value and how did they inspire his strate-
gies of capital creation aiming at the organization of an Iranian cultural 
festival? How was his approach received by Iranian stakeholders, German 
cultural organizers, and the visitors?
In the preceding chapters, I have highlighted a certain number of fac-
tors that play an important role in the way social boundaries are drawn 
between Iranians in Hamburg, which include, first, personal trajectories, 
1 Pseudonym.
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that is, the experience of doing kinship, place of birth, time and condi-
tions of migration; second, the way they mobilize resources, in particular 
Iran- and Germany-specific social and cultural resources, in their strate-
gies of capital creation; and third, the politics of value agents pursue 
within intersecting, partly contradictory systems of value that shape the 
social fields in which they are engaged. However, the interactions I ana-
lyzed so far were between people who shared an engagement in at least 
two of the same social fields. As agents that appeared in previous chapters 
come to interact in the context of Behruz organizing the Color festival, 
this chapter offers a perspective on the way alliances and confrontations 
emerge when each agent’s strategies of capital creation relate to a variety 
of different systems of value.
This chapter is based on my active participation in promotional activi-
ties in the three months run up to the Color festival as well as in organi-
zational tasks at the event itself in the spring of 2013. The argumentation 
will follow the way the complexity of the events was revealed to me, from 
the initial information I found about the festival in the internet to Behruz’ 
fundraising strategies, and to the reactions of his interlocutors. The analy-
sis allows me to situate arguments I made in the previous chapters and 
show that people of Iranian origin’s interactions refer to multidimen-
sional social fields shaped by competing regimes of value. Their social 
boundary-making thus needs to be understood as a tool that helps them 
to navigate barriers to capital accumulation they face in diverse local and 
transnational social fields.
 The Festival’s Concept
I first learnt about the Color festival through its presentation on a crowd-
funding website. Crowdfunding is a method to finance independent 
artistic or otherwise innovative projects that was initiated in the late 
2000s and reached much popularity and success in the early 2010s. Via 
an online platform, people make a donation for a project of their choice. 
Necessary funds, however, have to be raised within a specific time frame. 
If the budget target goal is not reached, donations must be restituted to 
the donators and the project cannot be realized. The 2013 event was 
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 supposed to be the first edition of an annual festival, promoting intercul-
tural understanding. The festival’s concept was described as follows:
The Color festival is about a different country each year, and wants to pres-
ent its melodies, its nature and its people through concerts, screenings and 
exhibitions. The goal: To change the perspective, to look beyond horizons, 
to inform and make people curious and, finally, to breathe new life into a 
long-established image. (www.startnext.de/000, assessed 17/03/2013)
The Color festival was scheduled on a three-day weekend in June. This 
kick-off edition was to be dedicated to Iran. The organizers presented the 
event as a reflection of and a contribution to Hamburg’s diversity:
Our aim is to establish the festival […], whereby the promotion of the 
hanseatic city’s interculturality is paramount. We want to achieve this goal 
by organizing transnational cultural co-operation between the Orient and 
the Occident. It is the young and emergent artists in the domains of film, 
photo, music and plastic arts who have the possibility to influence intercul-
tural co-existence. (www.startnext.de/000, assessed 17/03/2013)
The aim of the online crowdfunding campaign was to raise the amount 
of €30.000—a particularly high budget for crowdfunding projects as the 
site stated. To incite the interest in the festival, it promoted a picture of 
Iran that is different from the negative image forged by Western 
mass media:
Each country has a beauty of its own. Iran’s beauty however is too often 
concealed by misconceptions. The Color festival takes its spectators/visi-
tors on a trip to Iran that will surprise, fascinate and ultimately change 
them. As the famous poet Hafez once said: “If you are not traveling and on 
the road, how can you call yourself a guide?” (www.startnext.de/000, 
assessed 17/03/2013)
Thus, in order to present an allegedly alternative image of Iran, the festi-
val’s program featured an exhibition of portrait and landscape photo-
graphs by Sebastian, a Bavarian who had spent a year in Iran, as well as 
three concerts of Iranian classical and folklore music, one each evening. 
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It was constituted of two contrasting elements: romanticized rural life 
and folklore and Iranian classical music—a complex musical tradition 
whose audience and practitioners are mainly members of the urban cul-
tural elite. Strongly supported by the Iranian government, this music tra-
dition has experienced a revival since the Islamic revolution. Yet, the 
event’s publicity was devoid of any political reference, if it was not pro-
moting Iranian culture as apolitical. The event’s location was Hochsieben,2 
a former factory and one of Hamburg’s most important local venues for 
avant-garde theater, dance, and music performances. The picture below 
(Image 6.1) shows the exhibition of Sebastian’s photos in the location’s 
main hall.
The project’s presentation as an opposition to prevailing “misconcep-
tions” about Iran reflects a somewhat educational way to counter barriers 
to capital creation based on the lack of familiarity in the German society, 
frequently observed in this research (see also Lamont et al. 2013, 132); 
2 Venue name changed.
Image 6.1 Hochsieben’s main hall with Sebastian’s photo exhibition. (June 2013, 
author’s picture)
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Behruz, in particular, sought recognition for his knowledge of Iranian 
classical music as a capital, which is, alongside Portuguese Fado, his pre-
ferred music style. Through his collaboration with a fairly successful 
German photographer and the locally well-reputed venue, the presenta-
tion also set forth important social resources that can be conceived as 
Germany-specific. While the crowdfunding campaign was devoid of any 
personal references, taking a closer look at the organizer’s trajectory helps 
to understand how the project emerged and how this presentation target-
ing a rather German public fits into the project’s concept.
 Introducing the Organizer
The first volunteers’ meeting that took place three months ahead of the 
festival in a café located in the main street of the yuppie-and-alternative- 
culture Schanzenviertel was where I first met Behruz in person. Fashion- 
conscious in a down-to-earth way, Behruz wore a neatly trimmed designer 
stubble, chino trousers, flashy green sneakers, and a plain shirt. Tellingly, 
Karim, a 31-year-old volunteer of Iranian origin, once commented that 
“funnily enough, Behruz dresses a bit like rich kids but does not think 
like them” (field notes, May 2013).
The young man introduced himself as a German with Iranian and 
Iraqi roots, but stressed his identification with the city of Hamburg. 
Later, I learned that his parents grew up as Iranians in Bagdad, migrated 
as adults to Tehran in the frame of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), where 
they lived in a district in southern Tehran popular with people from Iraq. 
Finally, they moved to Bavaria in the mid-1980s, where Behruz was born. 
Two years later, they came to Hamburg. Behruz told me that his father 
had been a lawyer in Iran and, according to his cousin, his mother’s father 
had been a diplomat. Probably because his Iranian diploma was not rec-
ognized in Germany, he became self-employed as a carpet merchant like 
many other newly arrived Iranians in the 1980s and early 1990s. Research 
on Iranian migration observed this tendency toward self-employment 
also in other Western countries (Khosravi 1999; Moallem 2000). As 
Behruz’ father did not have a bazari background, he worked outside the 
established merchants’ system of reputation (Chap. 3). Behruz did not 
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say it explicitly, but I could sense that his carpet import company went 
bankrupt in the late 1990s, at the time of the market crisis. When I got 
to know Behruz, his father worked in a bookstore, but allegedly expected 
early retirement for health reasons in the following year. Behruz’ mother 
worked as a physiotherapist. Thus, Behruz’ family had experienced down-
ward social mobility as they struggled with barriers to capital creation in 
German contexts.
Maybe as a reaction, family relations are very close, even spatially: 
Leyla, his 25-year-old sister who just finished her studies in French and 
Islamic Studies, lives with their parents, while Behruz and his girlfriend 
Maria, who is of Portuguese origin, live in a separate apartment in the 
family’s semi-detached house in Bergedorf, a provincial middle-class resi-
dential suburb. Together, the family speaks both Persian and Arabic, and 
Behruz told me that he had been to Tehran to see his family a few times 
already. Not the father, but all three women took over much work for 
organizing the festival.
In a private conversation during that first meeting, Behruz told me his 
own professional trajectory: after graduating from high school, he wanted 
to study medicine. Both in Iran and among Iranians abroad, being a 
physician is one of the most prestigious professions, potentially generat-
ing much cultural and economic capital. As Milad, a film director, 
insightfully told me in another context, it is also a profession that offers 
relative economic stability, and therefore it is particularly interesting for 
people whose family does not have much economic resources. However, 
due to his low grades in high school, he had to wait before being able to 
enter this course. He ended up studying law instead, but quit after a year 
in favor of political science as a course of study. He was still an under-
graduate when he decided to become an independent cultural organizer. 
The Color festival was his first project and he paused his studies to 
realize it.
His professional disorientation reveals both insecurity and high ambi-
tions that are probably related to his parents’ difficulties to create capital 
in German social fields—and as we shall see later also among Iranians. 
This is even more the case as he is their only son: assumedly, Behruz felt 
his parents’ expectations over gaining upward social mobility. Engaging 
the German social field of cultural organization as a self-employed was 
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surely daring, because Behruz and his family had relatively limited finan-
cial resources, he had no experience in event management or degree that 
would prove his qualification, neither, beyond sparse individual contacts, 
a professional network to rely upon for support. In sum, he barely had 
any resources from which to create capital. Plus, both his person and his 
project bore the danger of facing barriers as a consequence of their Iranian 
and foreign resources failing to mediate familiarity with German cultural 
contexts. As mentioned in the vignette that introduces this book, the staff 
at Hochsieben had almost refused his festival, if it was not for the support 
of a senior member, Anna. The analysis of his fundraising strategies will 
offer us an understanding of the way his strategies of capital creation in 
the German public sphere and the local Iranian social field interrelated 
with the systems of value by which they are shaped.
 Fundraising Through Sameness and Difference
Back at the first volunteers’ meeting, I found Behruz sitting around a 
table with Melanie, a German woman in her early twenties who had just 
returned from a long trip to Iran, and, to my surprise, with Yara, the 
psychologist and representative of the Golestan association (Chap. 3). He 
told us that he only raised a modest amount of donations, so far: his 
efforts to raise funds in the social field of the German public sphere 
through crowdfunding were of little success. Plus, the city-state’s govern-
ment denied his project subsidies. As a matter of fact, in the light of the 
approaching federal elections in fall 2013, Hamburg government’s hands 
were tied when it came to any project having to do with Iran. This situa-
tion was not only due to the country’s international political and eco-
nomic marginalization under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but 
also to the fact that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in power at the 
Hamburg Senate had won the last local elections in 2010 partly thanks 
to its opposition to the former Christian Democratic Union (CDU) gov-
ernment’s collaboration with the Union of Iranian Entrepreneurs (BIU) 
and the government of the Islamic Republic (Chap. 3). Significantly, in 
the same period, the cultural senator refused to grant BIU subsidies for 
organizing the performance of a Tajik ballet.
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In the local Iranian social field, Behruz complained, his fundraising 
barely gained attention, although, here too, he consciously presented the 
festival as politically impartial. At this occasion, he told Yara that he had 
contacted the Golestan association several months earlier to suggest col-
laborating, but did not receive an answer. Meanwhile he learnt that 
Golestan was preparing its own festival and proposed to present these 
events as two parts of the same festival. Yara politely refused the collabo-
ration and stressed that Golestan had the support of the most important 
cultural organizer in Hamburg, as well as that of a well-known Iranian- 
German actress. The association obviously had been more successful in 
creating capital in the local social field of cultural organizers than Behruz, 
not least thanks to the resources of Sadegh and some other artist mem-
bers, as well as the anti-Iranian-government rationale of the festival, sup-
porting exile and underground musicians.
Yara, who is much more familiar with the local Iranian landscape and 
the power relations by which it is shaped than Behruz, advised him “If 
you want to get support from Iranians, you need names behind the proj-
ect” (field notes, April 2013). She thereby pointed to the previously 
observed fact that cooperation, alongside independence and familiarity 
with German cultural contexts, is a key value and implied that people 
would be much more willing to support a project financially if it was 
patronized by someone they know and trust. In sum, in contacts with 
German institutions, it was the failure of his Iran-specific resources to 
mediate the values of democracy, human rights, equality, and ultimately 
familiarity, and among Iranians it was Behruz’ lack of cooperation that 
impeded on his fundraising at this stage.
In the course of the discussion, Behruz announced how he wanted to 
deal with these constraints to capital creation, namely in putting more 
effort in raising funds among Germans through the crowdfunding cam-
paign. Behruz wanted to build a career in German contexts. However, 
although he was not explicit about this, in attracting a German audience 
he also hoped to gain the interest of Iranians. Significantly, during the 
presentation of a fundraising concert in front of a largely Iranian public 
of about 60 people, he stated, “Tonight, all the event is in German only, 
because it is also the aim of the festival to address Germans” (field notes, 
May 2013). How did he try to generate capital in these two social fields 
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simultaneously? A look at his agency in the local Iranian social field will 
offer the necessary insights.
First, Behruz built the festival’s concept on an opposition to estab-
lished Iranian cultural organizers whose events are typically designed for 
an exclusively Iranian public. Several times, notably in a discussion with 
Yara during our first meeting, Behruz critiqued another organizer of 
Iranian classical and folklore music concerts as “unprofessional” for inef-
ficient time management during the event and bad sound quality. 
Moreover, he despised the annual pop-music concerts of famous singers 
from Los Angeles, the ex-territorial hub of the Iranian pop-music indus-
try, for their festive atmosphere as shallow entertainment.
Behruz “I find it stupid just to party. That’s also what all people in Iran 
want. I want to convey content. I don’t understand the sense of it.”
Sonja “Well, it serves to cultivate social contacts.”
Behruz “Honestly, I don’t know how you party, but I don’t cultivate social 
contacts with it. You cultivate contacts in a café during the day, or in a 
restaurant in the evening. Partying, that comes from the West, from 
Europe and America.” (Field notes, July 2013)
Behruz’ evaluation shows a correspondence with the system of value put 
forward by the Iranian regime. It idealizes the image of the modest and 
profound “authentic” Iranian and opposes it to the superficiality of peo-
ple under Western cultural influence (Khosravi 2008, 32ff.). 
Simultaneously, his despise for pop music converges with the system of 
value that shapes the social fields of Iranians who identify as “intellectu-
als”. I heard Yara and Nazanin, a 60-year-old educational advisor and 
daughter of a professor, make similar judgments. Thus, Behruz argued 
that his festival would introduce “a new level” to the repertoire of Iranian 
cultural events in putting forward resources that mediate familiarity with 
German as well as Iranian cultural contexts, professionalism, indepen-
dency, and education.
Concretely, that meant that he marked the event off through a neat 
layout of publications in German and an avant-garde venue, which, until 
then, had never hosted any Iran-related events. Before, Iranian classical or 
folklore music concerts mostly took place in the more traditional 
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Laeiszhalle, a neo-baroque concert hall, or at the Hamburg University 
auditorium. Their publicity is mostly in Persian language and displayed 
only in shops and enterprises that are primarily frequented by Iranians.
We, instead, distributed flyers in middle-class and student districts 
such as Altona, Schanzenviertel, and round Hamburg University. Once, 
in a group of volunteers, we discussed the possibility of printing Persian 
and German bilingual flyers, when Behruz objected “Have you already 
seen Iranian flyers? They are completely overloaded. My design is mini-
malistic, that’s how it stands out” (field notes, April 2013). The festival 
logo was in two colors only, and publications were almost exclusively in 
German (and partly in English). When I distributed flyers among 
Germans, I noticed that the design was well received, maybe because it 
reminds that of a British government World War II poster “Keep calm 
and carry on” that became a very popular decorative theme since 
the 2000s.
The festival slogan, in locally spoken Low German and Persian, sym-
bolizes more than a statement of local diversity. It represents Behruz’ 
claim for culturally pluralistic identifications, which expresses his politics 
of value in German contexts aiming at making the exoticism conveyed by 
Iran-specific resources familiar through cultural education. In contrast to 
Afshin, who tried to promote diversity beyond cultural and ethnic identi-
fications as familiarity (Chap. 4), Behruz advertised diversity in the sense 
of interculturality, thus maintaining cultural and ethnic categories. 
Significantly, according to a magazine article, Behruz said that “Iranians 
would not succeed in presenting themselves with cultural self-confidence 
as part of the German society” (Brehmer 2013).
As precedingly discussed, mediating familiarity with the German cul-
tural context is an important factor in boundary-making among Iranians 
in Hamburg. Thus, in putting forward important Germany-specific 
resources and attracting a German public, Behruz wanted to address 
Iranians who have been successful in creating capital in German contexts. 
His attracting successful Iranians was part of the aforementioned politics 
of value. In Chap. 4, I showed that the German assimilationist approach 
to immigration leaves little space for pluralistic identification. In very 
simple terms, either you are German or a foreigner, but you cannot be 
both. In order to claim culturally pluralistic identifications, Behruz thus 
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needed to mediate familiarity with Iranian cultural contexts, but also 
professionalism, lest he would fail to convey familiarity with German 
contexts. Revealingly, at the end of the first concert, Hassan, a short 
Iranian man in his sixties, who distributes publicity and sells tickets at 
every Iranian event, spontaneously stepped on the stage and danced. The 
mostly German public clapped their hands and I laughed, but Behruz, 
who sat next to me, was angry and told me that he “did not find that 
funny” (field notes, June 2013). Considering these conditions, having 
Iranians with important Germany-specific resources attend the festival 
sustained Behruz’ politics of value in German social fields that aim at 
making the exotic familiar. However, there was another important reason 
to Behruz’ limited performance of Iranianness as we will see in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
The second aspect of his agency in the local Iranian social field was that 
Behruz presented himself as a German-Iranian but was reluctant to put 
forward Iran-specific social and cultural resources. As noted before, 
Behruz lacked social capital among Iranians, that is, contacts who could 
vouch for his trustworthiness. Plus, he disposed of only a very limited 
time frame to raise funds. Following Marcel Mauss (1966), to build up 
trust, time, frequency, and reciprocity of exchange are needed in which 
honesty and reliability can be put to the test. Yet, although he wanted and 
needed the support and attendance of Iranians, Behruz was loath to col-
laborate with Iranians. Significantly, he explained during a volunteers’ 
meeting, that calling or writing to Iranians to ask for funds was his moth-
er’s task “because he would not know how to talk to them” (field notes, 
April 2013). There are two main reasons why Behruz quite consciously 
limited his contacts with Iranians.
On the one hand, as discussed in Chap. 5, tight social relations between 
migrants often also entail interdependence and social obligations that 
may impede on a single individual’s strategies of capital creation. For 
example, Behruz told me that if they were to support him, Iranians would 
be expecting something in exchange. He thus offered free entries to eco-
nomic stakeholders such as Abtin—mostly people he did not know—
hoping that they donate money or bring their family and friends along. 
On the one hand, in avoiding establishing multiplex (i.e. professional 
and personal) relations, Behruz tried to escape obligations he would have 
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to fulfill after the festival. On the other hand, building too close relations 
may have mitigated his own strategies for generating capital in this festi-
val. This is certainly one of the reasons why, besides Behruz’ mother and 
sister, among the 14 members of the festival team, there were only two 
Iranian volunteers including myself.
On the other hand, ironically, Behruz had social obligations through 
his engagement in multiplex relations with certain people and institu-
tions, which were interwoven with his personal identifications. Indeed, 
while he presented himself as German and Iranian in any public context 
in the frame of the festival, he often spoke of his Arab origin to me in 
private. He thus elided his Iraqi identity in his contacts with Iranians. 
Yet, he created boundaries toward Iranians each time someone did not 
give him the support he hoped for. The reason is that he emotionally 
distanced himself from the people by whom he feared being rejected.
Revealingly, after the festival, Behruz told me “Iranians provided zero 
support. My mother told me so from the beginning, but I didn’t want to 
accept it” (field notes, July 2013). Strikingly, he never attributed similar 
behavior by Germans to their national or cultural identity. It appears thus 
that Behruz’ mother maintained important social boundaries toward 
Iranians. This is probably because their Iraqi identifications may have led 
people to categorize them as Arabs, which is a highly discriminated popu-
lation in Iran (Elling 2013, 167f.). Behruz’ cousin also confirmed: among 
Iranians abroad, she frequently meets barriers to capital creation based on 
her Arab name failing to convey familiarity with Iranian cultural contexts.
As argued in Chap. 2, ethnic and national identifications are fluid and 
shifting, contextually shaped by social and institutional categorizations 
and the experience of kinship. In concealing his Iraqi identifications, 
Behruz tried to suspend the creation of ethnic boundaries which could 
impede on his capital creation in the local Iranian social field. However, 
as family relations were tight, and his mother and sister were highly 
involved in the organization of the festival, loyalty to the family nega-
tively influenced his generation of capital: proving his mother wrong 
would have endangered the family cohesion that was built on differentia-
tion from Iranians. In Alejandro Portes’ (1998, 17) terms, Behruz’ family 
obligations thus became “downward levelling norms” (see Chap. 5). In 
concurrence with my observations among the children of early merchants 
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(Chap. 2), Behruz’ engagement in Iranian social fields was thus shaped by 
his family history and involvement in kinship relations. Focusing on cap-
ital creation among Germans was hence a way for Behruz to circumvent 
family conflicts and overcome the barrier his Iraq-specific resources 
would create by failing to convey familiarity with Iran.
Besides his family, Behruz had engaged in another alliance that made 
him doubt of his inclusion in Iranian contexts. First, I did not under-
stand why, in our last preparatory meeting in June 2013, he said “some 
people would think that we collaborate with the Iranian government and 
therefore won’t come” (field notes, June 2013) or even vandalize. However, 
on the second day of the festival, just before the headliner’s concert, I 
noticed that Behruz was particularly nervous. When a family of five with 
veiled women hurried inside, and I saw Behruz relieved, I guessed that 
they were invitees linked to the Iranian government. A discussion with 
Karim after the festival confirmed my supposition. When I asked Behruz 
afterward who he had asked for support, he was straightforward:
Behruz “We contacted the [Imam Ali] mosque, of course. They couldn’t 
help us, but they referred us to Berlin.”
Sonja “Why Berlin?”
Behruz “The department for cultural affairs of the embassy. They helped.”
Sonja “What did they do?”
Behruz “They paid for Taghi’s flight.”
Sonja “Ah, okay.”
Behruz “That’s just normal. That’s what they usually do. Also [the embas-
sies of ] Portugal and France.” (Field notes, July 2013)
The Iranian embassy had contributed with a €10,000 grant to the fes-
tival’s budget. In this context, I understood why Behruz repeatedly 
defended the Iranian government and political system in our conversa-
tions. When I met him on the day after the Iranian presidential elections 
in 2013, he was outraged at having seen the Iranian Consulate General’s 
entry decorated with green tags and toilet paper, and stressed that “after 
all, this is our consulate, the representation of our country, no matter 
what government there is.” On the same day, we met a Marxist, the 
60-year-old daughter of a binational couple who tested our political 
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 allegiances: “In Iran, people are unfree.” Behruz answered “People are 
more happy in Iran than here. The people you see on Sebastian’s pictures 
are not oppressed” (field notes, June 2013). Besides, while Behruz was 
not religious, his mother and sister were practicing Muslims. Nationalism 
is here intertwined with regime-loyalty and religious adherence.
Political and religious orientations often give rise to social boundaries 
between Iranian migrants (Nassehi-Behnam 1991; Sanadjian 2000; 
Moghadam 2013). Islamophobia and the promotion of “non-Islamios-
ity” is widespread among the majority of middle-class Iranians in England 
and Sweden (Gholami 2015; Khosravi 2018). Religious adherence is 
thereby often conflated with government loyalty, in particular among 
long-established migrants. In Iran just like among migrants, the relation 
between these interests as well as differentiation between political factions 
is much more complex (Adelkhah 1998; Bajoghli 2019). Fragmentation 
based on ideological convictions have been observed among migrants 
from other countries, too, in particular those, who, like Cuba and 
Armenia, are shaped by important political changes or conflicts (Pedraza 
2003; Kokot 2009). “non-Islamiosity”, we can see in this context, is an 
important value in the local Iranian social field that connects to the val-
ues of democracy, human rights, and equality, not least because of grow-
ing anti-Muslim racism in Germany (Fekete 2004; Shooman 2014) and 
because Hamburg hosts numerous institutions of the Iranian govern-
ment. Thus, if Behruz concealed his collaboration with the Iranian gov-
ernment, it was because he was apprehensive that it conveyed a lack of 
non-Islamiosity that would create a barrier to his capital creation 
among Iranians.
Erving Goffman (1963) identified practices of concealing as ways to 
circumvent social exclusion. Similar to dynamics observed among film 
professionals, Behruz’ individual convictions as well as his familial and 
political allegiances led him to engage in complex impression manage-
ment (Goffman 1990). The fear of people discovering the backstage of 
his performance, in turn, contributed to his wariness of collaborating 
with Iranians.
In sum, Behruz focused on capital creation among Germans in order 
to follow his politics of value both in the German public sphere and in 
the local Iranian social field. First, in the German public sphere, he put 
6 A Festival at the Interstices of Value Systems 
212
forward Germany-specific resources to convey assimilation and familiar-
ity. Simultaneously, he set forth certain Iran-specific resources to claim 
culturally pluralistic identifications and cultural expertise. In doing so, he 
hoped to overcome the limits posed by his lack of professionalism, finan-
cial capital, and social contacts and bridge the prevailing conflict between 
the values of exoticism and familiarity by making the exotic familiar. 
Second, in conveying familiarity with German cultural contexts in the 
local Iranian social field, he targeted an Iranian public that disposed of 
important Germany-specific resources. Their presence in the festival, in 
turn, sustained his politics of value in the German public sphere. Third, 
he mediated independence and evaded cooperation with Iranians because, 
on the one hand, he wanted to circumvent interdependencies and social 
obligations in internal relations. On the other hand, he tried to conceal 
his Iraqi identifications and his collaboration with the Iranian govern-
ment in order to prevent the emergence of barriers to his capital creation 
both among Iranians and among Germans.
Discussing the way Behruz’ festival was evaluated by different Iranian 
interlocutors will allow me explain why he was not satisfied with the fes-
tival’s outcome.
 Discrepant Reactions: Competing Systems 
of Value
While preparing the Color festival, Behruz contacted many Iranians for 
different motives and with various objectives. Danial, the entertainer; 
Yara, the Golestani; the businessman Javid; Ziba, the cultural organizer; 
and Nazanin, the educational advisor, are all engaged in some of these 
social fields: the German public sphere, the social field of local cultural 
organizers, the local Iranian social field, as well as the transnational social 
fields of Iranian businessmen and artists. As you can see in the graphic 
below (Fig. 6.1), these social fields intersect in very particular ways for 
each of these agents, and so do the systems of value by which they are 
shaped. In this section, we will see how their involvement with these 
conditions influenced their relation with Behruz.
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Danial started his career as an entertainer by hosting literature compe-
titions geared to a mainly young and rather German public. At the time 
of the festival, the eloquent 32-year-old began to extend his work to the 
national level, as well as in other German-speaking countries. Iranian- 
born, he came to Germany at the age of five. Putting forward Iranian 
identifications is a crucial part of his professional image. On shows, he 
gets usually introduced as “the great mogul of all Persian wordsmiths” 
(field notes, June 2013). His important local identifications, which he 
expresses in a dry, straightforward humor, an articulation that mixes Low 
German enriched with youth culture slang, however, are just as central to 
his persona. Behruz wanted him as a host for the festival because the val-
ues Danial puts forward would sustain his endeavor to make the exotic 
familiar by claiming pluralistic ethnic identifications. But, to his great 
disappointment, Danial’s fee was higher than Behruz could afford. Plus, 
the entertainer rejected the plea for gratis publicity in one of his shows. 
In an interview, Danial told me why he refused the collaboration:
local Iranian social field
German public sphere
transnational social field 
of Iranian businessmen
transnational social field 
of Iranian artists
social field of local 
cultural organizers
Behruz and the 
Color festival
Nazanin
Yara
Ziba
Javid
Danial
Fig. 6.1 Behruz’ potential Iranian allies and their positionalities at the intersec-
tion of tridimensional social fields
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Danial “I work, um- I mean, I never work with Iranians.”
Sonja “Okay.”
Danial “I decline all offers, because – most of it is always, I mean, most, in 
my experience – so far all they wanted was always very brazen and very 
insolent: ‘Come, Iranian, we are also Iranians, help us!’ […] I’m no 
Iranian artist. I’m an artist, and I’m, like, from – from here. […] In my 
domain, in what I do, I’m absolutely leading. I don’t need any Iranian to 
tell me – like for the um… what was the name again? For the Color 
festival.”
Sonja “What do you mean?”
Danial “He contacted me, he contacted me, the agency … five, six 
times.”
Sonja “Okay.”
Danial “‘Yes, do this, and wonderful…’ and my agency writes – see, they 
are Germans, they are no Iranians! Well! And he writes back ‘Yes, of 
course, three days, and how much does Danial charge?’ They said ‘So- 
and- so much.’ ‘Oh, well. That’s a lot, but okay, we would like to have 
him for three days’ and then, five days later another email ‘We have to 
see if we can get the money.’ Then, after two weeks he says ‘We don’t 
have enough money.’ This was evident from the beginning! ‘Um, can’t 
he do it like this [i.e. for free]?’ Then, the agency answers ‘That’s asking a 
bit too much, don’t you think? Doing a festival presentation for three 
days in a row like this?’ And then, in the end: ‘But this will get him very 
far’ or ‘much farer.’ ‘It is an experience he…’ That’s why I’m happy to 
have an agency, because that’s when I hang up! When people say such 
things! With Iranians – I don’t like Iranians. I work… Except if they are 
professionals and very good in what they do – which is very rarely, very, 
very, very rare, but otherwise they always think you owe them some-
thing.” (Interview, July 2013)
The transcript strikingly shows that Danial did not acknowledge Behruz’ 
Germany-specific resources as capital and thus created a boundary, dis-
tancing himself from the young man. As the graphic above indicates, 
Danial positioned himself in the social fields of the German public sphere 
and the local social field of cultural organizers. He did not want to be 
involved with Iranians in his professional life in any way. He thus evalu-
ated Behruz’ resources based on the systems of value that dominate these 
fields: Behruz’ Iran-specific resources, plus his putting forward the value 
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of cooperation together with a lack of solvency, in Danial’s view, hinted 
to a lack of professionalism, independence, and ultimately familiarity 
with German cultural contexts.
It is thereby important to consider that Danial’s and Behruz’ politics of 
value in German social fields were quite similar, just like the reason why 
both evaded collaborations with Iranians. Danial told me that he had 
experienced social obligations and downward leveling norms in contact 
with people he identified as Iranians—including his parents—as hamper-
ing his professional advancement among Germans. Significantly, he also 
refused to host Golestan association’s FusIran festival, but accepted to 
present an Iranian festival in 2017 which was organized by two Germans, 
when his career was much more advanced. At the difference of Behruz, 
however, Danial did not need Iranians’ collaboration to create capital 
among Germans. Therefore, their strategies of capital creation were 
incompatible.
With Yara, it was quite the contrary. Behruz’ and Yara’s politics of value 
did not coincide, but their strategies of capital creation were similar, with 
the exception that Yara was much more involved of the Iranian social 
field than Behruz. We saw in Chap. 4 that, just like Behruz, Yara was a 
newcomer to capital creation among Iranians. Thanks to her involvement 
in Golestan, she just began to engage in the transnational social field of 
Iranian artists and that of local cultural organizers. At the intersection of 
these social fields, Yara strove for upward social mobility by cooperating 
with Iranians who disposed of particular Germany-specific resources. She 
valued Behruz’ effort to make the exotic familiar, which resonated with 
her own strategies of capital creation in German contexts. At that time, 
the former oppositional activist, who could probably tell Behruz’ political 
views by the festival program, also did not bother that they failed to 
mediate democracy.
Therefore, she initially offered Behruz her help, even though she did 
not have the time to create trust, and even though her association refused 
an official partnership: Yara lent Behruz her car so he could flypost and 
introduced him to Iranian cultural stakeholders. In return, they con-
vened that Golestan would be allowed to distribute publicity for the 
FusIran event during the Color festival. Yet, the exchanges with Yara were 
exactly the kind of engagements that the young man sought to avoid. 
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Thus, he soon began to refuse her help, creating boundaries that impeded 
on Yara’s capital creation. She, in turn, critiqued his lack of cooperation, 
and, after the event, she also condemned his collaboration with the 
Iranian government. On an afternoon we spent together at obsequies 
(khatm) in September 2013, I mentioned that Behruz wanted to organize 
an event to take place at the same time as the FusIran festival.
Yara “He always makes very unclever moves. I don’t understand why he 
absolutely wants to organize the small festival in October, although the 
date of our festival has been fixed a year ago? He is no real competitor to 
us, but nevertheless, it’s a matter of principle. We offered our help many 
times, but he never accepted it.”
Sonja “Did he actually ever propose his help for your festival?”
Yara “No. He always says, he is no Iranian, yet everything in him is so 
Iranian.” (Field notes, September 2013)
Yara’s comment hints to Behruz’ contradictory approach to cooperation 
with Iranians: he may put forward Iranian identifications in order to 
stimulate alliances, as he did with Danial, and (sometimes even simulta-
neously) deny both, depending on whether or not these collaborations 
(continue to) foster his strategies of capital creation and comply with his 
politics of value. As we saw in Chaps. 2 and 3, time is an important factor 
in internal relations, as temporalities of cooperation determine and are 
determined by the level of compatibility of two agents’ strategies of capi-
tal creation and politics of value. The longer the collaboration, the more 
important it is that not only strategies of capital creation are compatible, 
but that also politics of value coincide. Behruz’ and Yara’s cooperation 
was short-lived, as strategies of capital creation among Germans were 
similar, but they did not share the same politics of value among Iranians.
Behruz’ failing to mediate cooperation was also why Javid, the presi-
dent of BIU, refused his support. After the festival, Behruz told me indig-
nantly that he had presented the project to the corporate consultant, 
asking for financial support and to borrow a few Persian rugs for the 
decoration. However, he was left without an answer and learnt later that 
Javid did not even discuss the offer with the members of the association, 
as promised. In an interview on the telephone, I asked Javid for his 
point of view:
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Basically, they came to see me and they got me exited, but I don’t get any-
thing out of it – if I spend money, as it were, I don’t get anything out of it. 
Um, that means, you should analyze your sponsors. What do they get out 
of it, if they give me money? That means, you have to – two hands: one 
washes other [sic!]. What does the donor get? Besides a donation receipt 
and this restitution. If this is not the case, you don’t get anything. (Interview, 
June 2014)
Contrary to Yara, Javid evaluated from the outset that the restitution 
Behruz offered was not worth for him to invest in this project: as an inter-
national entrepreneur active both in Germany and Iran, and as the presi-
dent of BIU, Javid successfully creates capital in the transnational social 
field of Iranian businessmen, in the German public sphere, and in the local 
Iranian social field. He considered Behruz’ request for cooperation, because 
the festival presented resources that convey both Germany- and Iran-
specific resources which were relevant to him. However, not having any 
restitution of interest revealed a lack of professionalism and autonomy. 
Based on this failure he judged that the project would be an unprofitable 
investment. In contrast to Yara, who wanted to create capital through 
long-term exchanges, Javid looked for immediate economic benefit. 
Besides, what Javid did not mention was that his refusal also relied on their 
competitive strategies of capital creation: Behruz tried to establish himself, 
alongside Javid, as a coordinator in local projects with the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Nevertheless, to confirm his importance as an Iranian stakeholder, 
Javid anyways made an according to him “moderate” donation of €500.
Ziba, a cultural organizer and Ayurveda therapist in her mid-forties 
who came to Hamburg as a teenager, did not care much about the restitu-
tion in cooperation with Behruz, nor about his solvency, nor his profes-
sionalism, despite being involved in the German social field of cultural 
organizers and in the local Iranian social field. She provided infrastruc-
tural and social support, for instance by inviting him to her  Persian- German 
language broadcast on an independent local radio station. I also witnessed 
her taking Behruz’ defense in front of critiques from Hochsieben’s staff.
Her support relied on the fact that Behruz’ strategies of capital creation 
among Iranians suited her politics of value in this social field. Significantly, 
in an interview after the festival, she told me that
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she offered Behruz her help because he does not belong to any group, just 
like herself. She works with different groups, and people frequently accuse 
her jokingly of cooperating with “competitors”. She does not like this, 
but she likes people who are courageous and try something new, and that’s 
why she supported Behruz. (Field notes, July 2013)
Ziba told me that in her experience, Iranian representational activities in 
Hamburg were often dominated by older people whose political views 
impeded on their creating sustainable collective strategies of capital cre-
ation in German contexts. As you could read in the introduction to this 
book, the unmarried woman also likes to challenge the prevailing evalu-
ation of gendered behavior in the local Iranian social field. Moreover, in 
the German public sphere, they shared an interest of “making the inter-
cultural a normality”, as she put it (field notes July 2013). Thus, the value 
she saw in Behruz and his project was indeed its novelty and its promo-
tion of the exotic as familiar. Strikingly, the fact that they were engaged 
in the same social fields followed similar strategies of capital creation and 
had similar politics of value—apart from his involvement with the Iranian 
regime which she never mentioned—did not create a barrier to her help-
ing him create capital both among Germans and among Iranians. Just 
like Zian in Chap. 5, she seemed to be confident enough of her inclusion 
in both social fields not to fear competition. Thereby the economic suc-
cess of the festival was of secondary importance to her.
Finally, there was the volunteer Nazanin. It was through me that the 
educational advisor in her early sixties heard about the festival and became 
engaged as a volunteer. Living in Germany since the 1960s, she is mar-
ried to a German lawyer, has only very few Iranian contacts, and did not 
travel to Iran since several decades. Nazanin mainly focused on creating 
capital among Germans. The daughter of a professor attributed much 
importance to her social standing. She lived in an upper-class 
 neighborhood, cared to be always well-dressed, and discursively sought 
distinction from Iranians who had less Germany-specific resources as her, 
as, for example, her beautician. Therefore, she cultivated an interest in 
Western high culture, and her close friend, Anna, worked at Hochsieben. 
She cooperated in the festival because, just like Yara and Ziba, she shared 
Behruz’ politics of making the exotic familiar in German contexts. 
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However, she withdrew her participation abruptly after we had the fol-
lowing conversation on the telephone:
Nazanin “Last time I asked Behruz for the pink flyers, I wanted to distrib-
ute them. I spent the whole Saturday handing them out the city center 
and at the very end an elderly lady called me back, [and told me that] no 
date was indicated on it. This really frustrated me. I spent so much time 
distributing the flyers. I don’t understand why he gave them to me.” 
Sonja “That’s true. I also noticed that he is quite chaotic. That’s a pity. He 
is still very inexperienced.”
Nazanin “Yes, but then you have to be behind such a project. I had a call 
with Anna, again. She said that people [at Hochsieben] already laugh 
about Behruz. First, he wanted to reserve several concert halls, and then 
always less. Why did he start off so ambitious? Now we still have a hall 
fitting 800 people.”
Sonja “Oh, 800? That’s a lot!” (Field notes, April 2013)
Thus, Nazanin’s evaluation of Behruz and his festival shifted when she 
perceived a lack of professionalism and saw it confirmed by the judgment 
of German cultural organizers. As we saw in Chap. 5, social fields may 
physically overlap and it is for this reason that Nazanin withdrew as a 
volunteer. Insecure about her inclusion in German social fields, she began 
to fear that instead of sustaining her revalorization of Iran-specific 
resources, the association with an unsuccessful project would renew bar-
riers to her capital creation due to her cultural and racial Othering.
In sum, these five Iranians with whom Behruz interacted had different 
professional and private trajectories, disposed of different resources, and 
were involved in different social fields. Consequently, they followed dif-
ferent strategies of capital creation in the local Iranian social field, which 
were motivated by politics of value that varied between rejection (Danial), 
contestation of (Ziba), and committed engagement (Yara) with the sys-
tem of value by which it is shaped.
Consequently, for each of them, different resources Behruz disposed 
of, or lacked, became decisive in the way they interacted with him. 
Interestingly, contrary to Behruz’ expectations neither—except for Yara—
took his collaboration with the Iranian government or his Arab identifi-
cations as a reason to refuse a collaboration. This may be due to Behruz’ 
successful impression management ahead of the festival. Certainly, 
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numerous people, like Milad, Hushang, and Babak did not come to the 
festival in the first place because they had decoded Behruz’ political ori-
entation before, as the singer Taghi is known for collaborating with the 
government.
These Iranian stakeholders based their decision to collaborate with 
him on the compatibility of his strategies of capital accumulation with 
their own engagements. Their interactions with Behruz highlight the way 
diversity among Hamburg’s Iranians evolves: people are engaged in mul-
tiple, overlapping social fields shaped by competing systems of value. 
Through their interactions, they constantly confirm, modify, and contest 
the predominant system of value in the local Iranian social field; these 
individual and collective politics of value influence, and are influenced 
by, their potential for action within a multitude of other local and trans-
national social fields in which they individually are also engaged.
Hence, the ways in which they responded to Behruz’ approach reveals 
their strategies of capital creation within and across these social fields and 
hints to their respective politics of value. The previous chapters already 
showed that, for people to work together in one way or another, it is the 
compatibility and not necessarily the closeness of their strategies of capi-
tal creation that is important. Relying on the same strategies of capital 
creation may rather encourage competition. However, the discussion of 
this chapter underlines that the parameters for successful collaboration 
shift with different temporalities: the longer the collaboration, the more 
important it may be for agents to follow, through their strategies of capi-
tal creation, similar or at least complementary politics of value.
 The Color Festival: Success or Failure?
As Pnina Werbner (1999) reminds, there is no universally valid evalua-
tion of failure and success. It is always relative to and evolves with the 
specific social conditions in which interactions take place. Was the festi-
val a success from Behruz’ point of view?
Two years after the festival, in 2015, the organizer commented on a 
social media website: “These were eight months of very practice oriented 
occupational training – only that they cost me 25.000€” (https://www.
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facebook.com/TheFUNHamburg/posts/000, assessed 14/03/2015). As a 
matter of fact, economic success seems to have been a crucial element in 
Behruz’ retrospective evaluation. Indeed, the crowdfunding campaign, 
which mainly targeted Germans, did not even raise a third of the €30,000 
budget. Behruz decided that he would pursue the project anyways, hop-
ing, as he said, to at least break even through ticket sales, his own and his 
family’s savings—and the secret Iranian government’s contribution. 
However, this goal could not be reached: the Color festival took place in 
a hall fitting 800 people. However, on the three evenings altogether, only 
about 600 tickets were sold. It was Taghi’s concert that reached the great-
est audience, and it was also the only concert where the public was domi-
nantly Iranian.
Given the barriers of capital creation that prevail in the German public 
sphere in relation to Iran-specific resources, Behruz’ lack of resources in 
the social field of cultural organizers and his half-hearted engagement in 
Iranian social fields, the number of festival-goers was actually not that 
small. A few months later, the FusIran festival, although being a collabo-
ration between Golestan association and one of the most important cul-
tural organizers in Hamburg, did not gather a greater public than the 
newcomer Behruz. The financial failure Behruz deplores was rather 
related to the choice of a too big and too expensive festival venue.
Behruz put the main blame for the festival’s failure on Iranians, argu-
ing that they did not support him. Revealingly, in an interview after the 
festival he said:
I don’t really see myself as an Iranian. I know this saying: “You need to keep 
Arabs satisfied and Iranians hungry” [Arabhâ bâyad sir negahdâshteh bâshi, 
irânihâ bâyad goshneh negahdâshteh bâshi]. Iranians are always unhappy. 
Even if you give them everything, they want more. (Field notes, July 2015)
Thus, the experience of barriers to capital creation in German social fields 
had stirred in Behruz the hope to compensate the lack with the support 
of capital generated in the local Iranian social field. This was further 
encouraged by the fact that, in conformation to the prevalence of bound-
aries based on assumed cultural differences and notwithstanding the mul-
ticultural dimension of the event promoted among Germans, the staff at 
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Hochsieben and some of the German visitors mainly perceived it as an 
event for Iranians. His politics of value had thus failed to be efficient 
enough in making the exotic familiar. Yet, this was a shortcoming about 
which Behruz did not speak.
Its consequence was that Behruz’ expectations toward Iranians grew, 
while his strategies of capital creation remained the same. They were 
deceived, in great part, because his ambiguity about cooperation with 
Iranians caused him to be loath to put forward Iran-specific resources. As 
we see in the quote, in response, Behruz resolved to enforce boundaries 
based on ethnic identifications by devaluating Iranians and putting for-
ward his Arab identifications. Correspondingly, the board of the festival’s 
second edition in 2014 comprised only Germans and people of Arab 
origin and the program featured, besides Iranian, also Arab and European 
artists. However, Behruz failed again to raise enough funds and aban-
doned the project as a whole.
Just as we observed in Chap. 4, where Afshin had similarly ambitious 
politics of value in German social fields, in order to redefine the value of 
Iran-specific resources, important Germany-specific resources, time, and 
collective action are needed. Behruz, however, lacked Germany-specific 
resources, such as financial assets, a professional network, and experience, 
relevant to convey professionalism and solvability, and his fear of interde-
pendency impeded on the emergence of durable collective action with 
Iranians. He thus found himself at the intersection of different systems of 
value creating barriers to his capital creation.
This chapter aimed at drawing the preceding findings together, in 
examining Behruz’ strategies of capital creation in the social fields of the 
German public sphere, the local social field of cultural organizers and the 
local Iranian social field in organizing an Iranian cultural festival. In 
doing so, I traced his underlying politics of value and explained how dif-
ferent Iranian stakeholders engaged with him through boundary-making, 
in order to show why he perceived the festival to have been a profes-
sional failure.
The analysis of the interactions around the Color festival brought 
up—and thus stressed the relevance of—numerous factors which I 
showed play a role in social boundary-making among people of Iranian 
origin living in Hamburg in previous chapters: the agents’ fluctuating 
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and flexible ethnic and national identifications, their experience of kin-
ship, the relevance of Germany- and Iran-specific resources in conveying 
crucial values in sometimes overlapping local and transnational social 
fields marked by historically rooted systems of value.
The discussion of this chapter showed clearly that there is no single 
system of value along which people of Iranian origin try to generate capi-
tal. Instead, their interactions take place at the intersection of multidi-
mensional, convoluted, overlapping, dynamic, and interdependent social 
fields shaped by systems of value that are at times contradictory, intersect-
ing, or complementary.
Behruz evaluated which people he asked for support on the basis of the 
compatibility of their strategies of capital creation with his—and so did 
the stakeholders when deciding whether to collaborate with him or not. 
Thus, social boundaries can not only represent imposed barriers to capital 
creation. People also actively use them to improve their capital creation: 
one can create or reinforce social boundaries if they generate capital, or 
try to deconstruct them, through impression management, if they impede 
on the valorization of resources.
Internal diversity, I suggest, is determined by the effect of a social rela-
tionship on the involved agents’ respective strategies of capital creation 
and, more importantly, its coherence with their politics of value in the 
social field in which they meet, as well as through its possible impact on 
their agency in other social fields. Thus, although, for instance, non- 
Islamiosity is an important value for many people involved in the local 
Iranian social field, its relevance is never fixed but dependent on the 
agents’ own politics of value and deriving strategies of capital creation in 
different social fields.
These arguments end the ethnographic component of this work. To 
close the circle, all that remains for me is to posit a few concluding remarks.
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Conclusion
“Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, 
that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else 
who ever lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt 1958, 8). For Hannah Arendt, 
plurality means both equality and diversity. Expressed in acts of differen-
tiation, plurality forms the condition of political life. Differentiation nec-
essarily requires initiative, thus plurality gives rise to creativity; it carries 
in it the seed of novelty (Arendt 1958, 175ff.). Yet, it is impossible to 
determine an exact and enduring definition of a single person, as his 
being is always in flux. Due to this extrinsic intangibility, all human rela-
tions are notoriously uncertain. Acts of differentiation always happen in 
social contexts and “it is because of this already existing web of human 
relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that 
action almost never achieves its purpose; but it is also because of this 
medium, in which action alone is real, that it ‘produces’ stories with or 
without intention” (idem 1958, 184). Through these stories, action 
becomes tangible, while remaining the result of human interactions 
whose agents, beginnings, and ends are not unequivocally identifiable.
This book essentially consists of incomplete ethnographic stories that 
explore the relationship between equality and diversity within webs of 
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human relations, that is, social fields. Its aim is to explain the relation 
between differentiation among Hamburg-based people identifying 
(among other things) as Iranians and their past and ongoing historically 
situated experience of local and global relations of inequality. My main 
interest thereby lies in merchants’ and artists’ kinship and professional 
relations.
Bringing together research on internal differentiation and transnational 
social fields, I used Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of capital creation within 
Michèle Lamont’s boundary approach to focus on processes of evaluation. 
The focus on evaluation allowed me to connect this approach to David 
Graeber’s anthropological theory of value, making it possible for me to 
identify migrants’ motivation in their strategies of capital creation and 
point out the potential of collective and individual action within and at 
the intersection of different social fields. The aim of this approach was to 
grasp the way migrants engage with and in power relations without using 
a vocabulary that reads migrants’ agency solely through the analytical lens 
of racism, Islamophobia, and exclusion. Instead, I highlighted empirically 
how these dynamics emerge in historical interrelation with social pro-
cesses in the global south, thus revealing migrants’ involvement in them, 
as well as their motivations and potential for acting upon them—or not. 
Perceiving internal diversity as a part of contemporary Western countries 
of immigration is crucial to understanding shifting internationally inter-
connected and historically rooted systems of value, grasping societal 
dynamics, and enhancing social cohesion.
 Internal Diversity
I approached the study of internal diversity through processes of differen-
tiation. I argued that boundary-making in internal relations needs to be 
understood with respect to the particularities of the social fields in which 
it takes place.
I showed that social fields mainly constituted by local Iranians are 
shaped—to different extents—by relatively high levels of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is high not only because of the modification of social ties 
through migration, but also because of Iranians’ difficulties to transfer 
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resources acquired in Iran to the German context, or to get recognition 
for their Germany-specific resources as capital. It also implies a relatively 
high level of interdependence (Faist 1998; Portes 1998; Bauder 2005; 
Zontini 2009). Uncertainty may increase when the social field of internal 
relations among migrants overlaps with other fields that are equally 
marked by uncertainty, as it is the case with professional fields that lack 
formalized mechanisms of evaluation (Apitzsch 2010), such as the inter-
national trade with Iranian carpets and the film business. I will come 
back to this observation below. My point here is that interdependence 
raises the stakes of boundary-making.
The ethnographic chapters showed that social boundaries between 
Iranians are never fixed, but subject to negotiation. Dimensions of com-
monality and difference are overlapping, sustaining and competing with 
each other in constant processes of negotiation. They are constructed and 
deconstructed through discursive or behavioral forms of inclusion and 
exclusion (Lamont 1992; Lamont and Molnár 2002). For instance, in 
telling me that the restaurateur Abtin was a Flüchtling (refugee), Akbar 
sought to disguise the fact that he himself had settled in Germany only 
after he had been granted asylum and stress his identification as a “tradi-
tional Iranian carpet merchant”. Behavioral boundary-making was 
reflected, for example, in the collective dancing of Golestanis on the stage 
of the FusIran festival, which underlined the identification with the asso-
ciation Golestan, while indirectly excluding those who remained in the 
public. We can thus understand the construction and deconstruction of 
social boundaries as a mutual—situational—evaluation of the interacting 
agents’ social, cultural, and economic resources (Moghaddari 2016).
There are numerous markers people use in boundary-making, and the 
ethnographic material presented in this study certainly could not reflect 
all of them. Certain markers of difference whose importance derives from 
their recurrence in diverse social contexts may be highlighted at this 
point: whether it is the personal experience of doing kinship and the 
resources inherited from previous generations, or being identified by oth-
ers as a member of a specific family, I argued that kinship ties influence 
the way Iranians relate to one another. Gender and norms of gendered 
behavior also constitute reasons for boundary-making—not only in 
 kinship relations. In the same vein, the construction of generational 
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boundaries is recurrent, while the event of the Islamic revolution in 1979, 
in relation to personal religious adherences and political allegiances, is a 
pivot point in internal relations (Gholami 2014; Khosravi 2018). Class, 
ethnic, regional, and local identifications relative to Germany and Iran 
are also central to boundary-making, often in conflation with other forms 
of collective identifications that resonate with diverging motivations and 
conditions of immigration, represented in notions such as intellectuals, 
bazaris, honaris, or else the figure of the Flüchtling. Thus, markers used in 
Hamburg largely correspond to those extant research identified in other 
locations of Iranian immigration (Bozorgmehr et al. 1993; Bozorgmehr 
1997; Sanadjian 2000; McAuliffe 2008). At the difference to newer des-
tinations, however, long-established migrants in Hamburg are mostly 
merchants who tend to be more religious and/or friendly toward the cur-
rent Iranian government than many post-1979 migrants. In this regard, 
dynamics of differentiation among Iranians in Hamburg are closer to 
those in other older locations of immigration, such as Dubai (Moghadam 
2013, 2015; Adelkhah 2016).
In the literature on Iranian migration, this research contributes to rare 
studies who take truly transnational perspectives, in showing how 
Iranians’ capital creation in transnational social fields influences their 
local inclusion (Ghorashi and Tavakoli 2006; Azadarmaki and Bahar 
2007; Khosravi 2007; Ghorashi and Boersma 2009; Sreberny- 
Mohammadi 2013). Simultaneously, the case study fills the gap in 
(English-language) research about Iranian immigration in the earliest and 
today still one of the most important destinations of Iranian migration. 
Hamburg, in particular, a location that draws on a long history of eco-
nomic and political ties to Iran, is a highly pertinent setting for further 
research on the role of migrants in Iran under international sanctions.
Within the great fluidity of social boundaries and the innumerous 
markers used, nearly all processes of social differentiation among Iranians 
in Hamburg are infused with definitions of Iranianness and Germanness. 
The relevance of these markers corresponds with research highlighting 
the importance of ethnic boundaries of Germany (Ehrkamp 2006; Bail 
2008; Gruner 2010; Çelik 2017; Yilmaz Sener 2018). The identification 
or categorization as Iranian or German thus passes through the 
 assessment of the volume and amount of resources judged as being 
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Germany- and Iran-specific. Such resources are, for example, language 
skills and accent, knowledge of codes of politeness, clothing styles, gen-
der norms, relevant social ties, and so on. The why and how of this 
observation requires a look at the values these resources convey among 
Iranians and in other local and transnational social fields—a discussion 
to which I turn below.
While plurality is the condition of human action, inequalities arise 
from the situational valorization of resources in processes of differentia-
tion (Bourdieu 1979). The study showed that the construction and 
deconstruction of a social boundary can both enhance and hinder capital 
creation. Individual agents may thus try to circumvent barriers to their 
generation of capital by constructing or deconstructing social boundar-
ies, putting forward certain resources, such as ethnic and national identi-
fications, and dissimulating others through impression management 
(Goffman 1963). The approach I developed in this book thus showed 
that boundary-making may be considered as a tool in the generation of 
capital, not only among Iranians, but also in other social fields.
 Creating Capital Across Social Fields
Building on the analysis of internal differentiation, I showed that Iranians 
living in Hamburg try to create capital in not only one, but in several 
multidimensional social fields, some of which, at least, are transnational. 
For instance, besides being involved in the local Iranian social field, 
Hushang also strives to create capital in the German and the transna-
tional Iranian social field of film professionals. Depending on their per-
sonal trajectories and on the social fields in which they are engaged, 
Iranians follow highly diverse strategies of capital creation.
As I traced collective strategies of capital creation through identitary 
narratives, I interrogated the motivation behind such a management of 
resources across social fields. Building on the anthropology of value 
(Graeber 2001, 2013), I showed that processes of evaluation reveal the 
values that are central in the respective social field: if the resources people 
put forward mediate value within a social field, they get acknowledged as 
capital. Thus, social fields are shaped by systems of value. Strategies of 
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capital creation arise when people try to enhance the efficiency of their 
resources within a given system. In doing so, they engage in what Graeber 
calls “politics of value”, that is, constructing meaning that both acknowl-
edges and resists existing systems of value. I will return to this below. It is 
politics of value that motivate people’s strategies of capital creation.
Following up on Louis Dumont (2013), values thereby stand in rela-
tion to one another, some may be mutually exclusive, while others may 
be conditioned by key values. Expanding on Aihwa Ong (1999), who 
theorizes barriers to capital creation, I argued that limits arise when a 
person’s resources fail to convey certain values within a social field. The 
barrier becomes more acute the more central these values are within the 
respective system.
Thus, going beyond extant research on transnational social fields 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Erel 2010; Nowicka 2013), I identified 
two reasons why the creation of capital in internal relations interacts with 
the agents’ individual positioning within and between social fields. First, 
social fields may physically overlap. For instance, if Hushang’s German 
colleagues see him on a film festival in Hamburg with Milad, his associa-
tion with someone whose resources fail to convey the key value of famil-
iarity is received in the German social field of film professionals. At the 
same time, an Iranian colleague engaged in the Iranian transnational field 
of film professionals might perceive this collective public appearance as 
mediating the values of professionalism and cooperation. Thus, depend-
ing on Hushang’s politics of value in different social fields and on their 
importance for his strategies of capital creation, he may seek closeness 
with Milad or try to construct boundaries in their relationship.
Second, systems of value prevailing in different social fields may inter-
sect. In this study, the mutual influence of systems of value was particu-
larly visible in the evaluation of Germany (or Western)-specific and 
Iran-specific resources. Let me illustrate this point with two examples. 
First, in Hamburg of the 1950s, local newspapers called people who, 
through their physical appearance, that is, race, or national origin, were 
marked as Middle Easterners “carpet-crooks”—they were perceived as 
unfamiliar. In order to create capital in the German carpet market, they 
needed resources that mediate the value of familiarity with German cul-
tural contexts. Young sons of Iranian bazaris who came to Hamburg 
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 during these years liked to go to ball houses, and some of them had learnt 
European ballroom dances back in Iran. This was because merchant fami-
lies were engaged in social fields in Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, in which familiarity with Western cultural contexts was an 
important value. This was historically related to the fact that it was 
Western powers that had put the monarch on the throne in 1941 and 
helped him counter a democratic coup in 1953. His promoting values 
that correspond to dominant systems of value in the West signaled an 
effort to maintain their political support, thus perpetuating unequal 
global power relations.
Another example relates to the present-day German social sphere. I 
showed that in a local TV broadcast from 2013, young second- generation 
Iranians who put forward important Germany-specific resources were 
asked about their opinions on the political regime in Iran, and in particu-
lar on then-president Ahmadinejad. The journalist thus stressed the value 
of democracy, human rights, and equality—in its Western-centric under-
standing. Following the same logic, both in the systems of value prevail-
ing among members of the association Golestan and in the transnational 
social field Iranian of honaris (constituted by artists and people close to 
the art scene), Iran-specific resources that convey opposition to the 
Iranian government and secularism—a value that may be termed, follow-
ing Reza Gholami (2014), non-Islamiosity—tend to be acknowledged as 
capital. Resources that suggest regime-loyalty and adherence to the 
Islamic faith, instead, constitute a barrier to Iranians’ capital creation in 
all three social fields as they suggest a lack of these values. Both examples 
show that systems of value that prevail in different social fields intersect, 
because historical interactions between unequally powerful agents in 
colonial and postcolonial contexts encouraged the integration of famil-
iarity with the West, together with democracy, human rights, equality, 
and exoticism (in the perception of the ethnic and racial Other) as key 
values in many social fields across the world. In this point, this study joins 
postcolonial, feminist, and queer theory in highlighting the historical (re)
production of global structures of inequality, including the involvement 
of migrants in it (Said 1978; Wolf 1982; Hooks 1986; Yuval-Davis 2007; 
Monsutti 2018).
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The pervasiveness of these originally Western values, in turn, accounts 
for the importance of the barrier to capital creation their lack inspires (see 
also Lamont 1992). This study thus confirms existing research on immi-
gration to Europe indicating that, in German, but—I add—also in 
many Iranian social fields, a lack of resources considered as Germany- or 
Western-specific can constitute a barrier to the generation of capital 
(Cederberg 2012; Weiss 2001). Consequently, because social fields may 
overlap or systems of value may intersect, people consider the evaluation 
of their Iran- and Germany-specific resources and its effect on their strat-
egies of capital creation in all social fields that they find relevant.
In sum, there is not a single system of value to which all Iranians 
adhere. Instead, depending on the historical and social characteristics of 
a specific social encounter and the personal and professional trajectories 
of the people interacting, various systems of value intersect and influence 
the way social boundaries are created. As boundary-making in internal 
relations serves to optimize Iranians’ chances to generate capital, their 
social differentiation must be understood as an expression of competitive 
individual and collective politics of value, engaging with various systems 
of value that shape local and transnational social fields.
 Politics of Value and Potential for Action
Reminding Arendt’s thoughts, each act of differentiation is an initiative 
to act on the world and one’s place in it. Yet, the fact that it is embedded 
in a web of relations thwarts the outcome—to varying degrees. Building 
on Graeber’s anthropological theory of value allowed me to trace migrants’ 
politics of value. Their potential for action, in turn, represents the power 
an agent has to influence the meaning of his resources in a social field.
To illustrate what I conceive of as politics of value, let us look at 
Iranians’ different engagements with the system of value in a single social 
field: the German public sphere. As a reminder, familiarity with German 
cultural contexts through assimilation is a key value, alongside democ-
racy, human right, equality, and exoticism. However, as multiple national 
or cultural identifications tend to be conceived as mutually exclusive 
(Sökefeld 2004; Ehrkamp 2006), it is quite impossible for an agent’s 
 S. Moghaddari
235
resources to convey familiarity, as any resource identified as Iranian is 
accompanied by the misrecognition of Germany-specific resources. Thus, 
in this study, a very common approach among my interlocutors, such as 
Babak, the artist, was to put forward resources, such as accent-free 
German and knowledge of Iranian poetry, that convey familiarity (within 
the described limitations) and exoticism, while avoiding those resources, 
such as regime-loyalty, that mediate a lack of democracy. They often do 
so by staging Iranianness, and it may be through subliminal acts of over-
stretching the performance that they express critique of this system of 
value. A newer and upcoming approach, mostly observed among long- 
established migrants, such as Omid the merchant, Behruz the cultural 
organizer, and Yara the educator, aimed at redefining the meaning of 
Iran-specific resources by promoting the exotic as familiar. Rarer are those 
people like Afshin, who follow the political goal to denationalize the 
meaning of their Iran-specific resources and promote the value of diver-
sity as familiarity, stressing local belongings beyond any ethnic and 
national identification. Thus, compared to working-class Turks, who 
tend to reject the requirement of assimilation, this research confirms that 
middle-class Iranian professionals living in Germany tend to comply 
with this system of value even though they struggle with it (Sanadjian 
1995; Ehrkamp 2006; Çelik 2015; Sadeghi 2018a, b). Indeed, the choice 
of the politics of value depends on migrants’ unequal potential to act on 
existing systems of value.
Which are the factors that enhance the potential of action of people’s 
politics of value? First, the volume and distribution of their resources as 
well as professional and personal trajectories will play an important role 
in the politics of value agents chose. The more Germany-specific resources 
one has, the higher is the potential for action in shaping the value of Iran- 
specific resources, as we saw in the conflict between Afshin and Babak. 
Second, it is much more efficient to pursue politics of value as a group 
rather than individually. In collaborations, however, we saw the impor-
tance of temporalities: while for short-term collaboration, such as the 
Color festival, it was enough for agents’ strategies of capital creation to be 
compatible, in long-term alliances, such as among carpet merchants, in 
relevant social fields politics of value have to coincide or at least be 
compatible.
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The ways systems of value connect across social fields in relation to the 
migrants’ potential to action are central to the negotiation of internal 
diversity. The two case studies of Iranian carpet merchants and members 
of association Golestan showcase great variation in this regard: Hamburg’s 
Iranian carpet merchants largely recreated the system of value that his-
torically prevails in the transnational social field of Iranian carpet mer-
chants, while engaging in the German carpet market and in the field of 
Iranian foreign trade. In the 1950s, this approach caused barriers to capi-
tal creation in the German carpet market. By the 2010s, through a variety 
of shifts in the systems of value, merchants’ collective politics of value 
succeeded in creating capital by mediating family cohesion, historical 
local rootedness, and professionalism in all three contexts, although their 
respective systems of value remained largely distinct. Their successful 
politics of value fostered strong internal cohesion but also high barriers to 
the inclusion of newcoming merchants.
In the second case, covering a much shorter time period, the system of 
value created within the association Golestan was new and thus less 
coherent, compared to the one prevailing among transnational Iranian 
merchants. It developed as an engagement to the systems of value that 
shape the social field of the German public sphere and the transnational 
social field related to the honari imaginary, which both intersect in giving 
key value to familiarity with German or Western cultural contexts and 
certain forms of  exoticism. While the founder-members wanted to 
oppose these hegemonic systems by creating a counterpublic (Nicholls 
and Uitermark 2016), a growing number of members worked toward 
their internal system of value intersecting with those prevalent in the two 
other fields.
In a way, Iranian social fields are often used as a toolbox for the crafting 
of Iranian identifications that serve in politics of value among Germans. 
However, internal relations also offer people, like Yara, the occasion to 
challenge established collective (class-related) identifications and gain 
upward social mobility. For others, such as Solmaz, refusing an Iranian 
identification was a way to withdraw from Iranian social fields and con-
test their prevalent systems of value. Others again, like Afshin, Danial, 
and Behruz, displayed Iran-specific cultural resources among Germans, 
although they had disengaged from local and transnational Iranian social 
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fields, often because they experienced the obligations attached to these 
relations as barriers to the creation of capital. The Iranian identifications 
my interlocutors displayed among Germans were a reinterpretation of 
collective identifications and imaginaries they nourished in  local and 
transnational Iranian social fields. More research would be necessary to 
trace how these transnational renegotiations lead to respective readjust-
ments of systems of value in Iran.
In tracing migrants’ unequal potential for action within individual or 
collective politics of value, I acknowledge both their scope of action as 
well as its limits. In doing so, this research goes beyond studies of trans-
national migrants’ strategies of capital creation that tend to either stress 
their possibility to challenge existing structures (Levitt and Glick Schiller 
2004; Erel 2010; Nowicka 2013) or underline their subjugation to them 
(Ong 1992, 1996; Weiss 2005). Thus, people identifying as Iranians in 
Hamburg may confirm systems of value dominating in a specific social 
field and simultaneously contest them elsewhere (Martuccelli 2006). Or 
they may defy the same boundaries they contribute(d) to create in differ-
ent social or historical contexts. Based on these reflections, we can under-
stand internal boundary-making as a reflection of migrants’ politics of 
value. In more general terms, these findings suggest that research on 
transnational strategies of capital creation should consider in further detail 
the complex ways in which valuations of different forms of capital may 
interact across diverse social fields in which agents may be engaged.
 Iranian-Germans?
The study of diversity among Hamburg’s Iranians showed that the system 
of value prevailing in the German public sphere stands in stark contrast 
with the lived reality of a growing part of the German population, which 
actively nourishes various cultural identifications. In the face of the large 
number of newcomers following the summer of 2015 and the ongoing 
crisis of the European border regime, it becomes even more important to 
understand the ways migrants partake in shaping changing systems of 
value in the German society (Vertovec 2015; Borneman and Ghassem- 
Fachandi 2017; Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017; Nowicka et al. 2017).
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The historical perspective on Iranian carpet merchants’ collective poli-
tics of value showed that, despite the relative limitation of their potential 
for action, migrants’ everyday collective action over long-time spans may 
influence the meaning of their resources and modify systems of value. 
Today, still, Hamburg-based people who call themselves “Iranians” tend 
to be referred to as “German-Iranians” (Deutsch-Iraner) or “Germans 
with migration background” in the press, stressing the Iranian as the 
more significant, that is, the determining, part of their identity. Yet, in 
the context of the refugee crisis, new social movements collectively try to 
reshape, similar to Afshin, Behruz, and Yara, the value of diversity or 
exoticism as connected to familiarity. Iranian public figures play an 
important role in this context (Moghaddari 2018). The historical per-
spective opens our view to the possibility that, one day in the far future, 
Iranians might call themselves “Iranian-Germans” (iranische Deutsche), as 
this book title suggests, or “Germans”, or develop identifications beyond 
national categories. In order to grasp the changes which German and 
European societies undergo, a diachronic perspective is useful to further 
investigate relations among migrants of the same but also of different 
national and ethnic origins.
It is the role of research in social science to highlight contradictions 
and discrepancies in social life. In particular anthropology, here, has the 
capacity and probably also the vocation, to testify about the diversity that 
burgeons in contemporary—in particular European—societies. In this 
way, anthropology may contribute to raising a greater awareness about 
the value of plurality.
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